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Calimeris, Lauren Marie (Ph.D., Economics) 
Understanding Teachers: Sorting, Productivity, and Attrition in the Public School System 
Thesis directed by Professor Jeffrey Zax 
     
  This dissertation is composed of three studies on public school teachers using data from the Schools 
and Staffing Survey and the Teacher Follow-Up Survey.   
  The first chapter combines restricted-use data from the 2007-2008 SASS and a disaggregated 
measure of teacher quality based on undergraduate institutional quality to determine where high quality 
teachers choose to teach. Higher quality teachers are more likely to teach at charter schools versus public 
schools than are lower quality teachers.  Among the youngest cohort of teachers, those who graduated from 
the Most Competitive colleges are 11 percentage points more likely to choose a charter school than their 
lower quality counterparts. These findings suggest that traditional public schools may be at a growing 
disadvantage in attracting teachers who graduate from the best universities. 
The second chapter investigates how teacher job satisfaction affects productivity as measured by the 
high school graduation rate and college enrollment rate.  It uses an instrumental variables (IV) approach to 
purge the model of the endogeneity of satisfaction.  The findings suggest teacher job satisfaction has a long-
lasting effect on student outcomes.  In particular, a one standard deviation increase in teacher job satisfaction 
increases the college enrollment rate by roughly 2.3-2.4 percentage points.  
The third chapter examines attrition and retention rates among teachers in charter and traditional 
public schools.  It finds that among new teachers, teaching at a charter increases the odds of leaving teaching 
by a factor of 2.13.  Among new teachers who voluntarily leave or move, teaching at a charter increases the 
probability of leaving by a factor of 3.04.  Charter status does not affect attrition among all teachers.  The 
results also indicate that the average marginal effect of graduating from a top ranked college reduces the 
probability of moving schools among all teachers, though college competitiveness does not marginally affect 
the mobility decisions of new teachers.  
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CHAPTER 1 
CHOOSING WHERE TO TEACH: THE EFFECT OF TEACHER QUALITY ON THE 
CHARTER VERSUS PUBLIC SCHOOL DECISION 
1.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Since their inception in 1992, charter schools have grown to operate over 5,000 schools in 39 states 
and the District of Columbia (Center for Education Reform 2010).  Charters are a free alternative choice for 
parents.  They are publicly funded and have more autonomy and greater accountability than traditional public 
schools (henceforth, public or traditional schools). Charters may have different academic focuses or may 
target different student populations.   
Opponents to the charter school movement believe that charters may drain resources from 
traditional schools (Dillon 2010).  Teachers are a key input into the education production function (see for 
example, Aaronson et al. 2002, Ferguson 1991, Ferguson and Ladd 1996, Goldhaber 2002, Goldhaber et al. 
1999, Hanushek et al. 1999, Hanushek and Rivkin 2003, Hanushek 1992, Hanushek 1971, Rivkin et al. 2005, 
Rockoff 2004), with teacher quality associated with 7% of the variance in student achievement gains (Rivkin 
et al. 2005).  One way to address if charters drain resources is to investigate where quality teachers are more 
abundant, at charter or public schools? Also, teachers may have faced different choice sets depending upon 
when they graduated from college, before or after the introduction of charter schools in the early- to mid-
1990s.  Depending upon when a teacher graduated from college, is there a difference in the probability of 
teaching at a charter versus a public school for different quality teachers? 
     This chapter’s main contribution is the investigation of sorting decisions among different quality 
teachers and different cohorts of teachers using data from the 2007-2008 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS). 
This paper also makes two secondary methodological contributions.  It demonstrates that when proxying for 
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teacher quality using the teacher's undergraduate college's competitiveness, the competitiveness should be 
measured at the time of enrollment as college competitiveness is not constant over time.  In addition, teacher 
quality should be measured as precisely as possible because aggregate quality classifications obscure 
distinctions in the choices made by teachers of different underlying quality. 
     This chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 gives the background of teacher quality proxy, and 
section 1.3 describes college competitiveness.  Section 1.4 discusses teacher quality. Section 1.5 illustrates 
perceived and real differences in charter and public schools.  Section 1.6 details the estimation strategy.  
Section 1.7 discusses the study findings.  Finally, section 1.8 concludes.  
 
1.2 TEACHER QUALITY BACKGROUND 
 
     Measuring teacher quality is extremely difficult.  Most characteristics of effective teachers such as 
passion, enthusiasm, work ethic, and people skills, are not easily measurable. Even so, studies have tried to 
find quantitative and observable ways of measuring quality. Licensure, testing, certification, and advanced 
degrees are considered observable measures of quality but are not consistently associated with improvements 
in student outcomes or teacher quality (Angrist and Guryan 2008, Angrist and Guryan 2004, Berliner 2005).   
    On the other hand, studies have found that a teacher's innate ability and intelligence are associated with 
positive gains in student outcomes. They have established measures of intelligence, including the teacher's 
SAT/ACT scores or college competitiveness as good indicators of effectiveness (Angrist and Guryan 2004, 
Coleman et al. 1966, Ehrenberg and Brewer 1994).  The competitiveness of a teacher's college is a common 
proxy for measuring teacher quality (Bacolod 2007a, Ballou 1996, Ballou and Podgursky 1997,  Ballou and 
Podgursky 1995, Baker and Dickerson 2006,  Boyd et al. 2010, Boyd et al. 2003, Carruthers 2009, Clotfelter et 
al. 2006, Ehrenberg and Brewer 1994, Figlio 1997, Podgursky et al. 2004)1.  The majority of these studies 
utilize the rankings from Barron's Profiles of American Colleges, which categorizes undergraduate institutions 
                                                          
1
 Some studies use the average SAT/ACT score of where the teacher attended college instead of the college's 
competitiveness rank.  See, for example, Figlio (2002), Hoxby and Leigh (2004), and Podgursky et al. (2004). 
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into one of 6 tiers: Most Competitive, Highly Competitive, Very Competitive, Competitive, Less Competitive, 
and Non Competitive. Other studies use similar rankings, such as the UCLA Higher Education Research 
Institute's ranking (Bacolod 1997a) or a measure by Lovejoy (Figlio 1997). 
 Most studies implementing college competitiveness as a proxy for teacher quality create aggregates of 
the original six Barron's categories, though the aggregations are not consistent.  For example, Baker and 
Dickerson (2006) and Lankford et al. (2002) consider teacher quality to be dichotomous, aggregating the top 
two tiers together and all other ranks together.  Carruthers (2009) also treats quality to be dichotomous, 
though she aggregates all teachers graduating from the top four tiers together.  Meanwhile, Clotfelter et al. 
(2006) create three aggregations: teachers from the top three tiers form the top group, those from competitive 
colleges are the middle group, and those from the lowest two tiers comprise the final group.  Ehrenberg and 
Brewer (1994), who provide the evidence that increases in teacher quality, as measured by the Barron's 
ranking, does significantly improve students' outcomes, do not aggregate quality ranks, nor does Hoxby 
(2002). 
     While aggregating quality categories is common, most studies do not explain why they do it. Some 
studies aggregate because their samples, especially among the higher ranks, are small (Podgursky et al. 2004), 
as individuals who attend more competitive colleges or who have higher standardized test scores are less 
likely to be teachers (Ballou 1996, Hanushek and Pace 1995).  Studies do not address if aggregations are 
masking effects of finer quality levels on their outcomes.   
 
1.3  COLLEGE RANKINGS 
 
     Most studies proxying for quality with college rankings use a single year, or a reference year, of 
rankings.  Most do not choose the reference year corresponding to when their teachers attended college.  Few 
even mention their reference year.  Of those that do, some studies choose a year that is the closest to when 
their median teachers attended (Hoxby 2002) or entered (Carruthers 2009) college. The reference year chosen 
could affect results if competitiveness changes over time, as teachers could be assigned an incorrect quality 
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measure, something most studies ignore.  If competitiveness changes, measurement error would lead to 
attenuation bias in study results. 
     This study uses the college rankings from Barron's Profiles of American Colleges, which ranks all 
four year institutions which offer bachelor's degrees if they are fully accredited or are recognized as candidates 
for accreditation.  Ranks are based on incoming freshmen characteristics, such as high school class rank, 
SAT/ACT scores, GPA, and acceptance rate, from the academic year prior to the publication year.  For 
example, the 1996 rankings are based on the characteristics of the entering freshmen of the 1995-1996 
academic year. The first year of publication was 1964, and the Profiles are revised biennially. 
     This study complied a dataset of rankings for the publication years 1970, 1984, 1986, 1992, 1994, 
1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002.  These years correspond to when the teachers of most interest in the SASS 
entered college.  Charter schools first opened in 1992, with the bulk of states passing charter laws between 
1993-19982.  Teachers graduating after 1992 will have had the charter option in their choice set at the onset of 
employment.  Accordingly, the ranking dataset consists of rankings since the inception of charters along with 
a subset of previous rankings.  Earlier rankings allow competitiveness to be tracked over time to determine if 
it changes.  More earlier years were not included as established teachers will have little incentive to leave their 
schools, while newer teachers have more perceived flexibility and are of the most interest to this study.    
     This study identified the Barron's ranked colleges IPEDS codes from the National Center of 
Education Statistics (NCES) for use in merging the rankings to the SASS data. It dropped specialized colleges 
(e.g., religious or arts schools), those that closed or merged, colleges with multiple campuses that are not 
uniquely identifiable in both datasets, and foreign colleges from the analysis. 
     Simple correlations of the rankings illustrate that they do shift. The correlation in ranks from 1970 
and 2002 is 0.64.  Among the highest two ranks (as of 2002), the correlation is 0.55. Thus, there is movement 
in the rankings for all levels of colleges, and it is greater among the best. 
                                                          
2 Two states passed laws in 1991 and 1992.  Six passed laws in 1993, three in 1994, eight in 1995, seven in 1996, four in 
1997, five in 1998, two in 1999, one in 2001, two in 2002, and one in 2003 (Center for Education Reform 2010). 
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     Table 1.1 illustrates how the ranks change from 1970 to 2002.  Most changes are increases3. Among 
all universities, nearly 37% have increased in ranking between 1970 and 2002, while 19% have decreased.  
Roughly 44% did not change over time. 
Table 1.1  Frequencies of Differences in University Ranks from 1970 to 2002
N % N % N % N % N % 
3 Categories Lower in 2002 2 0.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.9 2 2.2
2 Categories Lower in 2002 25 2.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 9 3.9 1 1.1
1 Category Lower in 2002 198 17.0 14 3.7 5 3.3 46 19.7 14 15.4
No Difference 512 44.0 99 26.4 39 25.3 99 42.3 39 42.9
1 Category Higher 337 29.0 188 50.1 66 42.9 66 28.2 35 38.5
2 Categories Higher in 2002 86 7.4 71 18.9 41 26.6 12 5.1 0 0.0
3 Categories Higher in 2002 3 0.3 3 0.8 3 2.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total 1,163 100 375 100 154 100 234 100 91 100
Very High or 
Most 
Competitive in 
1970All Universities
Highly, Very 
High, or Most 
Competitive in 
2002
Very High or 
Most 
Competitive in 
2002
Highly, Very 
High, or Most 
Competitive in 
1970
 
     Among universities ranked in the top three tiers in 2002, 70% have increased in rank since 1970 
while roughly four percent decreased. Among the top two ranks, 70% increased compared to three percent 
that decreased.  Increases are not surprising for schools achieving ranks in the top categories in 2002, but the 
number of tiers jumped indicates that at least 44 universities in the top two tiers in 2002 were not in this 
group in 1970.  These universities, and thus their earlier graduates, may be incorrectly classified both using a 
reference year and in aggregated groupings due to their large movements.     
     Columns 7 and 8 in Table 1.1 illustrate what happened to the top universities in 1970. Among the 
top three tiers, 33% of universities increased in rank while 24% decreased, and 42% remained the same. For 
the top two tiers, nearly 39% increased, and roughly 19% decreased. The findings suggest that some top 
ranked universities may have jumped aggregated groupings. 
     Table 1.1 demonstrates that college rankings are dynamic. Using a reference year may lead to 
erroneous inferences.  Furthermore, the number of tiers that colleges may change over time suggests that 
                                                          
3 One could argue that competitiveness changes over time are simply due to increases in the demand for higher 
education and do not actually reflect increases in university quality; however, the Barron's rankings are based on a 
stringent set of characteristics that remains stable over time.  Thus, school quality may be increasing as schools are able 
to accept a lower percentage of applicants with higher test scores, class ranks, and GPAs. 
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aggregating the quality measures will not solve the misclassification problem.  These findings support the idea 
of tracing college rank back to when the teacher entered college. 
 
1.4  TEACHER QUALITY 
 
     The SASS is administered every four years and is a stratified probability proportional to size sample 
of school teachers across the United States designed to be representative of the nation.  It is composed of a 
series of questionnaires, including school and teacher questionnaires.  The teacher survey contains 
information on teacher demographics (e.g., age, race, sex) and education, including the name of his 
undergraduate institution and its IPEDS code, his majors, degrees obtained, and his graduation years.   
     The IPEDS code matches the SASS teachers and the college rank dataset.  Teacher "matched 
ranking" is the Barron's ranking of the teacher's college published in the year of or the year subsequent to his 
enrollment.  For example, a teacher who entered college in 1983 or in 1984 received the 1984 rank, while one 
who entered college in 1985 or in 1986 received the 1986 ranking. The matched rankings represent the 
college-based teacher quality measure.  This paper excluded teachers who entered college in a year whose 
ranks were not included in the ranking dataset4.   
     In the 2007-2008 SASS, 18,1005 teachers match with their institution's ranking when the teacher 
entered college. Of these, 17,290 were full or part time regular teachers6. Only the 14,030 teachers who 
attended college in a state with charter laws as of 2007 are included in the primary analysis. Teachers prefer to 
teach close to where they grew up or to where they went to college (Boyd et al. 2003, 2005). As such, this 
paper assumes teachers who were educated in non-charter states do not perceive themselves to face the same 
                                                          
4 This study is therefore losing cohorts of teachers, not individual teachers.  Furthermore, the cohorts that are dropped 
from the analysis are generally older.  These cohorts likely will have already established tenure at their schools and are 
therefore of little interest to this study.  The few earlier cohorts included in the analysis illustrate this point. 
5 For confidentiality, all sample sizes are rounded to the nearest 10. 
6 This paper excluded long- and short-term substitutes and teacher aides from the analysis. 
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choice as teachers who were not.  It assumes that the cost of finding a charter job is different for these 
teachers than for those educated in charter states7. 
     To highlight the importance of the matched ranking measure, this study also uses a reference year 
teacher quality measure to illustrate differences in the two measures.  The 2002 ranks are the reference year 
ranking.  This year was chosen as it corresponds to the teachers who most recently attended college (e.g., 
teachers who graduated from college in 2006 entered in 2002, and those who graduated in 2007 entered in 
2003), allowing for the largest matched sample of teachers post charter introduction.   
     Table 1.2 presents the frequencies of college rankings in different subgroups of teachers, using both 
the matched ranking and the 2002 ranking.  It illustrates how the two methods of assigning ranks result in 
different distributions of college-based quality. The differences grow as the reference year is further from the 
true entrance year.  Table 1.2 also shows how the frequencies differ between public and charter teachers.   
     The 2002 ranks overstate the number of teachers from better colleges for both public and charter 
teachers.  This is expected, given the upward trend in ranks over time.  The discrepancies are even more 
pronounced as the teacher's actual college entrance year is further from the reference year. Among teachers 
who entered college prior to 1980, the matched ranking measure finds 0.8% of traditional teachers hail from 
Most Competitive colleges and 2.5% from Highly Competitive colleges. The 2002 measure classifies 2.5% of 
these same teachers from Most Competitive and 8.3% from Highly Competitive colleges. The matched 
ranking finds roughly 11% of teachers are from Very Competitive colleges compared to 18% using the 2002 
ranking.   
     For charter teachers entering college between 1980-1989, the matched ranking indicates that none are 
in the top two tiers, while the 2002 ranking indicates there are a few, though the small number rounds to 
zero.  For traditional teachers, the matched ranking classifies 3.6% in the top two, compared to 7.7% using 
the 2002 ranking. The discrepancies illustrate that volatility in competitiveness is translated to the teacher 
                                                          
7 All analyses have been carried out using all states, including charter and non-charter states, as well as using only 
teachers teaching in charter states. The general results hold for all analyses. 
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Table 1.2  Frequencies of College Competitiveness among Teachers in Matched Sample 
N % N % N % N % 
Non Competitive 0 0.0 40 3.3 0 0.0 30 2.5
Less Competitive 10 50.0 370 30.6 10 50.0 250 20.7
Competitive 10 50.0 640 52.9 10 50.0 590 48.8
Very Competitive 0 0.0 130 10.7 0 0.0 220 18.2
Highly Competitive 0 0.0 30 2.5 0 0.0 100 8.3
Most Competitive 0 0.0 10 0.8 0 0.0 30 2.5
Total 20 100 1,210 100 20 100 1,210 100
N % N % N % N % 
Non Competitive 10 16.7 250 11.3 0 0.0 110 5.0
Less Competitive 10 16.7 550 24.9 10 16.7 450 20.4
Competitive 30 50.0 1050 47.5 30 50.0 1070 48.4
Very Competitive 10 16.7 280 12.7 20 33.3 410 18.6
Highly Competitive 0 0.0 60 2.7 0 0.0 120 5.4
Most Competitive 0 0.0 20 0.9 0 0.0 50 2.3
Total 60 100 2,210 100 60 100 2,210 100
N % N % N % N % 
Non Competitive 30 7.69 640 8.7 20 5.1 400 5.4
Less Competitive 70 17.9 1320 17.9 70 17.9 1390 18.8
Competitive 160 41.0 3730 50.5 170 43.6 3690 49.9
Very Competitive 90 23.1 1220 16.5 90 23.1 1360 18.4
Highly Competitive 30 7.7 410 5.5 30 7.7 410 5.5
Most Competitive 10 2.6 80 1.1 20 5.1 140 1.9
Total 390 100 7,390 100 390 100 7,390 100
N % N % N % N % 
Non Competitive 10 5.9 170 6.6 10 5.9 140 5.4
Less Competitive 20 11.8 480 18.7 20 11.8 460 17.9
Competitive 80 47.1 1260 49.0 80 47.1 1320 51.4
Very Competitive 40 23.5 470 18.3 40 23.5 450 17.5
Highly Competitive 10 5.9 150 5.8 10 5.9 150 5.8
Most Competitive 10 5.9 40 1.6 10 5.9 40 1.6
Total 170 100 2,570 100 170 100 2,570 100
Teachers Entering College before 1980
Matched Ranking 2002 Ranking
Charter Traditional Charter Traditional
Teachers Entering College between 1980-1989
Matched Ranking 2002 Ranking
Charter Traditional Charter Traditional
Traditional Charter Traditional
Note: Teachers are regular full- or part-time teachers educated in charter states only.  Sample sizes rounded to 
nearest 10 for confidentiality purposes. Samples may not add up due to rounding. 
Teachers Entering College between 1990-1999
Matched Ranking 2002 Ranking
Charter Traditional Charter Traditional
Teachers Entering College between 2000-2002
Matched Ranking 2002 Ranking
Charter 
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population. The reference year rankings are distorting, and results based on this measure are likely to be 
biased. 
     Table 1.2 also illuminates how few teachers are from the top colleges, which is consistent with 
Hoxby's 2002 findings.  The matched ranking indicates 6.1% of all teachers are in the top two tiers. For 
teachers entering college before 1980, no charter teachers hail from Most Competitive colleges while 10 
(0.8%) traditional teachers do.  For those entering in the 1980s, none of the 60 charter teachers are in the top 
two tiers, while 80 of the 2,210 traditional teachers are.  The percentage of teachers in these ranks is 
increasing over time for both groups. 
     Table 1.3 expands on Table 1.2 by illustrating how many categories a teacher's college rank differs 
between the two assignment methods for different subgroups. While roughly 61% of all teachers are ranked 
the same, nearly 25% of public teachers are ranked higher using the 2002 ranking than the matched ranking.  
Roughly 17% are ranked lower in 2002. Among charter teachers, 22% are ranked higher, and 13% are ranked 
lower. 
     Table 1.3 also reiterates how using a reference year is more distorting the further away it is from the 
actual entrance year.  For those who entered college after 1999, 94% of charter and 89% of public teachers 
are ranked the same between the two methods. For those entering in the 1990s, only 59%  and 57% of 
charter and public teachers are.  This percentage drops to 50% and 48% for charter and public teachers 
entering in the 1980s. For those entering before 1980, 50% of charter teachers have the same ranking while 
46% of public teachers do.   
     The evidence presented illustrates that college ranks change over time, and these changes are 
reflected in the teacher population. There is a difference in rankings between public and charter school 
teachers, and this difference appears greater the older the teacher. Older teachers from better colleges are 
traditional school teachers, while there is a greater percentage of Most and Highly Competitive alumni in 
charters versus public schools among the younger teachers.  Since teacher quality is based on college ranks, 
teacher quality distributions differ depending upon how the rankings are assigned to the teacher.  The greater 
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the difference in the reference year and when the teacher actually entered college, the greater the 
misrepresentation.  Furthermore, the misrepresentation differs for charter and public teachers.   
 
Table 1.3  Frequencies of Differences in Rankings between the Matched Rankings & 2002 Rankings
N % N % N % N % 
3 Categories Lower in 2002 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
2 Categories Lower in 2002 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 100 1.4
1 Category Lower in 2002 0 0.0 120 4.7 70 17.9 1240 16.8
No Difference 160 94.1 2280 88.7 230 59.0 4240 57.4
1 Category Higher in 2002 10 5.9 150 5.8 80 20.5 1500 20.3
2 Categories Higher in 2002 0 0.0 20
a
0.8 10 2.6 280 3.8
3 Categories Higher in 2002 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 30 0.4
Total 170 100 2,570 100 390 100 7,390 100
N % N % N % N % 
3 Categories Lower in 2002 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
2 Categories Lower in 2002 0 0.0 20 0.9 0 0.0 20 1.7
1 Category Lower in 2002 10 16.7 300 13.6 0 0.0 170 14.0
No Difference 30 50.0 1050 47.5 10 50.0 550 45.5
1 Category Higher in 2002 20 33.3 670 30.3 10 50.0 350 28.9
2 Categories Higher in 2002 10 16.7 170 7.7 0 0.0 130 10.7
3 Categories Higher in 2002 0 0.0 10 0.5 0 0.0 10 0.8
Total 60 100 2,210 100 20 100 1,210 100
a
 Estimate refers to 2 or 3 categories higher in 2002
Note: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for confidentiality purposes.  Columns may not add up due to rounding. 
1980-1989 College Entrants pre-1980 College Entrants
Charter Traditional Charter Traditional
2000s College Entrants 1990-1999 College Entrants
Charter Traditional Charter Traditional
  
 
These results suggest that teacher quality should be measured by the rank of their undergraduate 
college at the time of their enrollment in order to avoid the mismeasurement biases which might arise if ranks 
are assigned from a single reference year.  The analysis below pursues this suggestion and quantifies the 
extent of these biases. 
 
 
11 
 
 
1.5  TEACHER PERCEPTIONS OF CHARTER & PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
 
     Proponents of charter schools claim that teachers choose charters because they can avoid the 
bureaucracy associated with traditional schools.  Charters are also attractive as they focus on student needs 
and outcomes (Center for Education Reform 2010).  Dye and Antle (1984) suggest that if productivity is 
correlated with preferences for nonpecuniary job aspects, then different types of workers might systematically 
sort across jobs, even in the absence of a monetary productivity premium.  Accordingly, different quality 
teachers may be attracted to different school types due to associated nonpecuniary attributes.  For charters, 
these attributes may include a shorter schedule, fewer hours, or more autonomy in the classroom.  Teachers 
sort and workplace characteristics matter, with higher quality teachers less likely to teach at urban (Ehrenberg 
and Brewer 1994, Figlio 2002, Figlio 1997) or poorer schools (Bacolod 2007b, Lankford et al. 2002).  Charter 
or public school bundles also may enter into preferences.   
     The SASS contains questions on school characteristics, teacher pay, and teachers' perspectives of 
their school. The mean values of the responses for charter and public teachers are presented in Tables 4 and 
6. The tables also indicate if the differences in the responses are significant. 
     Table 1.4 details summary statistics on basic workplace characteristics. On average, charter teachers 
report having longer contracts than public school teachers. They have more required hours and teaching 
hours per week.  Charter teachers are significantly less likely to be in a union.  They also earn significantly less 
money, on average, than traditional teachers. Since pay can vary with experience, teacher reported average pay 
by tenure is presented in Table 1.5. 
     The top half of Table 1.5 reports base pay and actual earnings by total experience. Charter teachers' 
average base pay is significantly lower than public teachers' for all except for those with 1-3, 10-14, 20-24, or 
over 30 years of experience.  Average total earnings are significantly less for charter teachers, though the 
significance varies for those with over 20 years of experience.   
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Table 1.4. Differences between Charter and Public School Teachers Workplace Characteristics 
Charter Mean n Public Mean n Difference t-stat N
School Characteristics
Contract Days 199 640 189 13390 10 8.92 14030
Hours per Week Required 39.1 640 37.9 13390 1.2 6.39 14030
Hours of Teaching per Week Required 30.6 640 29.6 13390 1.0 4.25 14030
Union Status (=1) 0.26 640 0.71 13390 -0.45 -1.83 14030
Pay Base $38,379 640 $42,913 13390 -$4,534 -9.43 14030
Annual Earnings $39,989 640 $45,235 13390 -$5,246 -10.32 14030
Note: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for confidentiality purposes.  
 
 The bottom half of Table 1.5 reports base pay and annual earnings based on tenure at the teachers' 
current schools. For their first 9 years of experience, charter teachers' base pay is significantly lower than 
public school teachers' base pay.  For teachers with 10 or more years of tenure at a school, the significance 
disappears.  For the most tenured, charter teachers report slightly higher pay, though the difference is 
insignificant. The trends are similar for total earnings. 
     If charter schools are to attract higher quality teachers despite lower salaries and longer school days 
and years, then other aspects of charter school employment must be more attractive than in traditional 
schools.  The SASS contains questions regarding how much control teachers believe they have on certain 
aspects of their teaching. Answers range from 1-4, with a value of 1 corresponding to "No control" and 4 
corresponding to "A great deal of control". Table 1.6 presents the mean responses for charter and public 
school teachers and indicates if any differences are significant. 
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Table 1.5. Differences between Charter and Public School Base & Total Pay
Charter Mean n Public Mean n Difference t-stat N
Years of Experience
1-3 years $36,009 270 $36,228 3520 -$220 -0.45 3790
4-5 years $37,105 140 $39,178 2020 -$2,073 -2.80 2150
6-9 years $40,284 150 $42,662 3360 -$2,379 -2.85 3510
10-14 years $43,814 50 $46,263 2063 -$2,449 -1.37 2110
15-19 years $42,449 20 $51,542 1190 -$9,093 -3.18 1220
20-24 years $44,976 10 $52,652 450 -$7,677 -1.55 460
25-30 years $38,768 10 $53,835 180 -$15,067 -2.17 190
30 plus years $55,784 10 $56,668 610 -$884 -0.17 620
All $38,379 640 $42,913 13390 -$4,534 -9.43 14030
1-3 years $37,412 270 $38,276 2050 -$864 -1.65 3790
4-5 years $38,829 140 $41,570 1890 -$2,741 -3.30 2150
6-9 years $41,984 150 $45,036 3330 -$3,052 -3.36 3510
10-14 years $45,413 50 $48,853 2240 -$3,441 -1.84 2110
15-19 years $44,969 20 $53,926 1220 -$8,956 -2.98 1220
20-24 years $47,084 10 $54,888 240 -$7,804 -1.52 460
25-30 years $41,208 10 $56,307 80 -$15,099 -2.05 190
30 plus years $57,192 10 $59,057 900 -$1,864 -0.34 620
All $39,989 640 $45,235 13390 -$5,246 -10.32 14030
Years at Current School
1-3 years $37,304 450 $39,072 6340 -$1,768 -3.75 6790
4-5 years $37,965 100 $41,842 2110 -$3,876 -3.85 2220
6-9 years $42,062 70 $45,437 2590 -$3,376 -2.40 2660
10-14 years $48,472 10 $48,898 1190 -$427 -0.11 1210
15-19 years $59,030 0 $52,573 600 $6,457 0.79 610
1-3 years $38,734 450 $41,214 6340 -$2,480 -4.95 6790
4-5 years $40,065 100 $44,278 2110 -$4,214 -3.86 2220
6-9 years $43,913 70 $47,938 2590 -$4,025 -2.68 2660
10-14 years $50,288 10 $51,475 1190 -$1,187 -0.30 1210
15-19 years $64,662 0 $54,864 600 $9,798 1.15 610
Note: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for confidentiality purposes.  Columns and rows may not add up due to rounding. 
Base Pay 
Total Earnings 
Base Pay 
Total Earnings 
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Table 1.6. Differences between Charter and Public School Teachers' Beliefs about Workplace Characteristics 
Charter 
Mean n
Public 
Mean n Difference t-stat N
Has Control Over
a
:
Selecting Instructional Materials 2.90 640 2.75 13390 0.04 3.40 14030
Selecting Course Content 3.00 640 2.80 13390 0.04 4.87 14030
Selecting Teaching Techniques 3.69 640 3.70 13390 0.02 -0.33 14030
Evaluating and Grading Students 3.63 640 3.62 13390 0.03 0.32 14030
Disciplining Students 3.46 640 3.46 13390 0.03 0.29 14030
Determining Amount of Homework 3.60 640 3.73 13390 0.02 -5.43 14030
Agreement
b
:
Satisfied Salary 2.72 640 2.63 13390 0.09 2.24 14030
Would Leave for More Pay if Possible 3.03 640 3.05 13390 -0.02 -0.58 14030
Satisfied with Teaching at School 1.62 640 1.54 13390 0.09 3.14 14030
Teachers at School are Happy 2.05 640 1.96 13390 0.09 2.73 14030
School is Run Well 2.12 640 2.00 13390 0.12 3.60 14030
Not Worth Teaching at Current School 3.22 640 3.25 13390 -0.03 -0.86 14030
Wants to Transfer to Another School 2.83 640 3.04 13390 -0.21 -5.13 14030
Worried about Job Security due to Student Test Performance 2.91 640 2.99 13390 -0.08 -2.12 14030
Administration Supportive 1.62 640 1.62 13390 0.01 0.16 14030
Parents Supportive 2.36 640 2.39 13390 -0.02 -0.68 14030
Principal Enforces School Rules & Supports Teachers 1.63 640 1.63 13390 0.01 0.24 14030
Teachers Enforce School Rules 2.15 640 2.25 13390 -0.10 -2.77 14030
Teachers Share Beliefs about School Mission 1.82 640 1.86 13390 -0.03 -1.16 14030
Principal Communicates School Goals to Teachers 1.57 640 1.63 13390 -0.06 -1.85 14030
Adequate Support forTeaching Special Needs Students 2.32 640 2.22 13390 0.09 2.67 14030
Materials (texts, supplies) Adequate 1.90 640 1.81 13390 0.09 2.71 14030
Duties/Paperwork Interfering 2.46 640 2.17 13390 0.29 7.80 14030
Staff is Cooperative 1.76 640 1.86 13390 -0.10 -3.10 14030
Staff Recognized for Good Work 1.97 640 2.00 13390 -0.03 -0.82 14030
Less Enthusiastic than when Started 2.97 640 2.90 13390 0.07 1.72 14030
a
 Teacher reported degree of control (1=No control, 2=Minor control, 3=Moderate control, 4=A great deal of control)
b
 Teacher reported degree of agreement (1=Strongly Agree, 2=Somewhat Agree, 3=Somewhat disagree, 4=Strongly disagree)
Note: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for confidentiality purposes.  
 
The top portion of Table 1.6 suggests that on average, charter teachers rate their control over 
selecting instructional materials and course content higher than public school teachers. They rate their control 
over determining the amount of homework lower than their public school counterparts. 
     The SASS also contains questions regarding teacher perceptions. Answers range from 1-4, with a 
value of 1 corresponding to "Strongly agree" and 4 corresponding to "Strongly disagree". In the bottom of 
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Table 1.6, a negative (positive) difference means the charter teachers agree (disagree) more with the statement 
than public school teachers.   
     Responses indicate that while charter teachers are less satisfied with their salaries than public 
teachers, they are not more likely to leave for greater pay. They are less satisfied with teaching at the school 
and do not believe their peers are happy.  They worry more about job security due to student performance.  
They believe the school is not run well, and they report lower satisfaction with the adequacy of teaching 
materials and support for disabled students than public teachers.   
     Compared to public school teachers, charter teachers believe that their peers are more likely to 
enforce school rules. They report that their principals communicate goals more, and they believe the staff is 
more cooperative.  Charter teachers report that other duties and paperwork do not interfere with their 
teaching. Finally, they report having maintained enthusiasm at a greater rate.   
     Thus, while charter teachers are paid less, are less satisfied with their schools and more worried about 
their jobs than public teachers, they are still maintaining their enthusiasm.  The support from staff, 
communication from the principals, and lack of extraneous duties support the suggestion that teachers may 
be attracted to charters because of nonpecuniary attributes.  This paper next investigates whether these 
preferences are related to quality. 
 
1.6 METHODS 
 
     While the process through which a teacher and school choose one another is two-sided, the SASS 
allows only the observation of the result of the matching process.  Baker and Dickerson (2006) use 1999-2000 
SASS data and assume that the school determines the match when investigating teacher quality in public, 
private, and charter schools. They find charters had a larger share of higher quality teachers than public 
schools.  The estimation equation considers college competitiveness the dependent variable and school type 
an independent variable. 
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     Carruthers (2009) examines North Carolina teachers who switch schools.  She finds teachers moving 
from public to charter schools are less qualified and less likely to have graduated from a competitive college 
than other movers.  She finds that charters do not skim high quality teachers from public schools, though 
they draw more effective teachers among those switching schools.  Like Baker and Dickerson, Carruthers also 
considers college competitiveness the dependent variable and school type an independent variable. 
     In both studies, the estimation equation assumes that a future event, school type, predicts a past 
event, college competitiveness.  They suggest where a teacher currently teaches predicts her quality, when in 
fact, different quality teachers may self-select into the different school types.  These studies reverse the 
causality of the relationship. 
     This paper takes a different viewpoint and investigates how teacher characteristics, in particular, 
teacher quality influences and predicts the matching result.  Assuming a teacher knows his own skill set, a 
teacher also knows which school would be suitable for his needs and desires in a workplace.  Teachers decide 
where to apply and how to sort.  A high quality teacher may like the autonomy at charter schools, while a 
lower quality teacher may desire more stringent guidelines and the union protection available at public 
schools.  Teachers are the most informed about their own abilities, desires, and beliefs, and ultimately they 
decide which position to accept, among those offered.   
      This study assumes that the highest quality teachers can choose their ideal schools8. Schools want to 
hire the best, and there are not enough top quality teachers to fill all positions.  Estimates for the highest 
quality teachers from Most Competitive colleges represent their preferences of school type.  The next highest 
quality teachers, those from Highly Competitive colleges, will also be able to choose their optimal schools, 
given the position is still available and has not been filled by the highest quality teacher.  The interpretation of 
the coefficient for these teachers represents a mixture of preferences and availability.  As quality declines, the 
interpretation represents availability more than preferences, as lower quality teachers will not be able to 
                                                          
8 Though charter schools are not uniformly distributed across charter states, it is also assumed that teachers are able to 
relocate to accept employment at a charter if desired. 
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choose freely between school types.  These teachers will be offered what has not been accepted by the higher 
quality teachers. 
      The basic model in this paper is represented by the following equation: 
 
                                   (1.1) 
 
     The dependent variable, Charter, is an indicator variable equal to one if teacher i teaches at a charter 
school during the 2007-2008 academic year and is equal to zero if the teacher teaches at a public school. Since 
the dependent variable is binary, the model is estimated via a probit regression.  For each probit, the marginal 
effects are calculated for a benchmark teacher.  The benchmark teacher is a White male of the lowest quality 
with no graduate degrees, with the average number of years of experience, and who is of the average age for 
the sample of interest.   
     The teacher quality measures are contained in the Q vector.  To determine if aggregating quality 
could mask effects of finer distinctions of quality, this paper estimates the equation using two specifications 
of the Q vector. The first aggregates quality, creating three quality groups.  Higher Quality is a dummy 
variable equal to one if teachers hail from Most or Highly Competitive colleges.  Lower Quality is a dummy 
variable equal to one if teachers are from Very Competitive, Competitive, or Less Competitive colleges.  Non 
Competitive teachers comprise the final group.  In the second specification, each ranking is included as a 
binary variable.  This specification is of the most interest, as it clearly illustrates what the effects are for 
differing levels of quality and indicates if there is a stronger effect for better quality teachers.  This paper 
estimated both specifications using the matched and the 2002 ranking to investigate how a reference year 
might distort findings. 
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     For all specifications,    is a vector of educational attainment variables, including if teacher i obtained 
either a Master's degree or a Ph.D.9  Finally,    is a vector of demographic controls, including teacher i 's 
years of teaching experience, age, gender, and ethnicity. 
     The model is estimated for all teachers pooled together as an introductory exercise.  It is then re-
estimated for each cohort to determine if sorting differences exist among the different cohorts. 
 
1.7  REGRESSION RESULTS 
1.7.1  2007-2008 SASS Findings 
 
     The results of the probit model for the aggregated quality regression are presented in Table 1.7.  
Column 1 presents the estimates using the matched ranking.  Column 2 presents the results for the matched 
population using the 2002 ranking, while Column 3 estimates the equation for all teachers using the 2002 
ranking, including those who do not have a matched ranking measure10. 
      The estimates affirm the model is plausible as the coefficients all exhibit the expected signs. With 
respect to controls, the negative and significant coefficient on Master's degree corresponds to the idea that 
charter teachers have little incentive to obtain an advanced degree compared to public teachers, who are often 
required by law to get one while the charter teachers are exempt. The table also indicates that more 
experienced teachers are less likely to work at a charter, holding constant quality. Since charter schools are a 
relatively recent development, this result is not surprising. A veteran teacher with job security, who has 
already established her reputation and learned the ins and outs of her school will have little incentive to leave.   
    
 
                                                          
9 All teachers have their undergraduate degrees in the analysis, so the comparison is to teachers without any graduate 
degree. 
10 Teachers without a matched measure are teachers who entered college in a year for which the Barron's rankings are 
not included in this study. 
19 
 
 
Matched 
Quality 
Matched 
Sample
All FT/PT 
Teachers
Higher Quality (=1) 0.2679*** 0.2312** 0.1012
(0.0962) (0.0948) (0.0709)
Lower Quality (=1) 0.0831 0.0344 -0.0477
(0.0726) (0.0891) (0.0662)
Master's Degree (=1) -0.1529*** -0.1576*** -0.1540***
(0.0407) (0.0408) (0.0314)
PhD (=1) -0.1688 -0.1788 0.2001
(0.3389) (0.3356) (0.1420)
Years of Teaching Experience (decades) -0.2963*** -0.3024*** -0.2833***
(0.0483) (0.0487) (0.0257)
Female (=1) 0.1311*** 0.1336*** 0.0701**
(0.0428) (0.0429) (0.0332)
Age (100s yrs) -0.0461 -0.0259 0.2252
(0.2607) (0.2612) (0.1777)
Hispanic (=1) 0.2610*** 0.2662*** 0.3023***
(0.0725) (0.0726) (0.0597)
Black (=1) 0.4982*** 0.5112*** 0.4376***
(0.0601) (0.0603) (0.0482)
Asian (=1) 0.3526*** 0.3429*** 0.3818***
(0.1279) (0.1275) (0.1028)
Pacific Islander (=1) 0.3498* 0.3530* 0.1645
(0.2116) (0.2133) (0.1963)
American Indian (=1) -0.1011 -0.0988 -0.1520
(0.1273) (0.1275) (0.1050)
Constant -1.6538*** -1.6457*** -1.6035***
(0.1121) (0.1250) (0.0905)
Observations 14030 14030 26510
Sample sizes rounded to nearest ten for confidentiality purposes. 
High quality refers to teachers from Most and Highly Competitive colleges
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.7. Probit Results of Charter School Participation & Teacher Quality, 2007-2008 Regular Teachers, 
Aggregated Quality 
2002 Ranks
Reporting probit estimates
 
 
 
20 
 
 
The positive and significant coefficients on Hispanic, Black, and Asian are unsurprising as charters 
disproportionately enroll minority students (Frankenberg et al. 2010, Hoxby and Muraka 2009). Given that 
students learn better from teachers with the same ethnicity (Dee 2004), a teacher who wishes to be the most 
effective will choose to teach where she shares the ethnicity of the students. 
     The quality estimates imply that Higher Quality teachers are significantly more likely to work at a 
charter than their lowest quality counterparts. There is no effect for Lower Quality teachers.   
     Comparing the results in Column 1 to those in Column 2 to determine if the difference in assigning 
ranks matters, the reference year produces a lower point estimate with a lower significance on the quality 
variables than the matched measure11.  The discrepancies worsen in Column 3, which incorporates all 
teachers, including those without a matched ranking.  The additional teachers entered college before 1991, 
further from the reference year.  The results represent what other studies using a reference year would have 
found.  The estimate for Higher Quality teachers is less than half of the previous estimates and is 
insignificant.  The studies would have erroneously concluded there was no quality effect, while the matched 
ranking indicates that there is one.   
     Table 1.8 reports the marginal effects of the probit presented in Table 1.7.  For this population, the 
benchmark teacher is 36.3 years of age with 9.6 years of teaching experience. The probability of teaching at a 
charter for this population is 4.6%.   
     The first column indicates that teachers with Master's degrees are roughly one percentage point 
(22%) less likely to work at a charter.  For each decade of teaching experience a teacher has, he is roughly 1.8 
percentage points, or 39%, less likely to work at a charter school.  Column 1 also finds that females are nearly 
22% more likely to work at a charter school than males.   
                                                          
11 The analyses were also carried out using the 2000 ranks as the reference year for columns 2 and 3, and the results and 
conclusions hold. 
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Matched 
Quality 
Matched 
Sample
All FT/PT 
Teachers
Higher Quality (=1) 0.0214*** 0.0182*** 0.0083
(0.0081) (0.0067) (0.0055)
Lower Quality (=1) 0.0056 0.0022 -0.0034
(0.0046) (0.0056) (0.0049)
Master's Degree (=1) -0.0082*** -0.0085*** -0.0100***
(0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0023)
PhD (=1) -0.0089 -0.0095 0.0179
(0.0150) (0.0149) (0.0152)
Years of Teaching Experience (decades) -0.0183*** -0.0191*** -0.0212***
(0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0032)
Female (=1) 0.0092*** 0.0096*** 0.0056**
(0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0027)
Age (100s yrs) -0.0029 -0.0016 0.0168
(0.0162) (0.0165) (0.0135)
Hispanic (=1) 0.0207*** 0.0216*** 0.0297***
(0.0075) (0.0079) (0.0078)
Black (=1) 0.0492*** 0.0520*** 0.0483***
(0.0102) (0.0113) (0.0085)
Asian (=1) 0.0305** 0.0299* 0.0402***
(0.0152) (0.0154) (0.0150)
Pacific Islander (=1) 0.0302 0.0311 0.0143
(0.0244) (0.0253) (0.0196)
American Indian (=1) -0.0057 -0.0057 -0.0099
(0.0066) (0.0068) (0.0061)
Observations 14030 14030 26510
Sample sizes rounded to nearest ten for confidentiality purposes. 
High quality refers to teachers from Most and Highly Competitive colleges
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.8. Marginal Effects of Charter School Participation & Teacher Quality, 2007-2008 Regular 
Teachers, Aggregated Quality 
2002 Ranks
Reporting probit estimates
 
The biggest effect appears to be with respect to a teacher's race.  Black teachers are 4.9 percentage 
points, or 107%, more likely to work at a charter than a White teacher.  Hispanic teachers are 2.1 percentage 
points (46%) more likely, and Asian teachers are 3.1 percentage points (67%) more likely to work at a charter 
than the White benchmark teacher. 
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     Quantifying the quality effect, the Column 1 finds Higher Quality teachers from Most and Highly 
Competitive colleges are 2.1 percentage points, or 46%, more likely to work at a charter school than the 
lowest quality benchmark teacher from a Non Competitive college. Lower Quality teachers are not 
significantly more likely to work at a charter school than the lowest quality benchmark.   
     The quality effect does not appear that large compared to other controls. While it is larger in 
magnitude than the effects of graduate degrees, gender, or years of experience, it is less than half the effect of 
being Black.  The small magnitude of the quality effect may be reflecting the fact that teachers were 
aggregated into quality groups, something that will be investigated in Table 1.9.   
     For the reference year marginal effects, Column 2 indicates that Higher Quality teachers are 1.8 
percentage points (39%) more likely to teach at a charter school than the benchmark teacher.  There is still no 
effect for Lower Quality teachers.  Again, incorporating all teachers in Column 3, the estimate is less than half 
of that in Column 2 and is insignificant.   
     While the previous tables illustrate that there is a quality effect, the question remains if finer 
distinctions of quality matter.  Table 1.9 presents the marginal effects for the disaggregated quality estimation.   
The columns can be interpreted in the same manner as those of Tables 7 and 8.   
     Table 1.9 indicates that the aggregated quality analysis fails to pick up differences among the finer 
quality distinctions.  Column 1 suggests that teachers from the Most Competitive colleges are 4.4 percentage 
points, or 96%, more likely to teach at a charter than those from Non Competitive colleges.  This estimate 
reflects the fact that schools desire better teachers, and these teachers are able to choose their ideal school.  
Thus, the 4.4 percentage point increase reflects these teachers' preferences for charters over traditional 
schools.    
23 
 
 
Matched 
Quality 
Matched 
Sample
All FT/PT 
Teachers
Most Competitive College (=1) 0.0442** 0.0401*** 0.0200**
(0.0189) (0.0151) (0.0095)
Highly Competitive College (=1) 0.0173** 0.0125 0.0045
(0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0061)
Very Competitive College (=1) 0.0185*** 0.0162** 0.0060
(0.0061) (0.0067) (0.0050)
Competitive  College (=1) 0.0038 0.0023 -0.0031
(0.0047) (0.0058) (0.0044)
Less Competitive College (=1) 0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0050
(0.0051) (0.0061) (0.0047)
Master's Degree (=1) -0.0087*** -0.0091*** -0.0092***
(0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0021)
PhD (=1) -0.0093 -0.0109 0.0140
(0.0147) (0.0142) (0.0133)
Years of Teaching Experience (decades) -0.0180*** -0.0189*** -0.0186***
(0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0028)
Female (=1) 0.0096*** 0.0098*** 0.0052**
(0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0024)
Age (100s yrs) 0.0039 0.0004 0.0149
(0.0160) (0.0165) (0.0119)
Hispanic (=1) 0.0207*** 0.0218*** 0.0270***
(0.0075) (0.0079) (0.0072)
Black (=1) 0.0514*** 0.0531*** 0.0445***
(0.0106) (0.0115) (0.0080)
Asian (=1) 0.0282* 0.0272* 0.0340**
(0.0147) (0.0148) (0.0133)
Pacific Islander (=1) 0.0311 0.0311 0.0126
(0.0250) (0.0254) (0.0176)
American Indian (=1) -0.0053 -0.0054 -0.0084
(0.0066) (0.0068) (0.0055)
Observations 14030 14030 26510
Samples rounded to nearest ten for confidentiality purposes. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.9. Marginal Effects of Teacher Quality & Charter School Participation, 2007-2008 Regular 
Teachers, Disaggregated Quality 
2002 Ranks
Reporting marginal effects for bench mark case 
Robust standard errors in parentheses
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     Highly and Very Competitive college graduates are 1.7 and 1.9 percentage points, or 37% and 41%, 
more likely to work at a charter than the benchmark teacher. These estimates are a combination of the 
teachers preferences for charter positions given their availability.  As quality declines, the point estimates 
decline as well, and teachers from Competitive and Less Competitive colleges are not significantly more likely 
to work at a charter.  The insignificant result may reflect the fact that these teachers were not able to choose a 
charter school, as the positions may have been filled.  As such, for these teachers, the estimate reflects 
availability more than preferences.   
     Table 1.9 also indicates that using the 2002 ranking continues to produce distorted estimates.  The 
difference is greatest between the two measurements for teachers from Most and Very Competitive colleges. 
In Column 2, the reference year ranking indicates the Most Competitive graduates are 4.0 percentage points 
more likely to work at a charter, while Highly Competitive graduates no longer have a quality effect.  Teachers 
from Very Competitive colleges are 1.6 percentage points more likely, while there is no quality effect for 
teachers from lower ranked schools. 
     The results suggest the probability of teaching at a charter over a public school generally increases as 
quality increases.  Aggregating quality leads to inaccurate conclusions.  Using a reference year is more 
misleading at the highest quality level, and it may change the significance of the findings. 
     Thus far, more experienced teachers appear less likely to choose a charter over a public school.  
Charters may have been perceived as risky ventures or as negative signals when they were first introduced. As 
such, the attraction to charter schools and the quality effect may be different among different cohorts of 
teachers depending upon when they started teaching. Table 1.10 presents the marginal effects of the probit 
regressions for different cohorts to determine if the quality effect varies between them. A cohort is defined as 
the group of teachers matched to a Barron's publication year. For example, teachers who entered college in 
1991 and 1992 are classified in the 1992 cohort. There are nine cohorts corresponding to the nine years of 
Barron's rankings in this study. 
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1969-
1970
a
1983-
1984
1985-
1986 1991-1992 1993-1994 1995-1996 1997-1998 1999-2000 2001-2002
Most Comp College (=1) 0.0385 0.0527 0.0954 0.1107* 0.1153*
(0.0555) (0.0634) (0.0673) (0.0630) (0.0658)
Highly Comp College (=1) 0.0022
b
0.0246 0.0016
b
-0.0284* 0.0888*** 0.0612** 0.0014
(0.0081) (0.0239) (0.0255) (0.0150) (0.0326) (0.0300) (0.0254)
Very Comp College (=1) -0.0006 -0.0084
d
-0.0014
d
0.0230 0.0043 -0.0034 0.0665*** 0.0381** 0.0228
(0.0044) (0.0174) (0.0030) (0.0149) (0.0218) (0.0149) (0.0217) (0.0189) (0.0223)
Competitive College (=1) -0.0013 -0.0038 -0.0003
e
0.0102 -0.0115 -0.0126 0.0258* 0.0143 0.0142
(0.0029) (0.0158) (0.0028) (0.0085) (0.0172) (0.0132) (0.0143) (0.0147) (0.0189)
Less Comp College (=1) -0.0054 -0.0029 0.0093 0.0130 -0.0113 0.0060 0.0018 -0.0034
(0.0165) (0.0033) (0.0093) (0.0215) (0.0139) (0.0152) (0.0157) (0.0198)
Grad. Deg. (MA/PhD) (=1) 0.0038 0.0031 0.0002 -0.0062 -0.0172* -0.0178** -0.0045 -0.0181** 0.0041
(0.0049) (0.0103) (0.0020) (0.0048) (0.0104) (0.0089) (0.0051) (0.0086) (0.0140)
Yrs Teach Exper (decades) -0.0021 -0.0250* -0.0035 -0.0239 -0.0470** -0.0338 -0.0343* -0.0004 -0.0076
(0.0022) (0.0150) (0.0031) (0.0165) (0.0213) (0.0220) (0.0200) (0.0239) (0.0355)
Female (=1) 0.0077* 0.0087 0.0279* 0.0104 0.0019 0.0416** -0.0071 0.0149 0.0053
(0.0044) (0.0125) (0.0147) (0.0071) (0.0107) (0.0166) (0.0059) (0.0095) (0.0093)
Age (100s yrs) 0.0551 -0.0053 -0.0030 0.0550 -0.1156 0.0435 -0.0356 -0.0569 0.0100
(0.0672) (0.0972) (0.0156) (0.0441) (0.0874) (0.0630) (0.0556) (0.0616) (0.0636)
Hispanic (=1) 0.0095 0.0194 -0.0029 0.0090 0.0043 0.0329 0.0400 0.0179 0.0428
(0.0172) (0.0315) (0.0032) (0.0121) (0.0218) (0.0285) (0.0262) (0.0184) (0.0271)
Black (=1) -0.0017 0.0128 0.0239 0.0162 0.0833** 0.0807** 0.0336 0.0872** 0.0550
(0.0051) (0.0245) (0.0219) (0.0147) (0.0384) (0.0353) (0.0210) (0.0347) (0.0341)
Asian (=1) 0.1834 0.0207 -0.0005 0.0898 0.0885 -0.0029 0.0230
(0.2253) (0.0335) (0.0128) (0.0692) (0.0616) (0.0191) (0.0413)
Pacific Islander (=1) 0.0926 0.0109 0.0651
(0.0944) (0.0519) (0.1153)
American Indian (=1) 0.0034 -0.0184 -0.0154
(0.0221) (0.0154) (0.0213)
Other Ethnicity (=1) 0.0076
c
0.0079
e
0.0129
c
-0.0073
c
0.0369
c
-0.0157
e
(0.0170) (0.0341) (0.0168) (0.0065) (0.0390) (0.0102)
Observations 1230 980 1300 1470 1630 1780 1920 1980 1750
a Reference group is  teachers from Less and Non Competitive colleges due to few observations.
b Estimate is for teachers from Most and Highly Competitive colleges due to few observations for Most Competitive colleges.
c Other ethnicity includes American Indians and Pacific Islanders. 
d Estimate is for teachers from Most, Highly and Very Competitive colleges due to lack of observations
e  Other ethnicity includes Asians as well as American Indians and Pacific Islanders.
Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for confidentiality purposes
Reporting probit estimates. 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Cohort Group
Table 1.10  Marginal Effects  Estimates of Teacher Quality & Charter Participation, 2007-2008 Teachers, by Cohort
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     The matched ranking is the sole quality measure in the cohort analysis.  Due to the small number of 
charter teachers in each cohort, this study combines some independent variables because of lack of variation.  
For example, it combines having a Master's or a Ph.D. into a dummy variable for graduate degrees which is 
equal to one if the teacher has either an M.A. or a Ph.D.  For the 1969-1970 and 1993-1994 cohorts, it 
combines teachers from Most and Highly Competitive colleges due to a lack of variation in these categories 
for charter and traditional teachers.  For other cohorts, such as 1983-1984 and 1985-1986, it combines 
teachers from Most, Highly, and Very Competitive colleges.  When necessary, this study combines minority 
groups as "Other Ethnicity" due to the small number of minorities in certain cohorts.   
     The marginal effects for each cohort presented in Table 1.10 are in reference to a benchmark teacher 
for that cohort12.  All coefficients on the controls exhibit the expected sign.  The quality effect is absent for 
older teachers, as expected, since these teachers would have already found their ideal school by the time 
charters were established.  The quality effect first appears in 1997, though there is a slight negative effect for 
teachers from Very Competitive colleges who entered in 1995-1996.   
     The quality effect is largest for the highest quality and most recent college graduates.  Among those 
who entered college in 2001-2002 and who graduated in 2005-2006, the probability of teaching at a charter is 
6.4%.  For these teachers, those from Most Competitive colleges are 11.5 percentage points, or 177% 
(11.5/6.4), more likely to teach at a charter than their benchmark teacher.   
     For those who entered college in 1999-2000, the probability of teaching at a charter is 7.0%.  Those 
from Most Competitive colleges are 11.1 percentage points, or 159% more likely to teach at a charter, 
compared to their benchmark.  Highly Competitive and Very Competitive college graduates are 6.1 (87%) and 
3.8 (54%) percentage points more likely to teach at a charter. 
     For those entering in 1997-1998, the probability of teaching at a charter is 5.3%. Teachers from 
Highly Competitive colleges are 8.9 percentage points more likely to teach at a charter than their benchmark.  
Those from Very Competitive and Competitive colleges are 6.7 and 2.3 percentage points more likely.   
                                                          
12 Recall the benchmark teacher is a White male of the lowest quality and of average age with the average number of 
years of experience for that particular cohort. 
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     The results from these three cohorts imply that the quality effect on charter school preferences is 
stronger in more recent cohorts. In particular, for the two most recent cohorts, teachers from the best 
colleges have the largest increase in the probability of teaching a charter school.  These results are important 
because if the highest quality teachers in the youngest cohorts are significantly more likely to prefer a charter 
school, this must be affecting the quality level of public school teachers. Furthermore, as older teachers retire, 
the quality effect on public schools can become even larger. 
 
1.7.2.  Persistence: 2003-2004 SASS Findings 
 
     While the SASS does not follow the same teachers across waves, it is designed to be representative.  
As such, data from the 2003-2004 SASS  along with data from the 2007-2008 SASS allow this study to 
observe many of the same cohorts at two different points in time.  The most recent cohort in the later data is 
not in the 2003-2004 data, as these teachers were just entering college at that time.  A cohort analysis13 
applied to the earlier data explores if the patterns observed in the most recent data persist.  This analysis 
implements the same methodology to identify the matched rankings.  The sample of regular teachers 
educated in charter states who have a matched ranking is 13,340.   
     The results for the cohort analysis using the earlier data are presented in Table 1.11.  The marginal 
effects are calculated in comparison to a benchmark teacher for each cohort.  This study combined quality 
measures and ethnicities for certain cohorts due to lack of variation in independent variables. 
     The estimates suggest that the quality effect is nonexistent for teachers who entered college prior to 
1991, as was true for the cohort analysis using the 2007-2008 SASS data.  For the 1991-1992 cohort, the 
magnitudes of the quality effect appears the same for both the 2003-2004 and the 2007-2008 analysis.  Thus, 
for older cohorts, decisions appear to be persistent. 
                                                          
13 The study replicated all previous analyses using the 2007-2008 data with the 2003-2004 data.  The general results hold 
and are available upon request. 
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Table 1.11.  Marginal Effects  Estimates of Teacher Quality & Charter Participation, 2003-2004 Teachers,  by Cohort
1969-1970 1983-1984 1985-1986 1991-1992 1993-1994 1995-1996 1997-1998 1999-2000
e
Most Comp College (=1) -0.0104 0.1511 0.0537 0.0898 0.0790 0.1059*
(0.0306) (0.1098) (0.0423) (0.0791) (0.0685) (0.0582)
Highly Comp College (=1) -0.0022 0.0217 0.0012
c
0.0244** 0.0515** 0.0572*** 0.0398*** 0.0544
c
(0.0278) (0.0152) (0.0032) (0.0115) (0.0215) (0.0180) (0.0149) (0.0400)
Very Comp College (=1) 0.0095 0.0292 0.0694** 0.0627** 0.0240 0.0327
(0.0230) (0.0228) (0.0309) (0.0285) (0.0182) (0.0512)
Competitive (=1) -0.0148
a
0.0073 0.0049
a
0.0265*** 0.0357** 0.0312*** 0.0126 0.0423
(0.0266) (0.0102) (0.0040) (0.0091) (0.0149) (0.0109) (0.0092) (0.0295)
Less Comp College (=1) -0.0136 -0.0041 -0.0006 0.0131* 0.0215 0.0243** 0.0169 -0.0157
(0.0270) (0.0101) (0.0022) (0.0079) (0.0167) (0.0124) (0.0118) (0.0224)
Grad Deg (MA/PhD) (=1) -0.0074 -0.0048 -0.0008 -0.0035 -0.0063 -0.0061 -0.0062
(0.0126) (0.0051) (0.0010) (0.0026) (0.0055) (0.0041) (0.0062)
Yrs Teach Exper (decades) -0.0323 -0.0123 -0.0070 -0.0250 -0.0429* -0.0303 -0.0256 0.0876
(0.0323) (0.0107) (0.0056) (0.0166) (0.0245) (0.0197) (0.0180) (0.0618)
Female (=1) -0.0136 0.0055 0.0123 0.0024 -0.0077 0.0002 0.0089 -0.0051
(0.0168) (0.0070) (0.0075) (0.0030) (0.0059) (0.0036) (0.0059) (0.0139)
Age (100s yrs) -0.0867 0.0623 0.0044 -0.0064 0.0376 0.0129 0.0401 0.0546
(0.2915) (0.0656) (0.0084) (0.0177) (0.0400) (0.0270) (0.0337) (0.0931)
Hispanic (=1) 0.1132 0.0375 -0.0006 0.0150 0.0219 0.0313 0.0376* 0.0295
(0.1061) (0.0441) (0.0019) (0.0123) (0.0192) (0.0202) (0.0225) (0.0429)
Black (=1) 0.0141 0.0022 0.0398* 0.0257 0.0535** 0.0691** 0.0176
(0.0254) (0.0040) (0.0220) (0.0181) (0.0254) (0.0303) (0.0328)
Asian (=1) -0.0013 0.0030 0.0006 -0.0025 0.0038 -0.0065
(0.0020) (0.0068) (0.0129) (0.0078) (0.0125) (0.0300)
Pacific Islander (=1) 0.0792 0.0180 -0.0038 -0.0039
(0.0815) (0.0209) (0.0140) (0.0165)
American Indian (=1) 0.0004 0.0026 0.0072 -0.0036
(0.0032) (0.0060) (0.0131) (0.0101)
Other Ethnicity (=1) -0.0001
b
-0.0062
d
0.0144
d
(0.0082) (0.0106) (0.0383)
Observations 1820 1270 1560 2090 2050 2190 1860 510
a
 Refers to estimate for teachers from Very Competitive and Competitive colleges  grouped together due to few observations for Very Competitive.
b
Other ethnicity includes Asians, Pacific Islanders, and American Indians.
c 
Refers to the estimate for  teachers from Most and Highly Competitive colleges grouped together due to few observations.
d
 Other Ethnicity includes Pacific Islanders and American Indians. 
e 
Graduate degree was not included due to collinearity. 
Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for confidentiality purposes
Reporting probit estimates. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Cohort Group
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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     Interestingly, for teachers in the 1993-1994 and 1995-1996 cohorts who graduated between 1997-
2000, the 2003-2004 data suggest there was a slight quality effect for Highly Competitive, Very Competitive, 
and Competitive college graduates.  By 2007-2008, the effect seems to have disappeared (Table 1.10). The 
1997-1998 cohort's decisions do appear similar in the two analyses, with the magnitudes of the quality effects 
similar in both datasets.  The few observations in the latest cohort of the 2003-2004 data make comparisons 
across the analyses difficult, though it is apparent the magnitudes of the estimates are increasing with quality. 
     The estimates in Table 1.11 imply that for the majority of cohorts, the patterns appear to hold over 
time.  The probability of teaching at a charter generally increases with college-based quality.  The probabilities 
for higher quality teachers increase in magnitude the younger the cohort.  These findings imply that as 
cohorts retire, the distribution of teacher quality in public schools may be increasingly skewed towards lower 
quality teachers as higher quality teachers choose charter schools. 
 
1.8  CONCLUSIONS 
 
     This paper uses a disaggregated measure of teacher quality based on the competitiveness of a 
teacher's college as measured by Barron's Profiles of American Colleges to determine how different quality 
teachers sort between public and charter schools.  The findings reveal that teachers from better colleges are 
more likely to teach at a charter than at a public school.  This probability increases with college 
competitiveness. The greatest impact is on the youngest and newest teachers, with the highest quality ones 
being roughly 11 percentage points more likely to teach at a charter over their lowest quality counterparts. 
Quality effects are nonexistent for older teachers. School choice patterns appear persistent over time given a 
subsequent analysis using the 2003-2004 SASS data, as the magnitudes of the quality effects for cohorts 
appear similar between the two datasets. 
     This paper further investigates how to most appropriately proxy for teacher quality using 
undergraduate college ranking.  It finds that aggregating quality levels can mask effects of finer quality 
distinctions and lead to erroneous conclusions.  Furthermore, since competitiveness and rankings are 
30 
 
 
dynamic, this paper finds that using a single reference year to measure competitiveness can be misleading and 
distort results.   The distortion consistently underestimates the differences in choosing a charter for each 
quality distinction.  The distortion becomes more pronounced the further the reference year is from when 
teachers actually entered college. 
     Few teachers hail from the best institutions.  Since teacher quality affects student outcomes, knowing 
where newer and better quality teachers' preferences lay may illuminate how to attract such teachers.  Since 
these teachers are disproportionately choosing charter schools, public schools must address their 
shortcomings and ask why these teachers are choosing the charter bundle. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DOES HAPPINESS MATTER? THE EFFECT OF TEACHER JOB SATISFACTION ON 
PRODUCTIVITY 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
For decades, researchers and policymakers have been struggling to reform education and to improve 
student outcomes. Improving educational attainment increases human capital levels, improves life outcomes, 
and boosts national productivity.  The popular press and studies on educational reform typically focus on 
policies' effects on student test scores. This focus likely is due to the abundance and availability of 
standardized test scores resulting from No Child Left Behind.  Critics argue that test scores may be racially, 
culturally, and sexually biased and that there is little evidence linking higher test scores to gains in earnings 
later in life (Evans and Schwab 1995).  Educational outcomes that are linked to positive economic gains and 
success in the labor market include the graduation and college enrollment rates.  The mean earnings of high 
school dropouts in 2008 was $21,023, compared to $31,283 for high school graduates and to $58,613 for 
college graduates with a Bachelor's degree (US Census Bureau 2011).  Those who graduate from high school 
are less likely to be unemployed, to be in prison, to need public assistance, or to die at a younger age 
(Mykerezi  2010). 
     Estimates of the national average high school graduation rate range from 68.8% (Swanson 2010) to 
74.9% (Stillwell 2010) and 77.1% (Heckman and LaFontaine 2010). Immediate enrollment of high school 
completers in two or four year colleges is roughly 69% nationwide (US Department of Education 2010).  
Given the importance of these educational outcomes, research must focus on increasing the graduation and 
college enrollment rates.  This study analyzes a new input in the educational production function, teacher job 
satisfaction, and investigates its effect on high school graduation and college enrollment rates.   
     Numerous studies have attempted to investigate the determinants of high school graduation while 
few study college enrollment.  Many of these studies analyze factors that are beyond the control of policy 
makers, such as parental marital status, socioeconomic background, teen pregnancy, drug abuse, or ethnicity 
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(McElroy 1996).  While student characteristics and home life are important determinants of educational 
outcomes, education reform cannot change these characteristics; however, it can affect other inputs into the 
education production function, such as teachers.  In fact, current debate surrounding education reform 
focuses around teacher-related issues such as quality, pay, retention, and accountability.  By providing quality 
instruction, teachers influence student outcomes.  Research shows that teachers affect test scores, and quality 
teachers are associated with gains in student earnings later in life (Chetty et al. 2011, Hanushek 2011). 
Teachers also may influence the graduation and college enrollment rates.   While training, qualifications, and 
classroom experience are all positively associated with gains in student outcomes, policy and economic studies 
often ignore how the classroom atmosphere and teacher attitudes and emotions affect student learning.   
      More enthusiastic teachers provide higher quality instruction (Kunter et al. 2008).   Happier teachers 
may foster better relationships with students, enabling students to improve academically (Murray and 
Lamgren 2005). Just as family support and parental involvement aid in high school graduation, students may 
also benefit from having better relationships with their teachers as they may feel support, motivation, and 
encouragement from their teachers (Englund et al. 2008). Teachers with greater job satisfaction may be more 
motivated, which may increase the intrinsic motivation in students (Day et al. 2000, Moe et al. 2010).   Poor 
relationships with teachers is a main reason rural students drop out of high school (McCaul 1988). This paper 
found no studies that investigate the effects of teacher job satisfaction on high school graduation and college 
enrollment rates. 
    For decades, sociologists, psychologists, and economists have believed that increases in job 
satisfaction should lead to increases in productivity. Meta-analyses from the 1980s found conflicting results; 
one found a strong positive correlation between individual job satisfaction and job performance (Petty et al. 
1984), while another found only a weak correlation between the two (Iaffaldano and Muchinsky 1985). 
Studies on the subject dissipated.  Recently, however, there has been a reemergence of studies investigating 
job satisfaction and productivity. Judge et al. (2001) find a moderate correlation between job satisfaction and 
worker productivity.  Meanwhile, Riketta (2008) reports that job attitudes and satisfaction predict future job 
performance.  Likewise, Oswald and colleagues (2008) designed a randomized trial in which some workers' 
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happiness increased while others' decreased.  Those with increases in happiness were more productive.  
Building on this literature, Borgogni et al. (2010) study self efficacy, job satisfaction, and job performance on 
workers in Italy.  Their results indicate that job satisfaction positively affects productivity.  If there is a 
positive relationship between job satisfaction and output in other industries, the same may be true in 
education.   
     This study contributes to two branches of the literature.  First, it contributes to research on job 
satisfaction and productivity by investigating the education sector.  Second, it contributes to the literature on 
high school graduation and college enrollment rates by analyzing a new input, teacher job satisfaction, along 
with a rich set of other school-level inputs that are of interest to policy makers, including charter status.   
    This study uses restricted-use data from the 2007-2008 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) to investigate 
how teacher job satisfaction in the public school system influences the graduation rate and the percentage of 
graduates who enroll in four year colleges.  This study also investigates the extent to which job satisfaction 
may be increased via nonpecuniary aspects of the job.  The extent to which satisfaction is sensitive to changes 
in these aspects will enable districts to save money while improving educational outcomes.   
     The findings suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the average level teacher job 
satisfaction at a school increases the college enrollment rate by roughly 2.3-2.4 percentage points.  There is no 
significant effect of teacher job satisfaction on the high school graduation rate.  A supportive and cooperative 
atmosphere and autonomy in the classroom are the biggest determinants of teacher job satisfaction. 
     The remainder of this chapter is set up as follows.  Section 2.2 describes the current literature, while 
section 2.3 discusses the empirical strategy.  Section 2.4 describes the data.  Section 2.5 presents the results.  
Finally, section 2.6 concludes. 
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2.2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.2.1  Education Production Function 
 
     Education is difficult to model as the educational process is cumulative.  Contributing to the 
difficulty of modeling it is that many factors that enter into a student's education are not readily measurable, 
such as innate intelligence, ability, and motivation.  Researchers agree that a student's learning is influenced by 
his familial background and neighborhood  (Coleman 1966, Dee 1998, Englund 2008, Hanushek 1986, 
Hanushek 2003).  Students from two parent households fare better than students from one parent 
households.  Students whose parents have high educational attainment have greater attainment than their 
peers.  Researchers are still searching for which school and policy-relevant inputs also affect student 
outcomes. 
      Variables such as student-teacher ratios or class size; per pupil expenditures, average expenditures, or 
teacher salaries; teacher experience and/or education; the percentage of students who are minority;  and the 
percentage of students on free or reduced-price lunches or some combination of the like typically are 
included in education production models (see for example Lamdin 1996, Ostroff 1992, Wilson 2001).  Also 
common are inputs such as relative teacher pay, the distribution of earnings, and the length of the school year 
(Bedard 2003, Card and Krueger 1992).   
     Figlio (1999) points out that "school success stories" have common themes, such as smaller classes, 
school-based management, good principals, and more money.   He finds that decreases in the student-teacher 
ratio are positively related to gains in student outcomes, as is starting teacher salary.  Eide and Showalter 
(1998) illustrate that school inputs matter differentially for different types of students.  In particular, 
expenditure matters most for the lowest ability students, while the length of the school year matters for those 
with the greatest abilities.   
     Differential effects were found in other studies as well.  Academically weak students and boys benefit 
most from reductions in class sizes (Heinsen 2009). Weaker students and those from disadvantaged 
backgrounds benefit most from smaller schools, and small secondary schools graduate a significantly larger 
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proportion of their students than do larger ones (Leithwood and Jantzi 2009).  School inputs and resources 
matter differentially for elementary level students as well (Summers and Wolfe 1977).  Small schools benefit 
all students, while disadvantaged students are helped more by certain inputs.  Teachers who received their 
Bachelor's degree from a higher ranked college produce greater student learning than those who attended a 
lower-ranked college. Lower income students benefit the most from these teachers.  Higher achieving 
students benefit most from teachers with more experience, while those with lower scores are negatively 
affected by these teachers.  High achieving students fare better in larger classes, while low achieving students 
do worse in these classes.  Black students benefit in a less racially diverse setting.   
     School characteristics that are consistently found to affect student outcomes positively include a 
reduction in class size (Coates 1998, Heinesen 2009, Krueger 1999), lower student-teacher ratios  (Card and 
Krueger 1992, Figlio 1999, Finn and Achilles 1990, Wilson 2001), and smaller schools (Bedard 2003, 
Leithwood and Jantzi 2009, Summers and Wolfe 1977).  Krueger (1999)  further found that the effect of 
smaller classes also continued affect elementary school children in later years.   
     Other, less commonly included inputs also affect student outcomes.  For example, student 
attendance is positively and significantly related to standardized test scores in elementary school children 
(Angrist and Lavy 1999, Lamdin 1996, Rivkin et al. 2005). Hanushek (2003) finds weak support for the 
notion that simply providing higher salaries or greater overall spending will lead to increased student 
performance. Coates (1998) finds time in instruction is a key determinant in average test scores.  White and 
Asian students tend to have higher standardized test scores than Black students (Krueger 1999). 
     The majority of the aforementioned studies are based on test score outcomes among elementary and 
secondary school students; however, studies investigating high school completion use similar school controls 
and find similar results.  For example, Wilson (2001) finds that the probability of graduation is greater among 
schools with higher per pupil spending and lower student-teacher ratios.  Likewise, smaller schools are 
beneficial for graduates (Bedard 2003, Leithwood and Jantzi 2009). 
     When considering the effects that teachers have on student outcomes, economic studies typically 
include only measures such as educational attainment, licensure, testing, certification status, or years of 
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teaching experience.  In fact, licensure, testing, and certification status are not consistently associated with 
improvements in student outcomes (Angrist and Guryan 2008, Angrist and Guryan 2004, Berliner 2005).  
Having a Master's degree has no significant effect on student outcomes (Angrist and Guryan 2008, Angrist 
and Guryan 2004, Berliner 2005, Figlio 1999, Krueger 1999, Rivkin et al. 2005).  Meanwhile, teachers who 
graduate from higher ranked colleges are more efficacious (Ehrenberg and Brewer 1994, Summers and Wolfe 
1977). 
     Psychologists and education specialists acknowledge that other teacher characteristics may also 
influence student outcomes.  Emotions play a powerful role in teaching and learning (Fried 1995, Goleman 
1995). Teacher qualifications, attitudes and instructional practices lead to reading and math gains in first grade 
(Palardy and Rumberger 2008).  Teachers, through their own emotions and motivation, motivate students 
(Day et al. 2000), and more enthusiastic teachers provide higher quality instruction (Kunter et al. 2008).  
Murray and Lamgren (2005) find that warm relationships with teachers positively affect GPA.  Student 
teacher relationships and school-based intervention programs also suggest that good relationships with 
teachers may help students (Anderson et al. 2004, Karcher et al. 2002) and may aid them in acquiring skills to 
be successful in school (Pianta et al. 2004).  One study found that teacher self-efficacy influenced job 
satisfaction, but job satisfaction did not affect student outcomes (Capara et al. 2006).   
 
2.2.2  Job Satisfaction 
 
     Economic, sociological, and psychological theory suggests that happier workers are more productive.  
Workers who are treated well and satisfied with their jobs will put forth greater effort in line with their 
employer's objectives.  Employers who treat workers poorly will have employees who put forth minimal 
effort due to the negative emotions of their treatment.  Empirical research finds that individuals with greater 
job satisfaction are more productive (Kube 2010, Mangione and Quinn 1975, Oswald et al. 2008, Patterson et 
al. 2004).  Boehm and Lyubomirsky (2008) conclude that happier people have better career outcomes, and 
there is a positive correlation between happiness and work performance. 
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     Kalleberg (1977) developed a theory of job satisfaction in which he disaggregates job satisfaction into 
six main components.  He argues that individuals value different aspects of the job differentially.  Given 
different job attributes, workers create a balance of the differing characteristics and obtain one composite, 
overall satisfaction measure of the job as a whole.  He finds the six main components include intrinsic and 
extrinsic measures, including convenience, finances, relationships with coworkers, career opportunities, and 
resource adequacy.  The intrinsic measures include aspects relating to the how interesting the job is, if the 
worker develops and uses his abilities, and if the worker is able to see results.  The intrinsic factors reflect the 
worker's desire to be stimulated by the job and to be able to exercise acquired skills at work.   
     The convenience aspect of the job refers to characteristics such as having good hours, freedoms 
from conflicting demands, no excessive amounts of work, and enough time to do the work.  Financial aspects 
include the pay, fringe benefits, and job security associated with the job.  Relationships with coworkers 
indicate if the coworkers are friendly, helpful, and supportive of the worker.  Career dimensions refer to 
aspects such as opportunities for promotion and whether the employee receives recognition for her work.  
Finally, resource adequacy refers to characteristics and aspects of the job that enable the worker to 
successfully complete his or her tasks.  These include attributes such as availability of help, equipment, and 
information required, as well as having helpful coworkers and adequate supervision.   
     Other economic studies have attempted to ascertain which job characteristics influence job 
satisfaction, and much of these findings corroborate Kalleberg's framework.   Clark (2001) reports that men 
value the extrinsic aspects of work, while women value intrinsic aspects.  Job security and pay are the biggest 
predictors of job satisfaction and quit behavior (Clark 2001, Clark 1998, Clark 1997).  Work hours and 
promotion opportunities are the least cited determinants of satisfaction (Clark 1997). Workers value 
interpersonal relationships followed by job content and high income (Clark 1998).   
     Furthermore, Borgogni et al. (2010) find that management, colleagues, and workers' immediate 
supervisors are strong predictors of job satisfaction.  Supervisors are a main contributor to job satisfaction as 
they are the ones who support and value employees, and they make explicit their demands of the employees 
and distribute rewards to workers. 
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     Gaziogly and Tansel (2006) report that individuals in the education field are less satisfied with their 
absolute pay, but they are more satisfied with their jobs and sense of achievement.  They also find that 
teacher job satisfaction is positively associated with greater job security and negatively associated with long 
working hours, larger schools, and union membership.   
     In the academic setting, school organization influences teacher job satisfaction (Byrk & Driscoll 
1988, Little 1982, Rosenholtz 1989, Rutter and Jacobson 1986).  Communication between teachers and the 
principal increases teacher job satisfaction (Bridges and Hallinan 1978, Forsyth and Hoy 1978, Little 1982).  
Principal leadership, communicative school organization, orderly environment, and average levels of control 
given to teachers increase teacher efficacy which increases job satisfaction (Lee et al. 1991).  Lack of 
autonomy and emotional exhaustion have a negative influence on job satisfaction (Skaalvik and Skaalvik 
2009).   
     Ostroff (1992) studied the effect teacher job satisfaction on student standardized test scores on the 
U.S. and Canada.  She found that higher job satisfaction was associated with increases in standardized test 
scores in math, reading, and social sciences among high school students.  While she treats satisfaction as 
exogenous, she acknowledges the possibility of reverse causality.  Another recent study found that teacher 
qualifications, attitudes, and instructional practices were positively associated with achievement gains in math 
in reading among first graders (Palardy and Rumberger 2008). 
    This paper therefore contributes to the current literature by investigating job satisfaction and productivity.  
It further contributes by linking teacher emotions and job satisfaction to student outcomes.  It fills a void in 
the literature by analyzing outcomes of high school students, in particular, the graduation and college 
enrollment rates.   
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2.3  EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
    The main goal of this paper is to identify the effect of teacher job satisfaction on productivity. A secondary 
goal includes examining other determinants of high school graduation and college enrollment rates.  
Therefore, the main equation of interest is the following: 
 
                                    (2.1) 
 
where O is the outcome of interest, the graduation rate of school s or the percent of graduates from school s 
who enroll in a four-year college.  Sat is the average level of teacher satisfaction at the school.  Contained in 
the vector T are average teacher characteristics, including the average competitiveness level of the teacher's 
undergraduate institution as ranked by Barron's in the year closest to when the teacher entered college; the 
average number of years of experience and its square; the percentage whose Bachelor's is in the field of 
education; the percentage with a Master's Degree; the percentages who have a regular, other (e.g., temporary, 
waived, emergency), or no state certificate; the percentage who are white, Hispanic, black, or other ethnicities;  
the percentage of teachers who are female; the average age and its squared term; the average reported log 
yearly earnings of teachers, the percentage who are unionized; and the percentage who are part time. 
     The vector C represents student demographic characteristics, including the percentage of students 
who are limited-English proficient; the percentage who are on an individualized education plan; the 
percentage who are on free or reduced price lunch; the percentage of students who are white, Hispanic, black, 
or other ethnicities; the percentage who are male; and the percentage who are migrant.  While this study is not 
able to measure directly parental support and familial background characteristics, including the percentage of 
students on school lunch and ethnicities may address these issues.  Students on reduced-price lunch come 
from poorer families, where the parents might be less educated and perhaps might not value education as 
much as better educated parents.  Even if they do value education, parents in these families may have to work 
multiple, low-paying jobs and may not have time to help their children with their homework or to encourage 
them academically.   
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    I is a vector of school-specific characteristics, including whether or not the school is a charter school, its 
enrollment and enrollment squared, the student-teacher ratio, and the average daily attendance rate.   The 
average daily attendance rate also may capture familial and neighborhood effects, as schools with lower 
average daily attendance may be in areas where education is not valued or where parents are not around to 
encourage their child to go to school.  Furthermore, average daily attendance captures if students are more 
prepared and learning in school.   
     The vector I also includes interactions of student and teacher ethnicities as well as characteristics 
such as whether or not the school is for problem children, has admission requirements, has a magnet 
program, is a Montessori or other specialized instruction school, whether it receives Title 1 benefits, whether 
it has a special program emphasis, is a special education school, a vocational/technical school, or an 
alternative school.   I also contains information regarding the organizational structure of the school, such as 
hours per day and hours per day squared, days of school and days of school squared per academic year, if the 
school has block, loop, or divided scheduling, if the school groups different age groups together, and if the 
school is on a 12 month schedule. I also includes information regarding the school's urbanicity. 
     Finally, D represents a vector of state fixed effects.  As educational policy varies significantly by state, 
excluding state effects would lead to omitted variable bias and would cause any effects found to be invalid.   
     Since the outcome of interest is a school-level variable, this study estimates equation (2.1) using one 
observation per school (full sample).  The teacher characteristics are aggregates (averages) of the teacher 
responses to the SASS questionnaires.  Therefore, this study also estimates equation (2.1) using only schools 
with at least three respondents to the SASS. 
     Estimating equation (2.1) by OLS may result in biased estimates, as the average level of teacher 
satisfaction is endogenous.  The endogeneity stems from reverse causality:  teachers who work at more 
successful schools will be happier.   As such, an instrumental variable approach is necessary to purge the 
model of this endogeneity.  The instruments for teacher job satisfaction are based on the Kalleberg (1977) 
framework and the other job satisfaction literature findings. The following equation represents the first stage:  
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                                    (2.2) 
 
     The exogenous instruments are contained in the vector A which represents the average levels of 
teacher autonomy and attitudes about their schools and teaching.  These variables include the variance of 
teachers' responses to questions regarding their level of agreement with if the staff is recognized for a job well 
done and if the principal supports teachers.  A also contains information regarding the average of teacher's 
responses to the amount of control they believe they have over selecting their instructional materials and 
textbooks and disciplining students.   
     Many of the determinants of teacher satisfaction, such as salary and hours (Clark 2001, Clark 1997), 
also may influence student outcomes directly.  Therefore, this analysis excludes these variables as potential 
instruments.  Using multiple instruments for job satisfaction is advantageous as it overidentifies the system, 
allowing for the orthogonality assumptions associated with the instruments to be tested formally.  
Furthermore, as Kalleberg (1977) suggested, individuals value different dimensions of jobs differentially, and 
they each weight these aspects individually to arrive at a single, composite measure of satisfaction.  As such, 
this estimation strategy further corresponds to Kalleberg's framework. 
     The teachers' views on if the staff is recognized for good work and on if the principal is supportive 
of the teachers' work reflect the career dimension of Kalleberg's framework.  If teachers feel support for their 
work and feel that they are not being criticized and unappreciated, they will be happier.  Furthermore, actual 
recognition for good work inspires teachers and makes them happier in their jobs.  These variables do not 
directly influence the graduation rate or college enrollment rate, except through increasing job satisfaction.   
     The variables relating to the teachers' views of control reflect the intrinsic aspect of Kalleberg's 
framework.  The variables reflecting the control over selecting books and materials and disciplining students 
do not belong in the second stage. They reflect how the teachers view their control over these aspects of their 
jobs and do not directly influence the outcomes of interest.  Having autonomy and control increases job 
satisfaction (Skaalvik and Skaalvik 2009), and high satisfaction increases a teacher's motivation (Moe et al. 
2010).  Thus, increased perceived control may increase satisfaction, resulting in happier and better teachers.  
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Control over selecting materials does not belong in the main equation, because while having the ability to 
select materials will aid teachers, teachers still need the skill set to be able to use these resources to be 
effective teachers.  Furthermore, the control variables represent the variance of the teachers' perceptions, so a 
direct link to outcomes is nonexistent.   
     The instruments are the variances of these variables as using the average of the variable would imply 
the average outcome.  Using the variance of the instruments suggests increases or decreases in satisfaction 
overall.  In other words, using an average to predict an average may violate orthogonality conditions, whereas 
variances give an extra degree of exogeneity. 
 
2.4  DATA 
 
     The data come from the restricted-use 2007-2008 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS).  The SASS is 
a stratified probability proportional to size survey that is administered every four years.  The SASS is 
composed of a series of questionnaires at the teacher, school, principal, and district levels.  Schools are 
sampled and surveyed first, and then teachers are sampled from the responding schools.  Teachers within 
schools are surveyed at a rate of at least one and no more than 20 teachers per school, with an average 
between 3 and 8 teachers sampled per school. 
     The teacher survey contains a series of questions about the teacher's demographic characteristics 
(e.g., age, race, gender); educational attainment, including the name of the teacher's undergraduate college, his 
majors, degrees obtained, years of graduation; years of teaching experience; and certification status.  It also 
contains questions about teacher's perceptions of the school climate and about the teacher's attitudes towards 
teaching and her school.   Respondents answered the questions on a scale of 1-4, and the average school-level 
response is an aggregation of the teachers' responses.  The measure of teacher job satisfaction is based on the 
question "I am generally satisfied with being a teacher at this school."  Responses range from 4 "Strongly 
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Agree" to 1 "Strongly Disagree."  The average level of teacher job satisfaction is 3.46, with a standard 
deviation of 0.381.  The minimum school level of satisfaction is 1.4, while the maximum is 4.0.   
     The school survey contains information regarding the student demographic composition, the 
numbers of staff and faculty working at the school, information regarding school programs, organization, and 
structure, and whether the school had any students in grades 9-12.  Since the outcomes of interest are the 
high school graduation rate and the percentage of graduates who enroll in four year institutions, the sample 
includes only schools that had seniors the year before the survey (e.g., seniors graduating in 2007).  The final 
sample is comprised of 29702 public high schools. 
     While there is much debate over the proper way to measure the graduation rate (see Heckman & 
LaFontaine 2010), the graduation rate in this study is the schools' reported rate of the percentage of seniors 
who graduated. It is roughly 87.8%, with a standard deviation of 21.6.  The enrollment rate is the percentage 
of graduating seniors who enrolled in a four year college.  Of those schools with graduating seniors, the 
average enrollment rate is roughly 45.6% with a standard deviation of 24.7.   
 
2.5  RESULTS 
2.5.1  Job Satisfaction 
 
    The quality of the identification strategy hinges critically on whether the instruments are important 
determinants of the level of teacher job satisfaction.  Table 2.1 presents the estimates of the first stage 
(equation 2).  In addition to the theoretical arguments above, the first stage regression results indicate that the 
instruments are valid.  The R-squared values of 0.20 and 0.21 for the full sample and the subsample of 
schools with at least 3 teachers responding indicate that the instruments explain the average satisfaction level 
adequately.  Shea's partial R-squared, which reports the part of satisfaction which is explained by the excluded 
                                                          
1
 The average level of job satisfaction for the subpopulation of schools with at least 3 teachers responding to the SASS is 
3.46 with a standard deviation of 0.36. 
2
 All samples sizes are rounded to the nearest 10 for confidentiality purposes.  The subsample of schools with at least 3 
teachers responding to the SASS is 2740. 
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instruments, is 0.13 for the full sample and 0.14 for the subsample of schools with at least three teachers 
responding to the SASS3.  Shea's partial R-squared terms suggest that the instruments explain a significant 
portion of satisfaction.   
Table 2.1    First Stage Estimates 
All Schools 3+ Obs/Schl
Variance of Teacher Agreement Staff Recognized for Job Well Done -0.0730*** -0.0742***
(0.0156) (0.0162)
Variance of Teacher Agreement Principal Supports Teachers -0.1696*** -0.1799***
(0.0160) (0.0156)
Variance of Control over Material -0.0265** -0.0316***
(0.0108) (0.0116)
Variance of Control over Discipline -0.1423*** -0.1501***
(0.0223) (0.0230)
2nd Stage Controls Yes Yes
Constant 2.0679** 1.7142
(1.0371) (1.0737)
Observations 2970 2740
Adjusted R-squared 0.204 0.209
Model I
First Stage Results
 
Furthermore, an F test on the excluded instruments results in an F statistic of 44.32 and 80.987 for 
the two samples, again suggesting that the instruments are not weak and continue to explain a significant 
portion of satisfaction, even after controlling for the exogenous variables in the main equation.  For the 
college enrollment outcome, the F statistics are 80.8 and 83.3 for all schools and for schools with at least 
three teachers responding. Finally, Hansen's J statistic, which tests the orthogonality conditions and ensures 
that the model is overidentified. For the graduation outcome, Hansen's J statistic is 0.13 (p=0.988) for the full 
sample and 1.23 (p=0.745), indicating that the model is overidentified.  For the college enrollment outcome, 
Hasen's J statistic is 3.58 (p=0.311) and 5.71 (p=0.126) for the two samples, confirming the model is 
overidentified and that the empirical strategy is sound. 
                                                          
3
 The college enrollment outcome is for a subsample of schools from the graduation outcome.  The adjusted R-squared 
terms for this outcome for all schools and for schools with at least three teachers responding to the SASS are 0.20 and 
0.24, respectively.  Shea's partial R-squared is 0.13 and 0.14 for the two samples. 
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     The results of the first stage analysis suggest that the biggest determinants of teacher job satisfaction 
are a supportive principal and autonomy over disciplining students.  Teachers also appear happier if they 
receive recognition for their hard work. Finally, the results indicate that the identification strategy is sound, 
the model is over identified, the instruments are not weak, and that the results are valid and consistent. 
 
2.5.2  Graduation Rate 
 
     The results of equation (2.1) using the graduation rate outcome are presented in Table 2.2.  Columns 
1 and 2 provide the OLS estimates for all schools and for schools with at least four teachers responding, 
respectively.  Columns 3 and 4 present the results of the IV estimation.   
     For the OLS estimation, the results in Column 1 indicate that a one standard deviation increase in 
the average teacher job satisfaction at a school is associated with an increase in the graduation rate of 0.87 
percentage points.  As such, the model suggests that happier teachers are more productive.  This finding 
implies that a relationship exists; however, this finding should be interpreted with caution due to the 
endogeneity of satisfaction. 
     For the controls, Column 1 suggests that schools whose teachers are more experienced have lower 
graduation rates. This could reflect that teachers may become stale in their teaching and may have difficulty 
engaging students the longer they have been teaching. 
     Schools with greater proportions of black teachers have lower graduation rates, as do schools with 
greater proportions of black and other minority students; however, interaction effects indicate positive 
effects.  That is, schools with greater proportions of black teachers and students have higher graduation rates.  
This is consistent with the finding that students learn better from teachers with whom they share their 
ethnicity (Dee 2004).   
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Table 2.2.  OLS & IV Estimates of Teacher Satisfaction on the Graduation Rate
All Schools 3+ Obs/Schl All Schools 3+ Obs/Schl
Average Teacher Satisfaction 2.2696** 2.5309** 1.8728 1.1984
(1.0392) (1.0295) (3.2898) (2.7703)
Ave College Rank 0.6880 0.3399 0.6754 0.2708
(0.8001) (0.8118) (0.7821) (0.7920)
Average Years of Experience of Teachers -0.8196** -0.6611 -0.8204** -0.6726*
(0.3841) (0.4190) (0.3741) (0.4085)
Average Years of Experience of Teachers Squared 0.0196 0.0149 0.0197* 0.0154
(0.0120) (0.0133) (0.0117) (0.0130)
Percent of Teachers Hispanic 0.0152 -0.0113 0.0149 -0.0123
(0.0427) (0.0451) (0.0422) (0.0441)
Percent of Teachers Black -0.1601* -0.2081** -0.1596* -0.2033**
(0.0861) (0.0879) (0.0842) (0.0860)
Percent of Students Hispanic -0.0748** -0.0712* -0.0766** -0.0786**
(0.0380) (0.0384) (0.0380) (0.0383)
Percent of Students Black -0.0966** -0.0682* -0.0977** -0.0704*
(0.0390) (0.0374) (0.0394) (0.0372)
Percent of Students Other Ethnicity (Asian, Am Ind, Oth) -0.1037* -0.1244** -0.1041* -0.1273**
(0.0594) (0.0608) (0.0582) (0.0595)
Charter School (=1) 4.3760 2.5549 4.3787 2.1946
(2.7855) (2.8789) (2.7336) (2.8028)
Average Daily Attendance Rate 0.0609 0.0858** 0.0621 0.0807**
(0.0407) (0.0420) (0.0395) (0.0409)
Pct Teachers Hispanic*Percent  Students Hispanic -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0001
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009)
Percent Teachers Black*Percent Students Black 0.0018* 0.0020** 0.0018* 0.0020**
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010)
Pct Teachers Other Ethnicity*Pct Students Other Ethnicity 0.0031* 0.0016 0.0032** 0.0015
(0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0015)
School for Problem Children -9.9379*** -5.9303 -9.9114*** -6.2920
(3.8210) (4.4212) (3.7516) (4.3265)
Magnet Program (=1) 3.4012** 2.3631* 3.3726** 2.3889*
(1.3601) (1.3440) (1.3346) (1.3165)
Special Education School (=1) -27.8324*** -28.9247*** -27.7165*** -29.1063***
(5.4612) (5.9323) (5.3427) (5.8069)
Vocational/Technical School (=1) -10.9168*** -8.5147** -10.8436*** -8.3052**
(3.6744) (3.7464) (3.6475) (3.6605)
Alternative School (=1) -18.7583*** -19.0889*** -18.7547*** -18.5543***
(3.3399) (3.8991) (3.3021) (3.7880)
Hours in School Day 10.0330** 13.8321*** 9.9394** 14.2340***
(4.3011) (5.2658) (4.2077) (5.1762)
Hours in School Day Squared -0.7087** -0.9944** -0.7004** -1.0241**
(0.3461) (0.4176) (0.3386) (0.4101)
School Organization: Multiple Age Groups Combined (=1) -3.0575*** -3.1697*** -3.0714*** -3.0924***
(0.7121) (0.7029) (0.6940) (0.6858)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 44.1117 19.2444 45.2427 19.3225
(67.9196) (73.4014) (66.8286) (72.0337)
Observations 2970 2740 2970 2740
Adjusted R-squared 0.304 0.286 0.304 0.285
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Other controls include: teacher age and age squared; the log average earnings of teachers, percentage of teachers of another ethnicity (Asian, American 
Indian, Other), the percentage of teachers who have a BA in Education, a Master's, are certified, are female, unionized, part time; the percentages of 
students who are limited english proficient, on an individualized education plan, on school lunch, male or migrant; the school's days per year and its 
square, total enrollment and its square, the student teacher ratio, if it is a Montessori, Title 1, or Special program emphasis school, if it has an admissions 
requirement,  if the school has a block, loop, or 12 month schedule, and its urbanicity.
IVOLS
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Schools that are for problem children, are special education, vocational/technical, or alternative 
schools have lower graduation rates than traditional public schools.  Special education schools have lower 
graduation rates by roughly 28-29 percentage points, while vocational/technical schools have lower 
graduation rates by 10.9 percentage points for the full sample and 8.5 percentage points for the subsample 
than traditional public schools.  Alternative schools have lower rates by 18.8 to 19.1 percentage points for the 
two samples.   Schools that group children in multiple age groups also have lower graduation rates by roughly 
3.1-3.2 percentage points.   
     Schools with magnet programs have greater graduation rates by nearly 3.4 percentage points than 
schools without magnet programs.  Schools with longer school days have greater graduation rates.  This 
corresponds to the idea that the longer students are instructed, the greater their achievement (Coates 1998).  
Overall, the general model appears to be valid as the controls exhibit the expected signs. 
    Column 2 presents the OLS results for the subsample of schools with at least three teachers responding to 
the SASS.  For this subsample, a one standard deviation increase in job satisfaction increases the graduation 
rate by 0.91 percentage points. 
     The results for the controls appear similar between the two samples, although there are a few 
differences.  Most notably, schools with greater attendance rates have greater graduation rates.  This finding is 
similar to the idea that attendance helps test scores among elementary students (Angrist and Lavy 1999, 
Lamdin 1996, Rivkin et al. 2005), therefore, attendance improving graduation rates is logical.   
     Other notable differences between the two samples are that teacher experience no longer negatively 
affects the graduation rate.  Also, being a school for problem children no longer negatively affect the 
graduation rate,   
     Given the endogeneity of satisfaction, the estimates for the OLS estimation are not consistent.  To 
address the endogeneity problem, columns 3 and 4 present the instrumental variables estimates. 
     Correcting for the endogeneity of satisfaction, the results suggest that teacher job satisfaction does 
not affect the graduation rate.  The results for the controls are similar between the OLS and IV models.  
Thus, OLS overestimates the effect of teacher satisfaction on the graduation rate.  The estimates for the 
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controls are similar between the OLS and IV estimations, as well as for both samples.  They are all of the 
predicted sign, confirming the plausibility of the model. 
 
2.5.3  College Enrollment Rate 
 
     Studies on college enrollment rates typically examine financial aid and the opportunity cost of 
attending college.  They do not focus on what high schools may do to encourage their graduates to attend 
college.  This study fills a void in the literature by investigating which school policies and characteristics are 
associated with increases in the college enrollment rate.   
     While increases in teacher job satisfaction do not influence the graduation rate, the question remains 
as to how job satisfaction may affect students in the longer term.  In particular, the question remains as to if 
teacher job satisfaction affects students' enrollment in four year colleges.  Table 2.3 presents the results of the 
estimation of equation (2.1) for the college enrollment rate outcome.  Columns 1 and 2 present the OLS 
results for the full and subsamples, respectively.  Columns 3 and 4 present the IV results for the two samples. 
     The OLS results are quite similar across the two samples.  The estimates imply that a one standard 
deviation increase in teacher job satisfaction increases the college enrollment rate by roughly 1.4 for the full 
sample and by 1.5 percentage points for the subsample of schools with at least three teachers responding to 
the SASS.  Thus, the OLS estimates imply teacher job satisfaction may have a lasting effect on student 
outcomes beyond high school.   
     Unlike with graduation, a one percent increase in the proportion of teachers with a Bachelor's degree 
in education is associated with a decrease in the college enrollment rate by roughly 0.05 and 0.06 percentage 
points for the two samples.  No other teacher characteristics affect the college enrollment rate. 
     With respect to student characteristics, increases in the proportion of students on school lunch are 
associated with decreases in the college enrollment rate.  This may reflect that these students must work full 
time after graduating from high school to help support their families.   
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Table 2.3.  OLS & IV Estimates of Teacher Satisfaction on the College Enrollment Rate
All Schools 3+ Obs/Schl All Schools 3+ Obs/Schl
Average Teacher Satisfaction 3.6487*** 4.2261*** 6.1911** 6.3767*
(1.0691) (1.1611) (3.1114) (3.2592)
Ave College Rank 1.2140 1.0876 1.2372 1.1173
(0.9009) (0.9720) (0.8879) (0.9551)
Average Years of Experience of Teachers 0.2048 0.5165 0.2551 0.5676
(0.3984) (0.4454) (0.3911) (0.4379)
Average Years of Experience of Teachers Squared -0.0018 -0.0115 -0.0036 -0.0137
(0.0117) (0.0130) (0.0115) (0.0127)
Percentage of Teachers with BA in Education -0.0475** -0.0631*** -0.0455** -0.0618***
(0.0222) (0.0238) (0.0219) (0.0234)
Percent of Students on School Lunch -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0011*** -0.0012***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Percent of Students Hispanic -0.1210*** -0.1233*** -0.1146*** -0.1205***
(0.0409) (0.0428) (0.0405) (0.0424)
Percent of Students Male -0.0903* -0.0755 -0.0875* -0.0747
(0.0509) (0.0545) (0.0499) (0.0534)
Charter School (=1) 6.1749* 6.1270* 6.9406** 6.8853*
(3.3054) (3.6388) (3.2350) (3.5504)
Total Enrollment 0.0040** 0.0033 0.0040** 0.0033
(0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0021)
Percent of Teachers Black*Percent  of Students Black 0.0016* 0.0014 0.0015* 0.0012
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Specialized Instruction (e.g., Montessori) (=1) -1.6705* -1.8934* -1.6307* -1.8519*
(0.9769) (1.0149) (0.9564) (0.9944)
Special Program Emphasis (=1) 16.3719*** 17.4036*** 15.7924*** 16.8472***
(3.8252) (3.8617) (3.7731) (3.8003)
Special Education School (=1) -21.9553*** -21.8469*** -21.7150*** -22.2091***
(4.4429) (4.9003) (4.3743) (4.8070)
Vocational/Technical School (=1) -16.4759*** -17.5681*** -16.6588*** -17.7222***
(3.3662) (3.6373) (3.3336) (3.5715)
Alternative School (=1) -23.9943*** -21.1988*** -25.1687*** -23.1600***
(2.9857) (3.4825) (2.9894) (3.4532)
School Organization: Multiple Age Groups Combined (=1) -1.3550 -1.7130** -1.3123 -1.6478*
(0.8564) (0.8719) (0.8412) (0.8547)
Urbanicity: City (=1) 2.3744* 2.9174** 2.2378 2.7914*
(1.4200) (1.4856) (1.3932) (1.4554)
Urbanicity: Suburb (=1) 3.9260*** 3.6856*** 3.8255*** 3.5542***
(1.2722) (1.3174) (1.2493) (1.2893)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2890 2680 2890 2680
Adjusted R-squared 0.309 0.292 0.308 0.291
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Other controls include: teacher age and age squared; the log average earnings of teachers, percentage of teachers of another ethnicity ( Hispanic, 
Black, or Asian, American Indian, Other), the percentage of teachers who have  a Master's, are certified, are female, unionized, part time; the 
percentages of students who are Black and other ethnicity, limited english proficient, on an individualized education plan, on school lunch, male 
or migrant; interactions of percentages of students and teachers Hispanic and other ethnicity; the school's days per year and its square, hours per 
day and its square, enrollment squared, the student teacher ratio, the attendance rate, if it has a Magnet program, is Title 1,if it has an admissions 
requirement,  if the school has a block, loop, or 12 month schedule, and the constant.
IVOLS
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 A one percentage point increase in the proportion of students who are Hispanic is associated with a 
decrease in the college enrollment rate by roughly 0.12 percentage points for the two samples.  An interaction 
of the percentage of teachers and students who are black positively affects the enrollment rate, though this 
effect is small in magnitude and is significant at the 10% level only in the full sample.  Finally, a one 
percentage point increase in the percent of students who are male is associated with a decrease in the 
graduation rate of nearly 0.9 percentage points, though this effect is significant only in the full sample of 
schools at the 10% level. 
     School characteristics and programs also associated with increases in the college enrollment rate.  
Unlike with the graduation outcome, charter status now has a positive effect on student outcomes.  Charter 
school graduates are roughly 6.17 and 6.13 percentage points more likely to enroll in college than traditional 
public school graduates in the two samples.  Schools with a larger enrollment have a slightly higer college 
enrollment rate among their graduates, though this effect is quite small and is only significant for the full 
sample. 
     Schools with a special program emphasis also have greater enrollment rates by roughly 16.4 and 17.4 
percentage points for the full and subsample, respectively.  Finally, schools in cities and suburbs have greater 
college enrollment rates than their rural counterparts.  Schools in cities have greater college enrollment rates 
by 2.4 and 2.9 percentage points for the full and subsamples, respectively.  Schools located in suburban areas 
have greater enrollment rates by 3.93 and 3.69 percentage points.   
     School characteristics and programs that are associated with negative college enrollment rates include 
school with specialized instruction programs (e.g., Montessori, etc.) have lower college enrollment rates by 
roughly 1.7 and 1.9 percentage points for the two samples.  Schools that are special education, vocational 
technical, and alternative schools also have lower college enrollment rates.  Special education schools have 
lower college enrollment rates by nearly 22.0 and 16.5 percentage points.  Vocational and technical high 
schools have lower rates by roughly 16.5 and 17.5 percentage points for the two samples.  Students 
graduating from these schools have little incentive to enroll in college as these students typically graduate with 
trade skills.  Finally, alternative high schools have lower college enrollment rates among their graduates by 
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nearly 24.0 and 21.2 percentage points for the two samples.  All of these schools serve a distinct group of 
students who are generally less likely to enroll in college for a variety of reasons.   Finally, for the sample of 
schools with at least three teachers responding to the SASS, the results indicate that schools which group 
multiple ages of students together have lower college enrollment rates of roughly 1.7 percentage points.   
     As with the graduation outcome, given the endogeneity of satisfaction, OLS estimates are 
inconsistent.  The IV estimates are presented in Columns 3 and 4 for the full and subsamples, respectively.   
     The results in Columns 3 and 4 in Table 2.3 imply that the OLS estimates underestimate the effect of 
teacher job satisfaction on the college enrollment rate.  The IV results indicate that a one standard deviation 
increase teacher job satisfaction is associated with an increase in the college enrollment rate of 2.35 
percentage points for the full sample and of 2.28 percentage points for the subsample of schools.  Thus, 
teacher job satisfaction has a lasting and long term effect on student outcomes. 
     As with the graduation outcome, the IV estimates for the controls are similar to the OLS estimates.  
The IV estimation also indicates that charter schools have a slightly larger effect on the college enrollment 
rate than the OLS estimates suggest.  Charter school graduates are 6.94 and 6.89 percentage points more 
likely to enroll in college than traditional public school graduates. 
 
2.6  CONCLUSIONS 
 
     Improving student outcomes is a major policy focus of the nation.  For decades, researchers have 
attempted to determine which school inputs affect student outcomes.  While most studies focus on changes 
in test scores, these outcomes are not linked to later life outcomes.  High school graduation and college 
enrollment rates are positively associated with improvements life outcomes.  Furthermore, increases in the 
high school graduation rate and college enrollment rate will lead to increased national productivity and 
decreased societal costs. 
     While much attention has been given to addressing teacher qualifications and teacher effectiveness, 
thus far research has not focused on teacher attitudes.  This paper sheds light on how teacher attitudes affect 
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student outcomes.  It contributes to the literature by investigating the effect of teacher job satisfaction on 
productivity, as measured by the graduation and college enrollment rates.  It finds that an increase of one 
standard deviation in the average level of teacher job satisfaction at a school has a lasting effect on students as 
it is associated with an increase in the college enrollment rate of roughly 2.3-2.4 percentage points.  It has 
negligible effects on the graduation rate.  The determinants of teacher job satisfaction suggest that improving 
teacher support and autonomy in their classrooms may help to increase teacher job satisfaction at little 
monetary cost to schools.   
     Finally, this study also attempted to determine which policy-relevant school characteristics may 
influence student outcomes. While charter school status had no significant effect on increasing the graduation 
rate, charter school graduates were nearly 7 percentage points more likely to enroll in college than their 
traditional school counterparts.   
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CHAPTER 3 
TEACHER ATTRITION IN CHARTER AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
     Teacher attrition in the public school system is a subject of much concern among policymakers.   It is 
estimated that the cost of replacing a teacher is roughly 25% of the salary and benefits per teacher (Texas 
Center for Educational Research 2000).   Attrition may be beneficial, if those who are not committed and 
those who are the least effective are the ones leaving.  If, however, higher quality teachers are the ones who 
are leaving, then attrition becomes a problem.  Furthermore, a constant churn of teachers in and out of 
schools may introduce instability into students' academic careers.  
     Charter schools are a hybrid of public and private schools in that they are publicly funded but may be 
exempt from some constraints associated with traditional public schools.  Charter teachers are generally 
younger than traditional public school teachers, and they are less likely to be union members.  They are also 
more likely to be from better ranked colleges.  Proponents of the charter school movement believe the 
autonomy associated with charters may make them attractive workplaces for teachers.  Given the 
fundamental differences between charter and public schools, investigating if there is a difference in attrition 
may illuminate how to encourage effective teachers to remain in the profession.   
     Attrition includes both teachers who leave the profession as well as those who switch schools.  
Attrition is higher among newer, younger teachers (Hansen et al. 2004, Inman and Marlow 2004, Miron and 
Applegate 2007).   Roughly 11% of teachers exit in their first year of teaching, while nearly 40% leave within 5 
years (Ingersoll 2002).  Certified teachers are less likely to leave (Ondrich et al. 2008), and non certified 
teachers are more likely to leave (Miron and Applegate 2007). Teacher attrition is also high in schools located 
in urban areas (Lankford et al. 2002) and in schools which serve minority (Feng 2010, Feng 2009, Hanushek 
et al. 2004, Scafidi et al. 2007) or poorer students (Lankford et al. 2002). Since charter teachers are newer and 
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younger than traditional teachers, since they are less likely to be certified, and since charters 
disproportionately serve minority students, the attrition rate may be higher at charter schools.  Charter 
teachers also have more autonomy than traditional public school (TPS) teachers, so attrition may be lower in 
charters.   
     With the rise of the charter school movement, recent literature has attempted to examine attrition in 
charter and public schools.  The results are somewhat mixed.  In Florida, charter teachers are more likely to 
leave their schools than TPS teachers, though those that leave are the weaker ones (Harris 2007).  Meanwhile, 
in Wisconsin, the high rates of turnover in charter schools is attributed to the types of teachers hired and 
charter location as opposed to their charter status (Gross and DeArmond 2010).  Among charter teachers in 
Florida, the less experienced are not more likely to move to another school (Harris 2007).   Studies on 
charters in Wisconsin and Florida may not be generalizable to the nation, as their charter laws are relatively 
strict and teacher requirements are similar between the two school types.  For example, in other states, newer 
and younger teachers are more likely to leave charters (Miron and Applegate 2007) .   
     Cannata (2010), using a binomial logistic hierarchical linear model, also finds charter teachers leave 
their schools at a greater rate than TPS teachers.  She cites that inexperience and lack of certification are the 
main drivers of decisions to leave.  She finds no difference in the odds of leaving for charter and TPS 
teachers after controlling for teacher and school characteristics and teacher experiences. Cannata's analysis 
only investigates teachers who leave teaching, not those who switch schools.   
     Using data from the 1999-2000 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) and the 2000-2001 Teacher 
Follow up Survey (TFS), Renzulli et al. (2011) estimate a multinomial logit model and find that charter 
teachers are 3.47 times more likely to leave schools and 2.7 times more likely to leave teaching altogether than 
TPS teachers.  While the authors control for teacher and school characteristics, they do not account for 
certification nor for qualifications such as the competitiveness of the teacher's undergraduate college.  Stuit 
and Smith (2009) find similar results using the 2003-2004 SASS and TFS.  Using a multinomial logit, the 
authors find that charter teachers are more likely to leave teaching and to move schools than traditional 
teachers, though their analysis is limited to sixteen states.   
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     This study draws on the previous literature on attrition and retention in schools and attempts to 
clarify the ambiguity.  It investigates how attrition, measured in terms of both leaving teaching altogether and 
switching schools, differs between charter and public school teachers and among teachers with different 
qualifications.  It further examines how attrition rates vary for all teachers versus new teachers.  Furthermore, 
it investigates differences in attrition among teachers who voluntarily left their schools.   
     This chapter is organized as follows:  Section 3.2 describes the relevant literature.  Section 3.3 defines 
the empirical strategy, and section 3.4 describes the data.  Section 3.5 presents the results, while section 3.6 
concludes. 
 
3.2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
     Teachers' mobility decisions are a factor of personal and professional characteristics.  These include 
general demographic and household characteristics, quality and qualifications, financial aspects, and 
nonpecuniary aspects of teaching.   
     With respect to personal demographics, Black teachers are more likely to leave teaching while 
Hispanic teachers are more likely to transfer districts (Feng 2009).  Gender's role in the mobility decision is 
slightly murky.  One study suggests that females are more likely to leave (Guarino et al. 2006), while another 
finds that males are more likely to lave (Harris 2007).  Among charter school teachers, gender and race are 
not significant predictors of the mobility decision (Miron and Applegate 2007).   
     One of the seemingly most obvious reasons is that teachers may leave their profession due to low 
pay or to relatively lower pay given outside options.  The literature on this aspect is mixed. One study reports 
that teachers do not leave for higher paying jobs (Scafidi et al. 2006), while others claim that they are less 
likely to change districts or leave teaching when they are paid relatively more (Feng 2009, Ondrich et al. 
2008). Other studies suggests that teachers respond to pay incentives, though the effect is small (Hansen et al. 
2004, Hanushek et al. 2004).    
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     Similarly, teachers who may have greater opportunities outside of teaching, such as those from 
higher-ranked colleges, those with graduate degrees, or those who teach high school, may be more likely to 
leave.  Again, the findings in the literature are slightly mixed.  Some studies indicate that teachers with greater 
qualifications and those who are more effective are less likely to leave (Feng and Sass 2011, Goldhaber et al. 
2010, Boyd et al. 2011, Boyd et al. 2008).  A host of other studies suggest that teachers graduating from better 
ranked colleges are more likely to leave teaching earlier (Guarino et al. 2006, Henke et al. 2000, Lankford et al. 
2002, Murnane and Olsen 1989, Murnane and Olsen 1990, Podgursky et al. 2004).   One study finds that  
both higher and lower quality teachers are more likely to leave teaching than are average quality teachers 
(Feng and Sass 2011). 
     The literature on teachers with advanced degrees is ambiguous as well.  Some studies suggest 
teachers with Master's degrees are more likely to leave (Hensen et al. 2004), while others suggest they are less 
likely to leave (Feng 2009). 
     High school teachers are more likely to leave teaching (Guarino et al. 2006, Henke et al, 2001, 
Ingersoll 2001, Kirby et al. 1999, Miron and Applegate 2007). Female math and science teachers are more 
likely to leave teaching than female elementary school teachers (Ondrich et al 2008).   
     School context matters to teachers, as they respond to school and student characteristics, as well as 
their experiences in their schools.  Teachers are more likely to leave low-achieving schools and academically 
disadvantaged students (Hanushek et al. 2004).  This effect is greater for more qualified teachers (Boyd et al 
2005, Lankford et al. 2002).  Teachers are more likely to leave when they are in higher poverty schools (Harris 
2007).   
     Teachers who leave cite a lack of professionalism, support, and collegiality as reasons for why they 
may leave (Inman and Marlow 2004). Johnson and Birkeland (2003) also find teachers leave due to lack of 
clear expectations and unsupportive and cooperative environments. 
     Charter teachers are less likely to move or leave schools with greater proportion of limited-English 
proficient (LEP) students, while public school teachers are more likely to leave these schools (Harris 2007).  
57 
 
 
Male teachers are more likely to move, and inexperienced public school teachers more likely to move than the 
more experienced (Harris 2007).   
     Thus, the literature and conclusions on teacher attrition leave an incomplete and complex picture.  It 
appears that newer, younger teachers leave teaching at a greater rate than their more experienced 
counterparts.  Teachers also leave more challenging work environments.  Teachers who have greater 
opportunity costs of teaching may be more likely to leave teaching.   What remains unclear is if the attrition 
rate differs for charter and TPS teachers, and if teacher qualifications, such as the competitiveness of the 
teacher's undergraduate college, matter.   
     This study draws on the previous literature and attempts to clarify which teacher, school, and student 
characteristics enter into the teacher mobility decision.  Furthermore, while most studies incorporate teacher 
demographic characteristics such as age, race, and gender, household characteristics tend to be lacking from 
the analysis.  This study incorporates household characteristics into the mobility decision as a teacher must 
factor in not only work-related aspects, but also his or her home life and necessities. Finally, this study 
investigates differences in attrition for different sub-groups of teachers, including new teachers and those 
who voluntarily left teaching, a characteristic often ignored in the literature1.   
 
3.3  EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
     To investigate factors that determine attrition rates, this study estimates a multinomial logit model to 
determine the probability that a teacher may leave or move schools.  The model is:  
          
        
            
 
    
     2    (3.1) 
                
 
                                                          
1Feng (2010, 2009) and Feng and Sass (2011) acknowledge that turnover may be a result of school actions, though they 
cite that in Florida 85-90% of turnover is voluntary. Since their data are from Florida, they therefore include both 
voluntary and involuntary leavers. 
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where A is attrition and j=0 represents staying in the current school, j=1  represents leaving teaching 
altogether, and j=2 represents switching schools.  The vector T contains teacher characteristics, the vector P 
includes information regarding teacher's perceptions of their school and experiences, and S is a vector of 
school characteristics. 
     Contained in T are teacher i's demographic, household, and teacher characteristics.  These include 
the teacher's age, gender, ethnicity, marital status, the competitiveness of the teacher's undergraduate 
institution, and if the teacher holds a Master's or doctorate degree.  A priori, this study expects that younger 
teachers will be more likely to leave or move schools as they will be less likely to be settled and established at 
their schools.   
This study does not have an expectation about the role of gender in the mobility decision, as prior 
literature was ambiguous. Females may be more likely to leave teaching, especially if they are caretakers of 
their families.  At the same time, they may be less likely to leave due to the convenient schedule of teaching if 
they are caretakers and have a perceived lack of options.   
Married teachers may be more likely to leave as they have the security of their spouse's income 
and/or may have to leave teaching because of their spouse's job.  On the other hand, married teachers may 
be more likely to leave because their lives are more stable than teachers who have never been married.  This 
study expects that teachers who are divorced or who become divorced or separated are more likely to move 
schools, as they may have had to move due to their divorce or separation.   
With respect to the competitiveness of the teacher's undergraduate institution, this paper anticipates 
that teachers graduating from higher ranked colleges may be more likely to leave teaching as they have a 
greater opportunity cost of teaching. Similarly, teachers with graduate degrees may be more likely to leave 
teaching than those without as they also have greater opportunity costs of teaching.   
     The household characteristics include the number of children under age five, number of family 
members, and household income. These characteristics are often ignored in studies on attrition and retention, 
likely because they are difficult to obtain; however, these characteristics should be included since teachers 
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make mobility decisions based on their own personal lives and households as well as based on their career 
experiences.    
     This study projects that the probability of leaving teaching is increasing in the number of children a 
teacher has under five years of age.  Teachers with young children will require day care for their young 
children, increasing the cost of teaching.  Along the same lines, teachers with larger households may be more 
likely to leave teaching as they may have to be the caretakers.   
     This study expects that teachers who are from households in the top tiers of the income distribution 
will be more likely to leave teaching than those from the middle or lower end of the distribution as these 
teachers' salaries likely will be a small part of the income and perhaps unneccessary.  Meanwhile, teachers 
from the lower or middle of the income distribution range may be more likely to stay in the profession as 
these teachers may be significant contributors to their household's well-being.   
     Teaching characteristics include the number of years of total teaching experience and it square, the 
number of years the teacher taught at the school and its square, if the teacher is a secondary or primary 
school teacher, whether the teacher is a union member, if the teacher is part time, the teacher's log yearly 
earnings, and the teacher's certification status.  A priori expectations suggest that newer teachers and teachers 
who are newer to their schools will be more likely to leave teaching or to move schools.   
This study anticipates secondary school teachers are more likely to leave teaching than elementary 
school teachers.  It expects that non unionized teachers are also more likely to leave as they do not have 
union support and may not be as committed to teaching.  Part-time teachers also are more likely to leave as 
they may be teaching part time while they look for a permanent job or because they may have other 
obligations that make teaching or having a full time job unattractive.    
Teachers who earn more will be less likely to leave or move schools.  Moving schools may cause 
teachers to earn less money, depending on the salary structure of the receiving school.  Furthermore, teachers 
who earn more may be at better schools or may have been at their schools longer, also contributing to the 
decision to stay.  Finally, uncertified teachers are expected to leave teaching at greater rates as these teachers 
have less invested in their teaching careers than certified teachers.   
60 
 
 
     The vector P contains information regarding teachers' perceptions or experiences at their schools.  
This includes information regarding the teacher's level of satisfaction with his/her job, whether the teacher 
believes if the school is run well, if the teacher has ever thought about transferring, or if the teacher believes 
other teachers enforce school rules.  This study anticipates that more satisfied teachers will be less likely to 
leave or move schools.  It also expects that teachers will be less likely to leave if they agree that the school is 
run well.  It expects that teachers who have thought about transferring will be more likely to move schools 
and less likely to leave teaching.  Teachers who think about transferring may be dissatisfied with their current 
schools, but they may be committed to teaching.  Finally, this study expects that teachers who agree that 
other teachers enforce school rules will be more likely to stay since enforcement may reflect a sense of 
support and community that teachers seek.   
     Also included in the vector P are variables indicating whether the teacher believes s/he has control 
over choosing his/her own teaching technique, choosing the materials for class, or over disciplining the 
students.  A priori, this study expects that greater degrees of control will be associated with decreases in the 
probability of leaving teaching, as teachers may desire autonomy in their classrooms.   
     Finally, S contains all student and school characteristics.  These include an indicator for charter 
status, the percent of students on an individualized education plan (IEP), the percent who are limited-English 
proficient (LEP), the percent on school lunch, and the percent of students and the percent of teachers who 
are Hispanic, Black, White, or Other (Asian, American Indian, or Pacific Islander).  A priori expectations 
suggest that teachers will be more likely to leave schools where they teach greater percentages of students on 
an IEP, who are LEP, and who are on free or reduced price lunch.  Finally, it expects that teachers may be 
more likely to leave schools with greater proportions of minority students.  It expects that Black and Hispanic 
teachers may be more likely to leave teaching than White teachers.   
     The vector S also includes the teacher's class size (or average class size if the teacher teaches multiple 
groups of students) and an indicator for if the school has teachers with no classroom.  This study expects that 
teachers who have larger class sizes may be more likely to move schools than to stay.  It also expects that 
teachers will be more likely to leave schools if there are not enough classrooms for each teacher to have 
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his/her own, although having too few classrooms may indicate that the teachers are happy and wish to stay at 
that particular school.   
     S contains characteristics of the school's organization and mission.  These include characteristics 
such as if it is a school for problem children or if it has admissions requirements, if the classes are taught with 
an interdisciplinary focus, or if there is team teaching at the school.  A priori expectations suggest that teachers 
will be more likely to switch schools if it is a school targeted at problem children.  Teachers will be more 
likely to stay if the school has admissions requirements, as students at these schools must have an increased 
desire to be at these schools.  Finally, teachers will be more likely to switch schools if the school has an 
interdisciplinary teaching focus or team teaching focus.  Although, having an interdisciplinary focus may be 
part of a school's mission, and if teachers choose their schools based on the mission, they may be more likely 
to stay due to the interdisciplinary aspect.   
     Final controls included are indicators for if the school has a twelve month schedule or block 
scheduling, both of which may be associated with lower retention at that school.  Finally, urbanicity, whether 
it is urban or rural, and state fixed effects also are included.  State fixed effects are important in this analysis, 
as not only do states determine teachers' retirement packages and requirements, but charter laws vary by state.  
Some states have very lenient charter laws, while others are more strict.  Although the laws vary by state, it 
should also be noted that not all charters within a state are the same and may vary quite significantly from 
other charters in the state; however, this study treats all charter schools the same.   
 
3.4  DATA 
 
     The data come from the restricted-use 2003-2004 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) and the 2004-
2005 Teacher Follow-up Survey (TFS).  The SASS is a stratified probability proportional to size survey that is 
administered every four years.  The SASS is composed of a series of questionnaires at the teacher, school, 
principal, and district levels.  Schools are sampled and surveyed first, and then teachers are sampled from the 
responding schools.  Teachers within schools are surveyed at a rate of at least one and no more than 20 
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teachers per school, with an average between 3 and 8 teachers sampled per school.  The TFS is based on a 
sub-sample of SASS teacher respondents to track attrition and retention in schools.  To help determine what 
drives attrition, the TFS purposefully oversamples teachers who leave teaching (leavers) and teachers who 
switch schools (movers).   
     The teacher survey contains a series of questions about the teacher's demographic characteristics 
(e.g., age, race, gender); educational attainment, including the name of the teacher's undergraduate college, 
degrees obtained, years of graduation; years of teaching experience and years of teaching at the current 
school; and certification status.  It also contains questions about teacher's perceptions of the school climate 
and about the teacher's attitudes towards teaching and his or her school.  Answered ranged from 4 "Strongly 
Agree" to 1 "Strongly Disagree."    
     To obtain the ranking and competitiveness of the teacher's undergraduate college, this study utilized 
rankings from Barron's Profiles of American Colleges, which ranks all four year institutions which offer 
bachelor's degrees if they are fully accredited or are recognized as candidates for accreditation.  The rankings 
are divided into six tiers, Most Competitive, Highly Competitive, Very Competitive, Competitive, Less 
Competitive, and Non Competitive.   This study complied a dataset of the rankings for the publication years 
1970, 1984, 1986, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002.   It identified the Barron's ranked colleges IPEDS 
codes from the National Center of Education Statistics (NCES) for use in merging the rankings to the SASS 
data. It dropped specialized colleges (e.g., religious or arts schools), those that closed or merged, colleges with 
multiple campuses that are not uniquely identifiable in both datasets, and foreign colleges from the analysis.  
Teachers' colleges competitiveness is identified off of the ranking in the year closest to when the teacher 
entered college.  For example, a teacher who entered college in 1990 received the 1992 ranking.   
     The school survey contains information regarding the demographic make up of the teachers and 
students at the school. Student characteristics include the percentages and number of students on IEPs, of 
students who receive free or reduced price lunch, and of students who are LEP.  It also contains information 
regarding the organization of the school, schedule of the school year, special programs or focuses, and 
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information on class sizes.  Finally, it contains geographic information, including the state and urbanicity of 
the school. 
     The Teacher Follow-Up Survey indicates if the teachers remained in their positions between the 
2003-2004 and 2004-2005 academic years, if they switched schools (movers), or if they left teaching altogether 
(leavers).  It also contains information regarding why they left, including if it was the result of a school 
staffing action (e.g., layoff, lack of contract renewal) or other reason (e.g., maternity or leave, retirement).  It 
contains demographic information regarding the teacher's household, such as the number of children under 
age 5, the number of people in the household, the teacher's marital status, the teacher's marital status the year 
before, and information regarding the household income.   
    There were 1,8302 former public school teachers and there were 3,500 current public school teachers in the 
TFS.  Teachers without a college identifier or who did not have a school identified in the school survey were 
dropped from the analysis.  The 650 teachers who retired after the 2003-2004 academic year were also 
excluded from the analysis.  The final sample consists of full or part time regular teachers who are not on 
maternity, paternity, disability leave, or sabbatical.  The full sample is 3,500 teachers. Of these teachers, 970 
were teachers with three or fewer years of experience who started within 5 years3.   
 
3.5  RESULTS 
3.5.1  Descriptive Statistics 
 
     Table 3.1 illustrates the differences between leavers and movers versus stayers.  Leavers and movers 
are more likely to be from charter versus traditional public schools.  They are more likely to be graduates of 
                                                          
2
 All samples are rounded to the nearest 10 for confidentiality purposes associated with the restricted-use nature of the 
data. 
3
 The SASS defines a new teacher as one with three or fewer years of teaching experience.  Many of these teachers 
started teaching greater than 5 years ago, but still have fewer than 3 years of experience.  This study defined new teachers 
as those with three or fewer years of teaching experience who started within 5 years.  This corresponds to the idea that 
teachers progress along a learning curve in their first few years, and it also corresponds to the idea that teachers leave 
teaching within their first 5 years. 
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Less and Non Competitive colleges, but they are less likely to be graduates of Competitive colleges.  
Generally, they are younger than traditional teachers, and they have more children under the age of 5 years.  
Table 3.1.  Descriptive Statistics for Leavers and Movers versus Stayers, All Teachers
Mean Std Err N Mean Std Err N Mean Std Err t-stat N 
Charter (=1) 0.065 0.008 1970 0.051 0.006 1530 0.015 0.008 1.81 3500
New Teacher (=1) 0.278 0.015 1970 0.273 0.011 1530 0.004 0.015 0.28 3500
Most Competitive College (=1) 0.008 0.003 1970 0.008 0.002 1530 -0.001 0.003 -0.29 3500
Highly Competitive College (=1) 0.044 0.007 1970 0.038 0.005 1530 0.005 0.007 0.76 3500
Very Competitive College (=1) 0.143 0.012 1970 0.144 0.009 1530 0.000 0.012 -0.04 3500
Competitive College (=1) 0.454 0.017 1970 0.511 0.013 1530 -0.058 0.017 -3.40 3500
Less Competitive College (=1) 0.257 0.015 1970 0.230 0.011 1530 0.027 0.015 1.84 3500
Non Competitive College (=1) 0.095 0.009 1970 0.068 0.007 1530 0.027 0.009 2.88 3500
Age (Hundreds yrs) 0.382 0.004 1970 0.407 0.003 1530 -0.025 0.004 -6.43 3500
Female (=1) 0.720 0.015 1970 0.746 0.011 1530 -0.025 0.015 -1.67 3500
Tch Hispanic (=1) 0.041 0.007 1970 0.035 0.005 1530 0.006 0.007 0.92 3500
Tch Black (=1) 0.100 0.010 1970 0.086 0.007 1530 0.014 0.010 1.44 3500
Tch Oth Ethnicity (=1) 0.062 0.008 1970 0.042 0.006 1530 0.019 0.008 2.55 3500
No. Children Under 5 0.396 0.022 1970 0.292 0.017 1530 0.104 0.022 4.69 3500
No. Family Members 2.763 0.046 1970 2.773 0.034 1530 -0.010 0.046 -0.22 3500
Got Married (=1) 0.044 0.007 1970 0.044 0.005 1530 0.000 0.007 -0.01 3500
Got Divorced (=1) 0.018 0.004 1970 0.011 0.003 1530 0.007 0.004 1.62 3500
Married Dec  2003 (=1) 0.646 0.016 1970 0.650 0.012 1530 -0.004 0.016 -0.24 3500
Separated/Divorced Dec 2003 (=1) 0.106 0.011 1970 0.108 0.008 1530 -0.002 0.011 -0.15 3500
Never Married Dec 2003 (=1) 0.239 0.014 1970 0.230 0.011 1530 0.009 0.014 0.60 3500
Household Income <$35,000 (=1) 0.110 0.010 1970 0.066 0.007 1530 0.044 0.010 4.49 3500
Household Income $35,000-50,000 (=1) 0.222 0.014 1970 0.181 0.010 1530 0.042 0.014 3.03 3500
Household Income $50,000-75,000 (=1) 0.197 0.014 1970 0.194 0.010 1530 0.003 0.014 0.23 3500
Household Income $75,000-100,000 (=1) 0.206 0.014 1970 0.235 0.011 1530 -0.029 0.014 -2.10 3500
Household Income $100,000+ 0.157 0.013 1970 0.194 0.010 1530 -0.038 0.013 -2.92 3500
Years Experience Total 10.105 0.329 1970 12.309 0.247 1530 -2.204 0.329 -6.69 3500
Years Teaching at School 5.313 0.242 1970 7.734 0.181 1530 -2.421 0.242 -10.02 3500
High School (=1) 0.552 0.017 1970 0.488 0.013 1530 0.064 0.017 3.77 3500
Union Member (=1) 0.655 0.016 1970 0.756 0.012 1530 -0.101 0.016 -6.51 3500
Part Time Teacher (=1) 0.082 0.008 1970 0.040 0.006 1530 0.041 0.008 4.98 3500
Log Yearly earnings 10.505 0.011 1970 10.619 0.008 1530 -0.115 0.011 -10.39 3500
Hours per Week 51.545 0.364 1970 52.440 0.273 1530 -0.895 0.364 -2.46 3500
Graduate Degree (=1) 0.397 0.017 1970 0.425 0.013 1530 -0.028 0.017 -1.68 3500
No certificate (=1) 0.045 0.006 1970 0.022 0.005 1530 0.024 0.006 3.79 3500
Other certificate (=1) 0.164 0.012 1970 0.136 0.009 1530 0.028 0.012 2.25 3500
Regular State Certificate (=1) 0.791 0.013 1970 0.842 0.010 1530 -0.051 0.013 -3.86 3500
Leavers/Movers Stayers Difference
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Table 3.1.  Descriptive Statistics for Leavers and Movers versus Stayers, All Teachers (cont). 
Mean Std Err N Mean Std Err N Mean Std Err t-stat N 
Teacher Satisfied with Teaching at School 3.200 0.027 1970 3.526 0.020 1530 -0.325 0.027 -12.10 3500
Teacher Agreement School Run Well 2.805 0.027 1970 3.005 0.020 1530 -0.199 0.027 -7.33 3500
Teacher Agreement Thought of Transferring 2.309 0.032 1970 1.878 0.024 1530 0.431 0.032 13.46 3500
Teacher Agreement Teachers Enforce Rules 2.857 0.031 1970 2.947 0.023 1530 -0.090 0.031 -2.90 3500
Teacher Control over Teaching Technique 3.604 0.021 1970 3.647 0.016 1530 -0.043 0.021 -2.02 3500
Teacher Control over Materials 2.736 0.035 1970 2.810 0.026 1530 -0.074 0.035 -2.11 3500
Teacher Control over Disciplining Students 3.433 0.023 1970 3.516 0.017 1530 -0.083 0.023 -3.60 3500
Pct Students on Individual Ed Plan 0.421 0.013 1970 0.387 0.009 1530 0.034 0.013 2.65 3500
Pct Students Limited English Proficient 0.153 0.009 1970 0.132 0.007 1530 0.021 0.009 2.25 3500
Ave Class Size 21.944 0.410 1970 22.405 0.307 1530 -0.461 0.410 -1.12 3500
Percent Students on Free Lunch 0.436 0.010 1970 0.407 0.007 1530 0.030 0.010 3.01 3500
School is for Problem Children 0.017 0.004 1970 0.010 0.003 1530 0.007 0.004 1.87 3500
School has Admissions Requirements 0.113 0.011 1970 0.108 0.008 1530 0.005 0.011 0.45 3500
School has Teachers with No Classrooms 0.330 0.016 1970 0.369 0.012 1530 -0.039 0.016 -2.39 3500
Percent Students Hispanic 0.139 0.008 1970 0.144 0.006 1530 -0.006 0.008 -0.76 3500
Percent Students Black 0.203 0.009 1970 0.169 0.007 1530 0.034 0.009 3.69 3500
Percent Students Other Ethnicity 0.073 0.005 1970 0.049 0.004 1530 0.023 0.005 4.69 3500
Percent Teachers Black 0.100 0.006 1970 0.082 0.005 1530 0.018 0.006 2.86 3500
Percent Teachers Hispanic 0.046 0.004 1970 0.051 0.003 1530 -0.006 0.004 -1.25 3500
Percent Teachers Other 0.030 0.003 1970 0.018 0.002 1530 0.012 0.003 3.80 3500
School Schedule Block (=1) 0.418 0.017 1970 0.386 0.013 1530 0.033 0.017 1.95 3500
School 12 Month Schedule (=1) 0.067 0.008 1970 0.037 0.006 1530 0.030 0.008 3.88 3500
School has Interdisciplinary Teaching (=1) 0.398 0.017 1970 0.388 0.012 1530 0.010 0.017 0.58 3500
School has Team Teaching (=1) 0.401 0.017 1970 0.424 0.013 1530 -0.023 0.017 -1.35 3500
Urbanicity: City (=1) 0.301 0.015 1970 0.250 0.011 1530 0.050 0.015 3.30 3500
Urbanicity: Suburb (=1) 0.328 0.016 1970 0.400 0.012 1530 -0.072 0.016 -4.42 3500
Leavers/Movers Stayers Difference
 
They are less likely to be female.  They are more likely to be Asian, Pacific Islander, or American Indian 
(other minority ethnicity).  They are more likely to come from households earning under $50,000 per year and 
less likely to be from households earning over $75,000 per year.   
Leavers and movers are more inexperienced, and they have been teaching at their schools fewer years 
than stayers. They are more likely to be high school teachers and part-time teachers, and less likely to be in a 
union.  They earn less money than stayers, and they work roughly one hour less per week.  They are less likely 
to have a graduate degree.  They are more likely to be uncertified or holding a temporary, provisionary, or 
probational teaching certificate and less likely to hold a regular state teaching certificate.   
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     Teachers who leave or move are less satisfied teaching at their schools and do not believe the school 
is run as well as stayers do.  They are more likely to have thought about transferring, and they do not believe 
that other teachers enforce school rules.  They report having less control over determining their teaching 
techniques, choosing teaching materials, and disciplining students.   
     Leavers and movers appear to be from more challenging schools.  They teach more students who 
are limited English proficient, who are on an individual education plan, and who are on school lunch.  
Leavers and movers they are more likely to teach at a school specifically for problem children.  They leave 
schools with greater percentages of Black or other minority students.  Their peer teachers are more likely to 
be Black or other minority ethnicities.  They are less likely to be from schools with more teachers than 
classrooms.  They are more likely to leave schools with block scheduling or with a twelve month schedule.   
     Leavers and movers teach in more urban areas than stayers.  They are less likely to teach in suburban 
areas. 
     All in all, the descriptive statistics for all the teachers appear to confirm the findings of the literature 
on teacher attrition and the a priori expectations of this study.  That is, leavers and movers tend to have a 
greater opportunity cost of teaching.  They report dissatisfaction with their schools and a general lack of 
autonomy.  Furthermore, they teach in more challenging environments than stayers.   
 
3.5.2  Multinomial Logit Results 
 
     Table 3.2 presents the results of the multinomial logit model presented in section 3.  Following the 
analysis by Gross and DeArmond (2010), the model is estimated four times using different controls to 
illustrate how the study findings may change depending upon the controls included in the model.   
     The results in Table 3.2 are for all teachers, including new teachers and involuntary leavers.  For each 
specification, the reference category is stay (e.g., stay in same school as last year).  The first column represents 
the difference between leaving and staying and the second column represents the difference between moving 
(switching schools) and staying.   
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Table 3.2.  Multinomial Logit Estimates of Mobility for All Teachers
Leave Switch Leave Switch Leave Switch Leave Switch
Charter (=1) 0.0827 -0.2619 -0.0402 -0.2667 -0.0722 -0.2659 0.1833 -0.2154
(0.1993) (0.1798) (0.2048) (0.1820) (0.2202) (0.1965) (0.2439) (0.2098)
Most Competitive College (=1) 0.0829 -1.1304** 0.0048 -1.1497** 0.0057 -1.2425** -0.0782 -1.2817**
(0.4640) (0.5429) (0.4735) (0.5453) (0.4636) (0.5870) (0.4899) (0.6121)
Highly Competitive College (=1) -0.0581 -0.2942 -0.0554 -0.2929 -0.0956 -0.2803 0.2160 -0.0943
(0.2727) (0.2456) (0.2723) (0.2456) (0.2735) (0.2572) (0.3093) (0.2798)
Very Competitive College (=1) -0.2347 -0.2065 -0.2372 -0.2050 -0.2252 -0.1585 0.0787 0.0432
(0.1981) (0.1789) (0.1982) (0.1792) (0.2047) (0.1936) (0.2361) (0.2131)
Competitive College (=1) -0.3722** -0.3035* -0.3770** -0.3025* -0.4040** -0.3458** -0.1431 -0.1891
(0.1693) (0.1553) (0.1695) (0.1554) (0.1738) (0.1685) (0.2008) (0.1865)
Less Competitive College (=1) -0.0367 -0.1505 -0.0370 -0.1489 -0.0324 -0.1416 0.1626 -0.0245
(0.1792) (0.1659) (0.1791) (0.1660) (0.1836) (0.1781) (0.2065) (0.1924)
Graduate Degree (=1) 0.3035*** 0.0873 0.3089*** 0.0888 0.3535*** 0.1181 0.2775** 0.0446
(0.1047) (0.0946) (0.1054) (0.0946) (0.1100) (0.0993) (0.1171) (0.1030)
Years Teaching Total 0.0593** 0.0565*** 0.0646*** 0.0572*** 0.0578** 0.0509** 0.0462* 0.0477**
(0.0237) (0.0211) (0.0243) (0.0216) (0.0251) (0.0229) (0.0264) (0.0235)
Years Teaching Total Squared -0.0012* -0.0010* -0.0014** -0.0010* -0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0009
(0.0067) (0.0059) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Years Teaching at School -0.1113*** -0.1115*** -0.1114*** -0.1117*** -0.1192*** -0.1221*** -0.1216*** -0.1278***
(0.0231) (0.0212) (0.0231) (0.0213) (0.0242) (0.0228) (0.0253) (0.0235)
Years Teaching at School Squared 0.0032*** 0.0116** 0.0032*** 0.0016** 0.0035*** 0.0022*** 0.0036*** 0.0022***
(0.0008) (0.0076) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
High School (=1) 0.6156*** 0.0040 0.6023*** 0.0034 0.5874*** -0.0023 0.6927*** 0.0427
(0.0992) (0.0845) (0.0997) (0.0845) (0.1171) (0.1020) (0.1247) (0.1077)
Union Member (=1) -0.3095*** -0.3009*** -0.3087*** -0.3011*** -0.2884*** -0.2386** -0.1921 -0.2492**
(0.1059) (0.0942) (0.1060) (0.0942) (0.1080) (0.0994) (0.1220) (0.1113)
Part Time Teacher (=1) 0.4222* 0.0777 0.4083* 0.0769 0.4617** 0.2371 0.6059** 0.3775
(0.2171) (0.2165) (0.2186) (0.2159) (0.2286) (0.2246) (0.2581) (0.2464)
Log Yearly Earnings -1.1831*** -0.6494*** -1.1583*** -0.6499*** -1.1242*** -0.5998*** -0.4731* -0.0455
(0.0219) (0.1996) (0.2199) (0.1993) (0.2369) (0.2163) (0.2773) (0.2434)
Age 20-24 yrs (=1) -0.0523 -0.3037 -0.0584 -0.3047 0.1031 -0.2519 0.0848 -0.2981
(0.2573) (0.2093) (0.2560) (0.2090) (0.2565) (0.2246) (0.2713) (0.2297)
Age 25-29 yrs (=1) 0.3227 -0.1119 0.3392 -0.1112 0.3621 -0.1216 0.3139 -0.1729
(0.2830) (0.2191) (0.2811) (0.2190) (0.2824) (0.2324) (0.2980) (0.2382)
Age 30-34 yrs (=1) 0.0407 -0.0792 0.4017 -0.0786 0.4695 -0.0166 0.3831 -0.0804
(0.3322) (0.2608) (0.3310) (0.2610) (0.3307) (0.2737) (0.3482) (0.2805)
Age 35-39 yrs (=1) 0.4402 -0.3006 0.4403 -0.3018 0.4943 -0.2228 0.3174 -0.3431
(0.3452) (0.2740) (0.3443) (0.2739) (0.3456) (0.2876) (0.3633) (0.2946)
Age 40-44 yrs (=1) 0.3397 -0.4974* 0.3333 -0.4993* 0.4112 -0.4504 0.2876 -0.5331*
(0.3550) (0.2813) (0.3545) (0.2811) (0.3551) (0.2943) (0.3747) (0.3017)
Age 45-49 yrs (=1) 0.0862 -0.3225 0.0787 -0.3252 0.1142 -0.2283 -0.0429 -0.3274
(0.3617) (0.2765) (0.3619) (0.2764) (0.3622) (0.2906) (0.3805) (0.2971)
Age 50-54 yrs (=1) 0.1563 -0.4275 0.1472 -0.4301 0.2238 -0.2887 0.0443 -0.3934
(0.3594) (0.2777) (0.3591) (0.2775) (0.3589) (0.2926) (0.3794) (0.3015)
Age 55-59 yrs (=1) 0.1175 -0.7244** 0.1079 -0.7271** 0.2066 -0.5691* -0.0225 -0.6901**
(0.3674) (0.2916) (0.3669) (0.2914) (0.3672) (0.3061) (0.3871) (0.3108)
Age 60-64 yrs (=1) 0.6971 -0.9111 0.6954 -0.9152** 0.8747** -0.6180 0.5231 -0.8476**
(0.4312) 0.3948** (0.4293) (0.3947) (0.4308) (0.4138) (0.4487) (0.4138)
Female (=1) -0.2717** 0.0018 -0.2665** 0.0020 -0.2492** 0.0311 -0.1804 0.0805
(0.1073) (0.0981) (0.1078) (0.0982) (0.1119) (0.1028) (0.1192) (0.1061)
Other Ethnicity (=1) 0.2405 0.5801*** 0.2314 0.5823*** -0.0766 0.3676* -0.0327 0.3692*
(0.2136) (0.1786) (0.2134) (0.1785) (0.2435) (0.2040) (0.2614) (0.2070)
No. Children Under 5 0.2090** 0.0759 0.2140** 0.0747 0.2458*** 0.0930 0.2541*** 0.0818
(0.0846) (0.0770) (0.0847) (0.0770) (0.0873) (0.0815) (0.0900) (0.0827)
Got Divorced 0.0811 0.5620* 0.0746 0.5658* 0.2243 0.7099* -0.0632 0.6031*
(0.4171) (0.3390) (0.4144) (0.3394) (0.4205) (0.3635) (0.4488) (0.3433)
Household Income $100,000+ 0.1599 -0.2200* 0.1649 -0.2190* 0.1701 -0.2138 0.3111** -0.1378
(0.1381) (0.1288) (0.1387) (0.1288) (0.1442) (0.1333) (0.1538) (0.1375)
Certication: None (=1) 0.8263*** 0.1066 0.8463*** 0.1721 1.0278*** 0.3712
(0.2550) (0.2601) (0.2623) (0.2768) (0.2882) (0.2905)
Certification: Other  (=1) -0.0444 0.0068 -0.0084 0.0168 0.1984 0.1874
(0.1435) (0.1224) (0.1464) (0.1301) (0.1574) (0.1367)
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
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Leave Switch Leave Switch Leave Switch Leave Switch
Teacher Agrees Satisfied with Teaching at School -0.4632*** -0.2687*** -0.4500*** -0.2665***
(0.0747) (0.0687) (0.0789) (0.0698)
Teacher Agrees School Run Well -0.1135 0.0918 -0.1578* 0.0672
(0.0774) (0.0695) (0.0807) (0.0710)
Teacher Agreement Thought of Transferring 0.0490 0.5461*** 0.0234 0.5355***
(0.0629) (0.0548) (0.0650) (0.0560)
Teacher Agrees other Teachers Enforce Rules 0.0620 0.0440 0.0825 0.0455
(0.0614) (0.0534) (0.0630) (0.0547)
Teacher Has Control over Teaching Technique -0.0357 0.0314 -0.0402 0.0295
(0.0843) (0.0785) (0.0871) (0.0799)
Teacher Has Control over Material 0.0701 -0.0529 0.0411 -0.0570
(0.0520) (0.0460) (0.0547) (0.0475)
Teacher Has Control over Discipline -0.0355 0.0073 -0.0545 -0.0058
(0.0773) (0.0715) (0.0816) (0.0728)
Percent Students on IEP 0.1536 0.1771 0.2077 0.2216*
(0.1390) (0.1257) (0.1470) (0.1299)
Percent Students on LEP 0.2392 0.2309 0.2003 0.1841
(0.2017) (0.1853) (0.2171) (0.1960)
Ave. Class Size 0.0005 -0.0016 0.0009 -0.0032
(0.0042) (0.0038) (0.0043) (0.0040)
Percent Students on School Lunch -0.1353 0.0181 -0.2151 -0.0791
(0.2341) (0.1952) (0.2642) (0.2120)
Percent Students Hispanic -0.0008 -0.1279 0.2939 0.1362
(0.3365) (0.3026) (0.4232) (0.3575)
Percent Students Black 0.2710 0.6295** 0.9414** 1.0292***
(0.3430) (0.2930) (0.3785) (0.3263)
Percent Students Other Ethnicity 1.7697*** 0.5490 0.8929 -0.0038
(0.4723) (0.4441) (0.5539) (0.5069)
Percent Teachers Black -0.2747 -0.5549 -0.6247 -0.7361*
(0.4578) (0.4075) (0.4929) (0.4198)
Percent Teachers Hispanic -0.7964* -0.6281 -0.6829 -0.4540
(0.4722) (0.4281) (0.5220) (0.4435)
Percent Teachers Other Ethnicity -0.9416 0.4010 -1.2881 0.2507
(0.7244) (0.6102) (0.9124) (0.6912)
School is for Problem Children (=1) -0.0529 0.0315 0.0158 0.0464
(0.4009) (0.3847) (0.4299) (0.4064)
School Has Admissions Requirements (=1) -0.2685* -0.1038 -0.1996 -0.0516
(0.1607) (0.1441) (0.1673) (0.1465)
School Has Teachers without Classrooms (=1) -0.3334*** -0.1535 -0.2720** -0.0918
(0.1050) (0.0957) (0.1118) (0.1001)
School Has Block Scheduling (=1) 0.1399 0.0013 0.0653 0.0104
(0.0979) (0.0889) (0.1058) (0.0935)
School Has 12 Month Schedule (=1) 0.5727** 0.6743*** 0.5201** 0.5626***
(0.2392) (0.2009) (0.2493) (0.2045)
School Has Interdisciplinary Teaching (=1) 0.1235 0.1544* 0.0856 0.1538
(0.1029) (0.0938) (0.1110) (0.0962)
School Has Team Teaching (=1) -0.0637 -0.1521* -0.0689 -0.1364
(0.1019) (0.0915) (0.1101) (0.0947)
City (=1) 0.0392 0.0631
(0.1488) (0.1342)
Suburb (=1) -0.0718 -0.0015
(0.1334) (0.1167)
State Effects & Urbanicity No No No No No No Yes Yes
Constant 11.660*** 7.4958*** 11.3484*** 7.4952*** 13.2614*** 6.3689*** 6.1439** 0.7648
(2.2723) (2.0816) (2.2856) (2.0813) (2.4924) (2.2424) (2.9094) (2.5573)
Observations 3500 3500 3500 3500 3500 3500 3500 3500
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Reference category is stay at school.  
Other controls include hours per week, Black or Hispanic ethnicity, number of family members, if the teacher got married between Dec 03 and Sept 04, marital 
status, household income categories under $100,000.  None of these were significant in the analysis. 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Table 3.2.  Multinomial Logit Estimates of Mobility for All Teachers (cont)
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     Included in Model I are teacher individual characteristics, including their demographic and household 
characteristics, as well as their teacher qualifications and characteristics.  The results of Model I indicate that 
charter teachers are not significantly more or less likely to leave teaching or to move schools than TPS 
teachers.  Furthermore, the results indicate that graduating from Most Competitive colleges decreases the 
odds of moving versus staying, with the relative odds being 0.323 times the odds of those graduating from 
Non Competitive colleges.  This translates to a decrease in the predicted probability of moving schools 
relative to staying by nearly 70%4 compared to those from Non Competitive colleges.   Teachers who 
graduate from Competitive colleges are less likely to leave or move versus to stay in their schools than 
teachers from Non Competitive colleges.  The odds of leaving for graduates of Competitive colleges are 0.69 
times the odds of leaving for graduates of Non Competitive colleges.  The relative odds of moving for 
Competitive graduates are 0.74 times the odds of the Non Competitive graduates.   
      Meanwhile, teachers with graduate degrees are more likely to leave teaching, with the relative risk of 
leaving increasing by a factor of 1.35 (a 35% increase in the predicted probability of leaving), than they are to 
stay in their schools.  They are not more likely to move schools than they are to stay.  Teachers with more 
experience appear more likely to leave teaching and to move schools, though this result is increasing at a 
decreasing rate and is somewhat surprising and quite small in magnitude.  With respect to years of teaching in 
their schools, those with more experience at their schools are more likely to stay versus to leave or to move.  
This result is increasing at an increasing rate. The magnitude of experience at their schools is larger than the 
magnitude of years of experience total, so the net effect appears to suggest that teachers with more 
experience at their schools and more total experience are more likely to stay in their schools versus leave and 
move. 
     High school teachers' relative odds are 1.85 times the odds of primary school teachers for leaving 
versus staying at their schools.  Teaching at a high school has no effect on the probability of moving versus 
staying.  These results are consistent with the literature on attrition.   
                                                          
4
 Transforming the estimates to odds ratios for interpretation, e^{-1.833}=0.306. Thus, graduating from a most 
competitive college leads to relative odds of moving versus staying are 0.306 times what they would be for a teacher 
graduating from a Non Competitive college. 
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     Union members are less likely to leave teaching compared to non-union members, and they are less 
likely to switch schools.  Part-time teachers appear more likely to leave teaching than to stay, but they are not 
more or less likely to move schools compared to full time teachers.  Teachers who earn more money are less 
likely to leave teaching and are less likely to move schools versus staying. 
     With respect to age, teachers who are 40-44 years old or who are 55-59 years old are less likely to 
switch schools versus to stay.  There is no age effect on the probability of leaving.   Females are less likely to 
leave teaching than males.  Teachers of other minority ethnicities are more likely to move schools than to 
stay.   
     With respect to household characteristics, the results indicate that for every additional child under 
age five that a teacher has, the relative odds of leaving teaching increases 1.23 times what they were before the 
additional child.  Teachers who divorced between December 2003 and September 2004 are more likely to 
switch schools. Finally, teachers from households earning more than $100,000 per year are less likely to 
switch schools than to stay, though they are not more likely to leave teaching. 
     In all, controlling only for teacher and demographic characteristics, the results suggest that charter 
teachers are not more or less likely to move schools versus to stay in their schools, and teachers from Most 
Competitive colleges are less likely to move schools.  The findings are consistent with the idea that those with 
a higher opportunity cost of teaching are more likely to leave teaching.  Furthermore, the results indicate that 
household characteristics do enter into teachers' mobility decisions. 
     Model II incorporates teacher certification status.  Certification requirements vary by state and by 
school type.  Some charter school teachers are not required to have a teaching certificate, while others are 
required to follow the same laws and requirements as traditional school teachers.  Controlling for teacher 
certification status, charter teachers remain no more or less likely to leave or to move schools versus staying 
compared with TPS teachers. Having no state certification increases the relative risk of leaving teaching by a 
factor of 2.28.  Certification status does not change the odds of moving schools versus staying.   The results 
for all other controls are similar to those from Model I.   
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     While teacher demographic characteristics may influence the mobility decision, school characteristics 
and teacher experiences at their schools matter as well.  Model III incorporates the school characteristics.  
There remains no difference in the mobility decisions of charter and TPS teachers. Teachers from Most 
Competitive colleges are even less likely to move schools versus stay.  Teachers graduating from Competitive 
colleges are less likely to leave teaching versus to stay, and they are less likely to switch schools as well.  The 
results for other teacher demographic and household characteristics are similar to the previous models.   
     The teacher experience variables indicate that teachers who are more satisfied with their jobs are less 
likely to leave teaching and are less likely to move schools than to stay in their schools.  Beliefs on how well 
the school is run does not affect the mobility decision in this specification.  Teachers who have thought about 
transferring are more likely to move schools than to stay in their schools. These results are consistent with the 
a priori expectations.  Interestingly, having control over teaching techniques, over choosing the materials for 
their courses, and over disciplining students does not have an effect on the mobility decisions.  These results 
are surprising given prior expectations. 
     Teachers appear more likely to move schools versus stay in their schools if their school has a larger 
percentage of Black students.  They are more likely to leave teaching if they teach in schools with a greater 
percentage of students of other minority ethnicity.  They are less likely to leave schools with greater 
percentages of Hispanic teachers. They are less likely to leave teaching if their school has admissions 
requirements, likely reflecting a school quality characteristic. They are also less likely to leave teaching if they 
work at a school that does not have enough classrooms for all of the teachers.  This finding is surprising, 
though it may reflect other attractive characteristics of the school.   
     Teachers who work at schools with 12 month schedules are more likely to leave teaching and to 
move schools versus to stay in their schools than teachers who do not face a 12-month schedule.  Teachers 
are more likely to move schools if their sending school has an interdisciplinary teaching focus, but they are 
less likely to move if their school has a team teaching environment.   
     Finally, geographic controls are included in Model IV.  Urban and rural areas serve different 
demographics, and the mobility decision may be influenced by school setting.  Also, since state laws dictate 
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the terms of teachers' contracts in both public and charter schools, state fixed effects must be included to 
capture the differences in laws between states.   
     The results from previous models are generally robust to adding the urbanicity controls and state 
fixed effects. The results in Model IV suggest that charter status does not enter into the teacher mobility 
decision.  Teachers graduating from Most Competitive colleges are less likely to move schools versus to stay 
in their schools compared to Non Competitive graduates.  These teachers have a relative risk of moving 
versus staying that is 0.28 times the relative risk of Non Competitive graduates of moving schools.  Graduates 
of Competitive colleges are no longer more or less likely to leave or switch schools compared to graduates of 
Non Competitive colleges.  Teachers who hold graduate degrees are more likely to leave teaching, with the 
relative odds of leaving increasing by a factor of 1.31 (31% increase in the predicted probability of leaving 
teaching) compared to those without a graduate degree.   
     The results for other teacher demographic controls are similar to those from previous models.  The 
most notable changes are that females are no longer less likely to leave and having a household income 
greater than $100,000 increases the probability of leaving.   
     With respect to teacher experience and school characteristics, again, the majority of the results are 
similar to those from Model III.  Having control and autonomy do not affect the mobility decision.  Teachers 
are more likely to switch schools if they taught in schools with greater percentages of students on an IEP. 
They are more likely to leave teaching and to move if they taught in schools that serve a greater proportion of 
black students. Other minority ethnicity is no longer significant in the ethnicity decision.  The percentage of 
teachers who are Hispanic no longer has an effect on the mobility decision.  Admissions requirements no 
longer effect the mobility decision, nor does interdisciplinary or team teaching.   
     All in all, charter status does not affect the teacher mobility decision in the full sample. Teachers with 
greater opportunity costs of teaching, those with graduate degrees or those who teach high school, are more 
likely to leave teaching.  Teachers from Most Competitive colleges are less likely to move schools versus stay.  
Teacher household characteristics continue to enter into the mobility decision. Investigating if these trends 
are the same for beginning teachers may help guide policymakers.    
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     This study reestimated the main model for new teachers who started teaching within 5 years and who 
have three or fewer years of teaching experience.  Again, the estimation added groups of controls at at time to 
illustrate how controls may influence findings.  The results are presented in Table 3.3.  The results are slightly 
different for newer teachers versus for the entire sample population.   
     In Model I, which only includes teacher demographics and household characteristics, it appears that 
charter teachers are more likely to leave teaching versus to stay in their schools by a factor of 2.13.  Including 
certification status, in Model II, the charter effect disappears.  Charter status continues to have no effect on 
the mobility decision in Model III, which includes school characteristics and teacher experiences and 
perceptions.  Once state fixed effects and urbanicity are included, the charter effect reemerges.  Hence, model 
specification may help explain the ambiguity in the literature 
    In the full specification (Model IV), for new teachers, those at a charter school have a greater relative risk 
of leaving teaching versus staying by a factor of 3.39 compared to TPS teachers.  There is no effect on the 
decision of moving or switching schools versus staying.  Also for new teachers, college competitiveness and 
graduate degrees do not appear to enter into the mobility decision, while they did for all teachers (Table 3.2).   
    Although they are relatively new to teaching, the more years of teaching experience, the less likely the 
teacher is to leave teaching.  Likewise, the more tenure at a school a teacher has, the less likely to switch 
schools the teacher is. Teaching at a high school increases the relative odds of leaving versus staying by a 
factor of 2.42  compared to primary school teachers.  Part time teachers are more likely to both leave teaching 
and to switch schools compared to full time teachers.  Teachers aged 25-29 and 35-39 are less likely to switch 
schools, while new teachers in their 40s are significantly more likely to leave teaching versus staying.  Hispanic 
teachers are more likely to switch schools versus stay compared to White teachers.   
    With respect to household characteristics, teachers who finalized a divorce are more likely to leave teaching 
than to stay at their schools.   New teachers from households earning in the $50,000-75,000 range are more 
likely to leave teaching than stay compared to those from households earning under $50,000. 
    Having no state certification increases the relative odds of leaving teaching versus staying by a factor of 
3.72.  Certification status has no effect on the odds of moving schools.   
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Table 3.3.  Multinomial Logit Estimates of Mobility for New Teachers
Leave Switch Leave Switch Leave Switch Leave Switch
Charter (=1) 0.7562** 0.1255 0.5538 0.1026 0.5148 0.0857 1.2204*** 0.3239
(0.3467) (0.3293) (0.3452) (0.3333) (0.4086) (0.3753) (0.4373) (0.4052)
Most Competitive College (=1) 0.6373 -0.2485 0.4706 -0.2546 0.7895 -0.3723 0.2537 -0.3008
(0.6165) (0.6596) (0.6513) (0.6622) (0.6918) (0.7076) (0.7260) (0.7899)
Highly Competitive College (=1) -0.2055 -0.0472 -0.1924 -0.0238 0.0123 0.0177 -0.2931 0.2901
(0.5244) (0.3689) (0.5114) (0.3698) (0.5295) (0.4224) (0.5975) (0.5020)
Very Competitive College (=1) 0.3055 0.1239 0.2925 0.1379 0.2977 0.1465 -0.0558 0.3236
(0.3776) (0.3131) (0.3787) (0.3141) (0.4270) (0.3547) (0.5047) (0.4436)
Competitive College (=1) -0.0705 -0.0021 -0.0592 0.0080 -0.1089 -0.0652 -0.4045 0.0171
(0.3394) (0.2743) (0.3419) (0.2749) (0.3777) (0.3168) (0.4539) (0.4061)
Less Competitive College (=1) 0.2828 0.1270 0.2972 0.1273 0.3601 0.1379 0.2369 0.3257
(0.3788) (0.3131) (0.3778) (0.3131) (0.4137) (0.3526) (0.4897) (0.4361)
Graduate Degree (=1) 0.1321 0.2097 0.1722 0.2152 0.2636 0.2347 0.0254 0.0521
(0.2794) (0.2199) (0.2889) (0.2202) (0.3236) (0.2340) (0.3545) (0.2667)
Years Teaching Total 1.4666* -1.2170* 1.4678* -1.2726* 0.9842 -1.2412 0.8102 -1.7214**
(0.8397) (0.7197) (0.8462) (0.7195) (0.9387) (0.7727) (1.0408) (0.8495)
Years Teaching Total Squared -0.3416 0.3592** -0.3302 0.3721** -0.2200 0.3673* -0.1955 0.4843**
(0.2111) (0.1784) (0.2126) (0.1785) (0.2363) (0.1919) (0.2606) (0.2110)
Years Teaching at School -1.3690*** 0.0699 -1.3574*** 0.0966 -1.0890* 0.2580 -1.2182* 0.6277
(0.5050) (0.5167) (0.5044) (0.5189) (0.6482) (0.5506) (0.6576) (0.6151)
Years Teaching at School Squared 0.2434** -0.0927 0.2337** -0.0998 0.1508 -0.1402 0.1781 -0.2088
(0.1100) (0.1214) (0.1098) (0.1224) (0.1485) (0.1281) (0.1453) (0.1445)
High School (=1) 0.7055*** -0.1514 0.6293*** -0.1519 0.6531** -0.0254 0.8871*** -0.0116
(0.2058) (0.1571) (0.2072) (0.1572) (0.2580) (0.1865) (0.2844) (0.2088)
Union Member (=1) -0.3929* -0.3147* -0.3953* -0.3132* -0.3274 -0.2350 -0.0152 -0.2549
(0.2169) (0.1693) (0.2165) (0.1696) (0.2311) (0.1810) (0.2767) (0.2234)
Part Time Teacher (=1) 0.5721 0.6671 0.4888 0.6825 0.8905 0.9413** 2.5143*** 1.7357***
(0.4648) (0.4382) (0.4825) (0.4391) (0.5440) (0.4726) (0.6935) (0.5999)
Log Yearly Earnings -1.6533** -0.5580 -1.6111** -0.5667 -1.7340** -0.6014 0.2253 0.5839
(0.6606) (0.4663) (0.6875) (0.4680) (0.8070) (0.5192) (0.9318) (0.6766)
Hours per Week 0.0009 0.0014 0.0018 0.0016 0.0015 0.0005 -0.0026 -0.0001
(0.0098) (0.0079) (0.0100) (0.0079) (0.0107) (0.0086) (0.0119) (0.0093)
Age 20-24 yrs (=1) 0.2515 -0.4122 0.2749 -0.4135 0.3562 -0.3715 0.5412 -0.4710
(0.3336) (0.2695) (0.3310) (0.2694) (0.3519) (0.2947) (0.4045) (0.3344)
Age 25-29 yrs (=1) 0.3785 -0.4650* 0.3977 -0.4597* 0.4195 -0.4261 0.6329 -0.6284*
(0.3328) (0.2651) (0.3288) (0.2650) (0.3602) (0.2873) (0.4130) (0.3363)
Age 30-34 yrs (=1) 0.4190 -0.5043 0.4283 -0.5015 0.4008 -0.4311 0.3400 -0.6399
(0.4692) (0.3758) (0.4692) (0.3769) (0.4964) (0.3954) (0.5423) (0.4476)
Age 35-39 yrs (=1) 0.6692 -0.7529* 0.6746 -0.7480* 0.6011 -0.7406 0.7729 -0.9871*
(0.5066) (0.4378) (0.5141) (0.4375) (0.5505) (0.4704) (0.6530) (0.5120)
Age 40-44 yrs (=1) 0.8786* -1.1320** 0.8894* -1.1336** 1.1075** -0.9182* 1.6045** -0.9125
(0.5248) (0.4864) (0.5320) (0.4871) (0.5646) (0.5269) (0.6272) (0.6029)
Age 45-49 yrs (=1) 1.3378** -0.5258 1.3701** -0.5092 1.2128* -0.4103 1.5247** -0.4923
(0.5766) (0.5148) (0.5762) (0.5150) (0.6252) (0.5538) (0.7452) (0.6197)
Age 50-54 yrs (=1) 0.2862 -0.6837 0.2755 -0.6818 0.4408 -0.5409 0.6981 -0.8001
(0.6874) (0.5954) (0.6889) (0.5963) (0.7111) (0.6100) (0.7584) (0.7251)
Age 55-59 yrs (=1) 0.7437 0.1412 0.7172 0.1534 0.6508 0.5856 1.1017 0.6786
(0.8582) (0.6184) (0.8579) (0.6240) (1.0101) (0.7115) (1.0019) (0.7584)
Age 60-64 yrs (=1) 1.9166* -15.2416*** 1.8306* -13.7737*** 1.9512* -12.5183*** 2.3522** -14.5463***
(1.0612) (0.9304) (0.9393) (0.8924) (1.0356) (0.8823) (1.1257) (0.9112)
Female (=1) -0.1825 -0.0896 -0.1760 -0.1029 -0.1592 -0.1709 0.0071 0.0013
(0.2162) (0.1840) (0.2198) (0.1853) (0.2354) (0.1983) (0.2713) (0.2272)
Black (=1) -0.4636 0.0293 -0.6130* 0.0374 -0.3086 0.0140 -0.4989 0.0988
(0.3495) (0.2580) (0.3605) (0.2585) (0.4531) (0.3494) (0.4774) (0.3872)
Hispanic (=1) 0.1289 0.3532 -0.0062 0.3358 0.0459 0.5343 0.0606 0.6562*
(0.4562) (0.3538) (0.4538) (0.3541) (0.5160) (0.3861) (0.5092) (0.3948)
Got Divorced 1.3445* 0.6381 1.3114* 0.6572 1.1926 0.8355 1.5885* 0.6843
(0.7662) (0.6922) (0.7171) (0.6923) (0.7503) (0.6836) (0.8290) (0.6906)
Household Income $50,000-$75,000 0.3992 0.1804 0.4370* 0.1817 0.4718* 0.2246 0.6020** 0.3148
(0.2448) (0.2086) (0.2435) (0.2083) (0.2621) (0.2238) (0.2918) (0.2374)
Certication: None (=1) 1.0878*** 0.0526 1.0630*** 0.0666 1.3145*** 0.2673
(0.3370) (0.3349) (0.3728) (0.3574) (0.4235) (0.3793)
Certification: Other  (=1) 0.1175 -0.1017 0.0549 -0.1218 0.3733 0.1372
(0.2092) (0.1628) (0.2243) (0.1731) (0.2768) (0.1987)
Model IVModel I Model II Model III
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Table 3.3.  Multinomial Logit Estimates of Mobility for New Teachers (cont)
Leave Switch Leave Switch Leave Switch Leave Switch
Teacher Agrees Satisfied with Teaching at Schl -0.5420*** -0.3763*** -0.6757*** -0.4634***
(0.1495) (0.1327) (0.1725) (0.1458)
Teacher Agrees School Run Well -0.1592 0.1142 -0.3538* 0.0618
(0.1771) (0.1423) (0.1964) (0.1537)
Teacher Agrees Thought about Transferring 0.1511 0.5678*** 0.1067 0.5712***
(0.1366) (0.1100) (0.1463) (0.1211)
Teacher Agrees other Teachers Enforce Rules -0.2006 0.1539 -0.1873 0.1869
(0.1310) (0.1045) (0.1395) (0.1151)
Teacher Has Control over Teaching Technique -0.3622* 0.0618 -0.4522** 0.0334
(0.1868) (0.1625) (0.2026) (0.1756)
Teacher Has Control over Material 0.0534 -0.1451 0.0239 -0.1538
(0.1091) (0.0902) (0.1197) (0.0995)
Teacher Has Control over Discipline -0.0314 0.0869 0.0129 0.1025
(0.1632) (0.1394) (0.1794) (0.1462)
Percent Students on IEP 0.2440 0.1657 0.3589 0.2065
(0.3069) (0.2345) (0.3373) (0.2621)
Percent Students on LEP 0.9271** 0.0788 0.6947 -0.0264
(0.4385) (0.3938) (0.4761) (0.4272)
Ave. Class Size -0.0046 -0.0126* -0.0022 -0.0145*
(0.0092) (0.0073) (0.0092) (0.0083)
Percent Students on School Lunch 0.0718 0.2115 0.0105 0.2055
(0.4828) (0.3793) (0.5495) (0.4363)
Percent Students Hispanic -0.0815 0.2442 0.5165 0.5151
(0.6957) (0.5575) (0.9125) (0.7303)
Percent Students Black -0.0700 0.4406 0.5866 1.2588*
(0.7264) (0.5604) (0.8182) (0.6530)
Percent Students Other Ethnicity 0.4088 -0.5724 -1.2796 -2.1263**
(0.9260) (0.8202) (1.0763) (1.0272)
Percent Teachers Black -0.5760 -0.7171 -1.0883 -1.2337
(0.9223) (0.7808) (0.9309) (0.8323)
Percent Teachers Hispanic -1.2936 -0.7302 -1.2285 -1.0578
(0.9481) (0.6381) (1.0094) (0.6991)
Percent Teachers Other Ethnicity -0.5805 -0.0920 1.6053 1.3087
(1.2517) (1.0934) (1.4823) (1.6303)
School is for Problem Children (=1) 0.0156 -1.6982** -0.0842 -2.1744**
(0.6889) (0.8652) (0.7277) (1.0186)
School Has Admissions Requirements (=1) -1.0078*** -0.1963 -0.9412*** -0.0598
(0.3374) (0.2516) (0.3528) (0.2733)
School Has Teachers without Classrooms (=1) -0.6004*** -0.1817 -0.5356** -0.1382
(0.2265) (0.1800) (0.2492) (0.1985)
School Has Block Scheduling (=1) -0.0260 0.0740 -0.0826 0.2000
(0.2077) (0.1677) (0.2455) (0.1858)
School Has 12 Month Schedule (=1) 0.6855 0.5472 0.6433 0.4307
(0.5243) (0.3630) (0.5049) (0.3624)
School Has Interdisciplinary Teaching (=1) -0.0846 0.0810 -0.2299 0.0443
(0.2333) (0.1792) (0.2682) (0.1934)
School Has Team Teaching (=1) 0.1062 -0.1274 0.2574 -0.0681
(0.2205) (0.1694) (0.2455) (0.1841)
City (=1) -0.2606 -0.4545
(0.3187) (0.2794)
Suburb (=1) -0.1716 -0.0951
(0.2995) (0.2452)
State Effects & Urbanicity No No No No No No Yes Yes
Constant 15.5126** 7.5099 14.8758** 7.6486 20.2854** 7.0587 1.8768 -3.8002
(6.7827) (4.8666) (7.0471) (4.8838) (8.4336) (5.5306) (9.7538) (7.0362)
Observations 970 970 970 970 970 970 970 970
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Reference category is stay at school.  
Other controls include hours per week, Other ethnicity, number of family members, number of children under 5, if the teacher got married between Dec 03 
and Sept 04, marital status, household income categories above $75,000.  None of these were significant in the analysis. 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
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     School culture and experiences appear to matter more to newer teachers than they did to all teachers.  
Teachers who report being more satisfied with teaching are more likely to stay in their schools and are less 
likely to leave teaching or to move schools.  Teachers who report greater satisfaction with how well their 
school is run are also less likely to leave teaching versus to stay.  Teachers who agree more with the statement 
that they have thought about transferring are more likely to switch schools versus stay.   
     Autonomy matters to new teachers.  Increases in the perceived amount of control teachers have in 
their classrooms over choosing their teaching techniques is associated with a decrease in the odds of leaving 
versus staying by a factor of 0.64.   
     Newer teachers are less likely to move schools versus stay if they have larger classes, though this 
effect is quite small and is significant at the 10% level.  They are more likely to leave schools with larger 
percentages of black students, and they are less likely to leave schools with larger percentages of Asian, 
American Indian, or Pacific Islander students.   
     New teachers who teach at schools for problem children are less likely to move schools versus to 
stay.  These results may reflect that some teachers enjoy working with higher risk students. Similarly, the 
results suggest that teaching at a school with admission requirements decreases the odds of leaving teaching 
compared to staying.   Teachers who teach at schools with more classrooms are also less likely to leave 
teaching.   
     Thus far, the results suggest that among all teachers, charter status does not have an effect on teacher 
mobility. Teachers with a greater opportunity cost of teaching are more likely to leave teaching.  Among new 
teachers, those teaching at a charter school are more likely to leave teaching.  Newer teachers are also more 
sensitive to autonomy and control in their classrooms.   
     So far, the analysis has focused on all teachers, regardless of why they left or switched schools.  
Included in these teachers are those who voluntarily moved schools or left teaching as well as teachers who 
were forced to due to a school staffing action (e.g., lay off, unrenewed contract).   Assuming schools act in 
their own best interest, it may be informative to examine what influences the decisions of voluntary leavers 
and movers.    
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 Table 3.4 presents the multinomial logit results for all voluntary leavers and movers. The results 
indicate that again, model specification matters.  For Models I through III, it appears that charter teachers are 
less likely to switch schools versus to stay in their school; however, including the geographic controls, charter 
status no longer has an effect on the mobility decision.  Teachers from Most Competitive colleges are less 
likely to move schools versus to stay in their current schools.  Teachers who have graduate degrees are more 
likely to leave teaching than to stay compared to those without a graduate degree.   In general, teachers with a 
greater opportunity cost of teaching are more likely to leave teaching, including those who may have greater 
possibilities outside of teaching (those who teach high school, those who make less money, or those who 
have a graduate degree) and those who have more household responsibilities (e.g., more younger children).   
     Table 3.5 presents the results for new teachers who voluntarily leave.  Again, the results are similar to 
the previous analysis with a few exceptions. In the full specification, teaching at a charter increases the odds 
of leaving versus staying by a factor of 3.04 compared to TPS teachers.   Teachers who hail from Very 
Competitive colleges are more likely to switch schools versus those from Non Competitive colleges.   
Previously, college competitiveness did not affect teacher mobility among new teachers.  Another notable 
difference is that married and divorced teachers are less likely to leave teaching than their single counterparts.   
     While charter status does not appear to matter in the full sample of leavers and movers, it does enter 
into the decision for new teachers. College competitiveness appears to affect the likelihood of moving 
schools but not of leaving teaching. 
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Table 3.4.  Multinomial Logit Estimates of Mobility for All Voluntary Leavers/Movers
Leave Switch Leave Switch Leave Switch Leave Switch
Charter (=1) -0.1816 -0.3339* -0.2806 -0.3421* -0.3497 -0.3646* 0.0119 -0.1451
(0.2257) (0.1941) (0.2321) (0.1953) (0.2500) (0.2132) (0.2766) (0.2316)
Most Competitive College (=1) 0.0152 -1.0717* -0.0649 -1.0929* -0.0094 -1.1003 0.0413 -1.2830*
(0.5100) (0.6038) (0.5100) (0.6066) (0.4874) (0.6755) (0.5202) (0.7218)
Highly Competitive College (=1) -0.0300 -0.4497 -0.0241 -0.4472 -0.0382 -0.4082 0.2869 -0.2477
(0.2944) (0.2766) (0.2934) (0.2764) (0.2960) (0.2902) (0.3411) (0.3190)
Very Competitive College (=1) -0.1781 -0.1594 -0.1763 -0.1579 -0.1503 -0.0981 0.1096 0.0721
(0.2152) (0.1955) (0.2152) (0.1956) (0.2231) (0.2124) (0.2571) (0.2385)
Competitive College (=1) -0.3186* -0.2153 -0.3231* -0.2150 -0.3312* -0.2487 -0.1043 -0.1552
(0.1850) (0.1695) (0.1849) (0.1696) (0.1899) (0.1852) (0.2197) (0.2092)
Less Competitive College (=1) 0.0314 -0.1037 0.0289 -0.1027 0.0438 -0.0927 0.1924 -0.0322
(0.1961) (0.1815) (0.1957) (0.1816) (0.2003) (0.1964) (0.2251) (0.2165)
Graduate Degree (=1) 0.3443*** 0.1254 0.3487*** 0.1259 0.3823*** 0.1661 0.3089** 0.0898
(0.1141) (0.1018) (0.1149) (0.1018) (0.1194) (0.1082) (0.1280) (0.1129)
Years Teaching Total 0.0631** 0.0694*** 0.0634** 0.0688*** 0.0542** 0.0584** 0.0398 0.0584**
(0.0263) (0.0232) (0.0269) (0.0239) (0.0274) (0.0256) (0.0289) (0.0265)
Years Teaching Total Squared -0.0010 -0.0014** -0.0011 -0.0014** -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0013*
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Years Teaching at School -0.1064*** -0.1018*** -0.1073*** -0.1024*** -0.1131*** -0.1123*** -0.1141*** -0.1184***
(0.0249) (0.0229) (0.0250) (0.0230) (0.0260) (0.0247) (0.0274) (0.0257)
Years Teaching at School Squared 0.0031*** 0.0015* 0.0031*** 0.0015* 0.0033*** 0.0021** 0.0034*** 0.0023**
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
High School (=1) 0.6544*** 0.1088 0.6460*** 0.1091 0.6282*** 0.1119 0.7006*** 0.1381
(0.1087) (0.0916) (0.1090) (0.0916) (0.1280) (0.1119) (0.1364) (0.1181)
Union Member (=1) -0.3683*** -0.4238*** -0.3588*** -0.4216*** -0.3573*** -0.3628*** -0.1868 -0.2753**
(0.1134) (0.1002) (0.1136) (0.1002) (0.1155) (0.1070) (0.1304) (0.1185)
Part Time Teacher (=1) 0.3592 -0.1790 0.3545 -0.1734 0.3843 -0.0088 0.4930* 0.1452
(0.2410) (0.2454) (0.2426) (0.2448) (0.2531) (0.2524) (0.2832) (0.2713)
Log Yearly Earnings -1.1429*** -0.7549*** -1.1341*** -0.7571*** -1.0919*** -0.7151*** -0.4142 -0.0907
(0.2380) (0.2146) (0.2396) (0.2140) (0.2567) (0.2335) (0.3015) (0.2604)
Age 30-34 yrs (=1) 0.5546 0.1321 0.5484 0.1308 0.6206* 0.1942 0.5352 0.1738
(0.3533) (0.2850) (0.3514) (0.2851) (0.3518) (0.3062) (0.3718) (0.3171)
Age 35-39 yrs (=1) 0.5417 -0.1146 0.5439 -0.1154 0.5975 -0.0312 0.3939 -0.1278
(0.3679) (0.2987) (0.3664) (0.2987) (0.3682) (0.3204) (0.3871) (0.3319)
Age 40-44 yrs (=1) 0.2398 -0.3496 0.2446 -0.3486 0.3192 -0.3178 0.1895 -0.3617
(0.3807) (0.3078) (0.3796) (0.3076) (0.3808) (0.3291) (0.4033) (0.3420)
Age 45-49 yrs (=1) 0.1312 -0.2435 0.1347 -0.2439 0.1672 -0.1520 0.0054 -0.2087
(0.3857) (0.3034) (0.3848) (0.3034) (0.3842) (0.3254) (0.4029) (0.3363)
Age 50-54 yrs (=1) -0.0350 -0.2635 -0.0363 -0.2647 0.0416 -0.0975 -0.1638 -0.1853
(0.3899) (0.3025) (0.3893) (0.3023) (0.3882) (0.3269) (0.4093) (0.3418)
Age 55-59 yrs (=1) -0.2532 -0.5741* -0.2443 -0.5742* -0.1501 -0.3862 -0.4725 -0.4787
(0.3994) (0.3207) (0.3991) (0.3206) (0.3977) (0.3407) (0.4209) (0.3528)
Age 60-64 yrs (=1) 0.3918 -0.6340 0.4071 -0.6362 0.6327 -0.3516 0.2673 -0.5337
(0.4752) (0.4177) (0.4748) (0.4175) (0.4769) (0.4555) (0.4954) (0.4697)
Female (=1) -0.2979** 0.1159 -0.2957** 0.1153 -0.2995** 0.1459 -0.2792** 0.1890
(0.1165) (0.1071) (0.1170) (0.1072) (0.1218) (0.1125) (0.1310) (0.1172)
Other Ethnicity (=1) 0.1854 0.5689*** 0.1961 0.5722*** -0.0175 0.2789 0.0351 0.2537
(0.2379) (0.1937) (0.2361) (0.1934) (0.2640) (0.2246) (0.2884) (0.2346)
No. Children Under 5 0.2546*** 0.1017 0.2594*** 0.1010 0.2953*** 0.1282 0.3123*** 0.1297
(0.0909) (0.0819) (0.0911) (0.0819) (0.0927) (0.0876) (0.0973) (0.0891)
Got Divorced -0.2237 0.6450* -0.2320 0.6475* -0.0472 0.8573** -0.3521 0.8084**
(0.5019) (0.3490) (0.4981) (0.3490) (0.5059) (0.3750) (0.5329) (0.3646)
Household Income $100,000+ 0.1720 -0.1417 0.1787 -0.1412 0.1960 -0.0998 0.4072** 0.0369
(0.1516) (0.1385) (0.1522) (0.1384) (0.1581) (0.1442) (0.1698) (0.1497)
Certication: None (=1) 0.7384** 0.1344 0.7837*** 0.2296 0.9999*** 0.4210
(0.2886) (0.2897) (0.3011) (0.3137) (0.3345) (0.3323)
Certification: Other  (=1) -0.1528 -0.0423 -0.1043 -0.0108 0.1576 0.1969
(0.1593) (0.1370) (0.1618) (0.1472) (0.1766) (0.1557)
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
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Leave Switch Leave Switch Leave Switch Leave Switch
Teacher Agrees Satisfied with Teaching at School -0.4541*** -0.2167*** -0.4389*** -0.2148***
(0.0805) (0.0741) (0.0855) (0.0760)
Teacher Agrees School Run Well -0.1015 0.1152 -0.1519* 0.0939
(0.0842) (0.0764) (0.0884) (0.0786)
Teacher Agrees Thought about Transferring 0.0375 0.6320*** 0.0091 0.6215***
(0.0676) (0.0598) (0.0707) (0.0613)
Teacher Agrees other Teachers Enforce Rules 0.0405 0.0292 0.0513 0.0205
(0.0667) (0.0577) (0.0686) (0.0592)
Teacher Has Control over Teaching Technique -0.0248 0.0618 -0.0157 0.0450
(0.0912) (0.0861) (0.0958) (0.0880)
Teacher Has Control over Material 0.0386 -0.0574 0.0140 -0.0505
(0.0559) (0.0507) (0.0592) (0.0523)
Teacher Has Control over Discipline 0.0010 -0.0328 -0.0172 -0.0422
(0.0835) (0.0768) (0.0893) (0.0780)
Percent Students on IEP 0.1471 0.1322 0.2223 0.1959
(0.1510) (0.1366) (0.1610) (0.1428)
Percent Students on LEP 0.0948 0.2794 0.0649 0.2532
(0.2184) (0.2008) (0.2349) (0.2158)
Ave. Class Size 0.0009 -0.0018 0.0011 -0.0032
(0.0045) (0.0040) (0.0047) (0.0042)
Percent Students on School Lunch -0.2447 0.0104 -0.4850* -0.0954
(0.2560) (0.2118) (0.2915) (0.2316)
Percent Students Hispanic 0.0312 -0.1905 0.6394 0.0547
(0.3614) (0.3379) (0.4542) (0.4135)
Percent Students Black 0.3401 0.6491** 0.9000** 1.0022***
(0.3767) (0.3146) (0.4193) (0.3535)
Percent Students Other Ethnicity 1.7729*** 0.7915 1.2212* 0.5181
(0.5410) (0.4960) (0.6346) (0.5688)
Percent Teachers Black -0.4708 -0.4940 -0.5666 -0.7452
(0.4970) (0.4407) (0.5365) (0.4571)
Percent Teachers Hispanic -0.6332 -0.6388 -0.4647 -0.4081
(0.5191) (0.5006) (0.5827) (0.5257)
Percent Teachers Other Ethnicity -1.3679 0.8393 -2.2629* 0.2981
(0.9635) (0.6812) (1.1682) (0.7535)
School is for Problem Children (=1) -0.1061 0.2626 -0.0660 0.2883
(0.4648) (0.4036) (0.5107) (0.4386)
School Has Admissions Requirements (=1) -0.1680 -0.1623 -0.0738 -0.1108
(0.1704) (0.1576) (0.1763) (0.1620)
School Has Teachers without Classrooms (=1) -0.3497*** -0.1786* -0.3223*** -0.1125
(0.1141) (0.1039) (0.1224) (0.1097)
School Has Block Scheduling (=1) 0.0908 -0.0231 0.0030 -0.0046
(0.1065) (0.0971) (0.1170) (0.1037)
School Has 12 Month Schedule (=1) 0.5607** 0.6612*** 0.4865* 0.5346**
(0.2632) (0.2238) (0.2759) (0.2326)
School Has Interdisciplinary Teaching (=1) 0.1011 0.1715* 0.0616 0.1772*
(0.1102) (0.1022) (0.1198) (0.1060)
School Has Team Teaching (=1) -0.0990 -0.1018 -0.0978 -0.0700
(0.1099) (0.1001) (0.1202) (0.1042)
City (=1) 0.0244 0.0982
(0.1623) (0.1464)
Suburb (=1) -0.0123 0.0381
(0.1459) (0.1292)
State Effects & Urbanicity No No No No No No Yes Yes
Constant 10.7868*** 7.8627*** 10.6831*** 7.8923*** 11.7972*** 6.1108** 5.4211* 0.2316
(2.4797) (2.2417) (2.4974) (2.2390) (2.7247) (2.4654) (3.1626) (2.7329)
Observations 3050 3050 3050 3050 3050 3050 3050 3050
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Reference category is stay at school.  
Table 3.4.  Multinomial Logit Estimates of Mobility for All Voluntary Leavers/Movers (cont)
Other controls include ages 20-24 and 25-29,  hours per week, Black or Hispanic ethnicity, number of family members, if the teacher got married 
between Dec 03 and Sept 04, marital status, household income categories under $100,000.  None of these were significant in the analysis. 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
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Table 3.5.  Multinomial Logit Estimates of Mobility for All New Voluntary Leavers/Movers
Leave Switch Leave Switch Leave Switch Leave Switch
Charter (=1) 0.4490 0.1410 0.2267 0.0999 -0.0463 0.0506 1.1139** 0.3607
(0.3959) (0.3574) (0.4015) (0.3582) (0.4920) (0.4072) (0.5561) (0.4374)
Most Competitive College (=1) 0.8886 0.3909 0.6648 0.3770 1.2115 0.5507 1.0842 0.7271
(0.7257) (0.7306) (0.7436) (0.7351) (0.8600) (0.8440) (0.9131) (0.9261)
Highly Competitive College (=1) 0.0854 0.0354 0.1357 0.0402 0.3309 0.1932 -0.1412 0.4743
(0.6184) (0.4404) (0.6093) (0.4435) (0.6312) (0.4903) (0.7307) (0.5993)
Very Competitive College (=1) 0.7088 0.5422 0.7232 0.5445 0.7220 0.7324* 0.3507 0.9095*
(0.4657) (0.3775) (0.4702) (0.3808) (0.5252) (0.4228) (0.6511) (0.5393)
Competitive College (=1) 0.1684 0.4044 0.2151 0.3989 0.1592 0.4392 -0.2330 0.4908
(0.4378) (0.3387) (0.4427) (0.3425) (0.4842) (0.3796) (0.5902) (0.4944)
Less Competitive College (=1) 0.3957 0.4691 0.4409 0.4542 0.4045 0.5441 0.1448 0.7328
(0.4839) (0.3869) (0.4846) (0.3896) (0.5271) (0.4295) (0.6411) (0.5362)
Graduate Degree (=1) 0.4632 0.4171 0.5151 0.4238* 0.6568 0.5077* 0.5720 0.2693
(0.3273) (0.2566) (0.3430) (0.2574) (0.4107) (0.2788) (0.4551) (0.3132)
Years Teaching Total 1.6015 -1.6690** 1.5256 -1.7517** 1.2737 -2.2153** 0.9652 -2.6745***
(0.9798) (0.8485) (0.9805) (0.8463) (1.0984) (0.9050) (1.2536) (0.9860)
Years Teaching Total Squared -0.4152* 0.4857** -0.3883 0.5055** -0.3307 0.6304*** -0.2603 0.7512***
(0.2480) (0.2090) (0.2486) (0.2090) (0.2781) (0.2246) (0.3138) (0.2441)
Years Teaching at School -1.3288** 0.0250 -1.3018** 0.0417 -1.5096** 0.1673 -1.7214* 0.3526
(0.6104) (0.5233) (0.6094) (0.5269) (0.6880) (0.5766) (0.8938) (0.6862)
Years Teaching at School Squared 0.2512* -0.0881 0.2444* -0.0946 0.2642* -0.1313 0.3075 -0.1674
(0.1353) (0.1193) (0.1357) (0.1207) (0.1529) (0.1315) (0.2064) (0.1627)
High School (=1) 0.9795*** -0.1090 0.9198*** -0.1055 0.7992** 0.0250 1.1758*** 0.0283
(0.2450) (0.1804) (0.2457) (0.1804) (0.3107) (0.2158) (0.3569) (0.2464)
Union Member (=1) -0.5589** -0.5360*** -0.5582** -0.5323*** -0.6427** -0.4785** -0.0941 -0.4706*
(0.2509) (0.1935) (0.2505) (0.1935) (0.2744) (0.2114) (0.3409) (0.2575)
Part Time Teacher (=1) 0.5762 0.0724 0.5026 0.0962 0.7155 0.1796 2.6315*** 0.8827
(0.5399) (0.5192) (0.5654) (0.5182) (0.6658) (0.5522) (0.8106) (0.7029)
Log Yearly Earnings -1.9460** -1.0090* -1.9916** -1.0183* -2.3433** -1.0574* 0.2147 0.2975
(0.8833) (0.5587) (0.9437) (0.5641) (1.1367) (0.6273) (1.2779) (0.8268)
Age 20-24 yrs (=1) 0.5908 -0.0631 0.6292 -0.0577 0.7038* -0.0020 0.9729** -0.0741
(0.3836) (0.3057) (0.3828) (0.3050) (0.4116) (0.3335) (0.4862) (0.3690)
Age 25-29 yrs (=1) 0.6074 -0.2709 0.6319* -0.2579 0.5685 -0.2116 0.8689* -0.4146
(0.3753) (0.3008) (0.3699) (0.3013) (0.4149) (0.3280) (0.4871) (0.3769)
Age 30-34 yrs (=1) 0.5811 -0.2245 0.6615 -0.2124 0.6751 -0.0854 0.6529 -0.2961
(0.5444) (0.4297) (0.5448) (0.4320) (0.5692) (0.4621) (0.6572) (0.5173)
Age 35-39 yrs (=1) 0.9773* -0.7955 0.9935* -0.7686 1.0871* -0.6350 1.2329 -0.9325
(0.5858) (0.5008) (0.5969) (0.5001) (0.6419) (0.5377) (0.7869) (0.5920)
Age 40-44 yrs (=1) 0.8821 -0.9848* 0.9269 -0.9722* 1.0364 -0.7709 1.7530** -0.7322
(0.6319) (0.5764) (0.6365) (0.5760) (0.6986) (0.6332) (0.7651) (0.7131)
Age 45-49 yrs (=1) 1.5970** -0.8948 1.6536*** -0.8879 1.6046** -0.7768 2.1043*** -1.0173
(0.6360) (0.5949) (0.6326) (0.5950) (0.6642) (0.6357) (0.8073) (0.6799)
Age 50-54 yrs (=1) 0.9068 -0.4453 0.9239 -0.4588 1.1179 -0.4569 1.1616 -0.6760
(0.8113) (0.7058) (0.8184) (0.7030) (0.7992) (0.7743) (0.9738) (0.9080)
Age 55-59 yrs (=1) 0.9242 -0.2515 0.9752 -0.2311 0.6923 0.0218 0.6470 0.0384
(0.9640) (0.7442) (0.9745) (0.7597) (1.0056) (0.7789) (1.0381) (0.8479)
Age 60-64 yrs (=1) 1.5669 -13.0758*** 1.7191 -13.1015*** 0.8324 -11.8311*** 0.7554 -12.3516***
(1.1552) (0.9019) (1.1318) (0.9114) (1.0108) (0.8942) (1.2766) (0.9854)
Black (=1) -0.5938 0.0340 -0.7380* 0.0319 -0.2851 -0.0350 -0.5393 0.0682
(0.4062) (0.2886) (0.4200) (0.2908) (0.5267) (0.3955) (0.5542) (0.4495)
Married Dec. 2003 -0.4744 -0.0007 -0.4763 0.0066 -0.5519* -0.1552 -0.8067** -0.2544
(0.2994) (0.2540) (0.3021) (0.2540) (0.3334) (0.2754) (0.3985) (0.3168)
Separated/Divorced Dec. 2003 -0.8752 0.0964 -0.8590 0.1116 -1.1631** -0.1506 -1.5556*** -0.3842
(0.5365) (0.4176) (0.5322) (0.4146) (0.5504) (0.4451) (0.5809) (0.4775)
Household Income $50,000-$75,000 0.5438* 0.0744 0.5366* 0.0729 0.5758* 0.0894 0.8651** 0.2513
(0.2847) (0.2488) (0.2842) (0.2489) (0.3078) (0.2672) (0.3477) (0.2835)
Certication: None (=1) 1.1953*** 0.1721 1.2207*** 0.1923 1.7305*** 0.3662
(0.4015) (0.3889) (0.4719) (0.4195) (0.5557) (0.4576)
Certification: Other  (=1) 0.0819 -0.1559 -0.0217 -0.1672 0.4115 0.1328
(0.2442) -0.1904 (0.2679) (0.2041) (0.3514) (0.2395)
Model IVModel I Model II Model III
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Leave Switch Leave Switch Leave Switch Leave Switch
Teacher Agrees Satisfied with Teaching at School -0.4490*** -0.2832* -0.6173*** -0.3744**
(0.1703) (0.1546) (0.2104) (0.1676)
Teacher Agrees School Run Well -0.2170 0.2739* -0.4514* 0.2059
(0.2113) (0.1632) (0.2498) (0.1840)
Teacher Agrees Thought about Transferring 0.2357 0.7483*** 0.1316 0.7756***
(0.1561) (0.1309) (0.1704) (0.1498)
Teacher Agrees other Teachers Enforce Rules -0.3256** 0.0702 -0.3601** 0.1124
(0.1577) (0.1197) (0.1731) (0.1294)
Teacher Has Control over Teaching Technique -0.6265*** 0.1107 -0.7552*** 0.1211
(0.2116) (0.1906) (0.2371) (0.2069)
Teacher Has Control over Material 0.1581 -0.0174 0.1656 0.0065
(0.1372) (0.1045) (0.1517) (0.1189)
Teacher Has Control over Discipline 0.1362 -0.0886 0.1670 -0.1446
(0.1978) (0.1582) (0.2164) (0.1672)
Percent Students on IEP 0.4399 -0.0430 0.5448 -0.0521
(0.3591) (0.2794) (0.4189) (0.3201)
Percent Students on LEP 0.9930** -0.0589 0.6431 -0.3360
(0.4878) (0.4444) (0.5181) (0.4944)
Ave. Class Size -0.0041 -0.0154* -0.0053 -0.0231**
(0.0106) (0.0086) (0.0109) (0.0104)
Percent Students on School Lunch -0.5362 0.0808 -1.1197* 0.0548
(0.5960) (0.4240) (0.6736) (0.4755)
Percent Students Hispanic 0.2002 0.5585 1.3813 0.6357
(0.7800) (0.6308) (1.0508) (0.8437)
Percent Teachers Black -1.0511 -0.7328 -1.5370 -1.0776
(1.2040) (0.7923) (1.2684) (0.8460)
Percent Teachers Hispanic -1.1352 -1.0706 -1.1729 -0.9065
(1.1060) (0.8106) (1.3293) (0.8757)
Percent Teachers Other Ethnicity -3.1018 0.3377 -2.2433 1.8416
(3.0941) (1.5369) (3.9905) (1.7611)
School is for Problem Children (=1) -0.1846 -2.3138** -0.3236 -2.6116**
(1.0396) (1.0144) (1.0802) (1.1509)
School Has Admissions Requirements (=1) -0.6971* -0.1585 -0.5777 0.0011
(0.3902) (0.2815) (0.4028) (0.3099)
School Has Teachers without Classrooms (=1) -0.5366** -0.3223 -0.4612 -0.2159
(0.2614) (0.2077) (0.2955) (0.2258)
School Has Block Scheduling (=1) -0.1312 0.1575 -0.2791 0.2849
(0.2448) (0.1967) (0.3046) (0.2186)
School Has 12 Month Schedule (=1) 0.2184 0.3922 0.4032 0.1938
(0.7113) (0.4342) (0.7237) (0.4178)
School Has Interdisciplinary Teaching (=1) -0.4236 -0.0909 -0.4695 -0.2001
(0.2651) (0.2102) (0.3141) (0.2304)
School Has Team Teaching (=1) 0.2632 -0.1055 0.3709 0.0171
(0.2542) (0.1980) (0.2970) (0.2123)
City (=1) -0.4366 -0.4854
(0.4049) (0.3331)
Suburb (=1) -0.2616 0.1256
(0.3613) (0.2874)
State Effects & Urbanicity No No No No No No Yes Yes
Constant 15.5126** 7.5099 17.5120* 11.7088** 25.8742** 10.7333 2.4448 -2.0362
(6.7827) (4.8666) (9.7265) (5.8935) (12.0127) (6.6379) (13.4520) (8.5799)
Observations 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Reference category is stay at school.  
Other controls include hours per week, female, Hispanic or other ethnicity, number of children under 5, number of family members, if the teacher got 
married or divorced between Dec 03 and Sept 04, marital status, household income categories above $75,000.  None of these were significant in the 
Table 3.5.  Multinomial Logit Estimates of Mobility for All New Voluntary Leavers/Movers (cont)
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
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3.5.3  Marginal Effects 
 
     While it is informative to understand how charter status and college competitiveness affect mobility 
decisions in general, it is also informative to analyze the marginal effects of these variables.   Given the 
previous analysis on model specification, this study estimated the average marginal effects for the full 
specification (Model IV) for all four populations: all teachers, new teachers, all voluntary movers and leavers, 
and new voluntary leavers and movers5.   
     The average marginal effects for the variables of interest are presented in Table 3.66.  Charter status 
does not have an effect on the mobility decision for all teachers nor for all voluntary leavers and movers.   
For new teachers, the average marginal effect of teaching at a charter school decreases the probability of 
staying in the school by roughly 11.0 percentage points, and it increases the probability of leaving by nearly 
11.9 percentage points.  Among new teachers who voluntarily left teaching or switched schools, teaching at a 
charter school increases the probability of leaving teaching by 9.6 percentage points.  It no longer significantly 
affects the probability of staying.  These results suggest that while new charter teachers are more likely to 
leave teaching, some of this effect is due to school staffing issues.  That is, the marginal effect appears bigger 
for all new teachers, including those who were forced to attrit, than it is for those teachers who voluntarily 
left.  This may reflect that charter schools are exerting their power to control staffing and to choose to keep 
those teachers who are the better fit for their schools.  A caution in this finding, however, is that among those 
who were forced to attrit, it is unclear if these teachers would have chosen to stay, leave, or switch schools 
regardless of the school's decision.   
                                                          
5 The average marginal effects were calculated for all models for all populations and are available upon request. 
6 The average marginal effects for all other controls and variables are available upon request.  
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Table 3.6.  Average Marginal Effects of Multinomial Logit of Mobility for Variables of Interest, by Sample 
Stay Leave Switch Stay Leave Switch
Charter (=1) 0.0118 0.0431 -0.0549 -0.1097* 0.1187*** -0.0089
(0.0380) (0.0325) (0.0360) (0.0662) (0.0426) (0.0654)
Most Competitive College (=1) 0.1612* 0.0809 -0.2422** 0.0237 0.0451 -0.0688
(0.0959) (0.0684) (0.1085) (0.1214) (0.0759) (0.1332)
Highly Competitive College (=1) -0.0054 0.0392 -0.0339 -0.0201 -0.0490 0.0690
(0.0501) (0.0407) (0.0476) (0.0820) (0.0623) (0.0847)
Very Competitive College (=1) -0.0113 0.0087 0.0027 -0.0377 -0.0242 0.0619
(0.0380) (0.0313) (0.0364) (0.0716) (0.0524) (0.0746)
Competitive College (=1) 0.0340 -0.0078 -0.0262 0.0207 -0.0463 0.0256
(0.0331) (0.0263) (0.0316) (0.0653) (0.0471) (0.0684)
Less Competitive College (=1) -0.0097 0.0262 -0.0165 -0.0545 0.0084 0.0461
(0.0340) (0.0272) (0.0328) (0.0703) (0.0508) (0.0732)
Graduate Degree (=1) 0.0270 0.0384** -0.0114 -0.0080 -0.0001 0.0081
(0.0182) (0.0159) (0.0180) (0.0460) (0.0358) (0.0436)
State Effects & Urbanicity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3500 3500 3500 970 970 970
Stay Leave Switch Stay Leave Switch
Charter (=1) 0.0161 0.0107 -0.0268 -0.1063 0.0961* 0.0102
(0.0414) (0.0357) (0.0380) (0.0716) (0.0513) (0.0677)
Most Competitive College (=1) 0.1478 0.0853 -0.2332* -0.1498 0.0765 0.0733
(0.1069) (0.0706) (0.1215) (0.1401) (0.0860) (0.1455)
Highly Competitive College (=1) 0.0064 0.0558 -0.0623 -0.0505 -0.0358 0.0863
(0.0555) (0.0428) (0.0512) (0.0931) (0.0712) (0.0965)
Very Competitive College (=1) -0.0172 0.0110 0.0062 -0.1314 -0.0059 0.1373
(0.0413) (0.0327) (0.0386) (0.0832) (0.0633) (0.0861)
Competitive College (=1) 0.0265 -0.0051 -0.0214 -0.0475 -0.0458 0.0933
(0.0361) (0.0276) (0.0336) (0.0766) (0.0573) (0.0792)
Less Competitive College (=1) -0.0114 0.0292 -0.0177 -0.0982 -0.0186 0.1169
(0.0371) (0.0284) (0.0349) (0.0834) (0.0614) (0.0848)
Graduate Degree (=1) -0.0351* 0.0380** -0.0030 -0.0649 0.0455 0.0194
(0.0195) (0.0167) (0.0188) (0.0548) (0.0407) (0.0464)
State Effects & Urbanicity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3050 3050 3050 750 750 750
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Reference category for original multinomial logit is stay at school.  
Average marginal effects reported for Model IV specification. 
All Teachers New Teachers
All Voluntary Leavers/Switchers New Voluntary Leavers/Switchers
  
With respect to college competitiveness, among all teachers, the average marginal effect of graduating 
from a Most Competitive college increases the probability of staying in their schools by 16.1 percentage 
points and it decreases the probability of switching schools by 24.2 percentage points.  It does not 
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significantly affect the decision to leave.  Among voluntary leavers and movers, the average marginal effect of  
graduating from a Most Competitive college decreases the probability of moving schools by roughly 23.3 
percentage points.  The average marginal effects of college competitiveness are not significant for new 
teachers.  Therefore, it appears that teachers graduating from the top colleges are less likely to move schools 
than are teachers graduating from lower-ranked colleges.  This may be indicative of the fact that these 
teachers were able to find a better match with their schools as they may have been the most desirable teachers 
and able to choose their ideal schools.   
     Thus, the marginal effects indicate that among new teachers, teaching at a charter school increases 
the probability of leaving teaching by 9.6 to 11.9 percentage points.  Part of the attrition from charter schools 
may be charters exercising their ability to keep only teachers who are the best fit for their schools.  
Graduating from a better college does not affect the mobility decision of new teachers, but it significantly 
reduces the probability of moving schools by roughly 23 to 24 percentage points.  Furthermore, among all 
teachers, including voluntary and involuntary leavers, teachers graduating from a Most Competitive college 
are 16.1 percentage points more likely to stay at their current schools than to switch schools or to leave 
teaching.    
 
3.6  CONCLUSIONS 
 
     This study investigates teacher mobility in the public school system.  It attempts to clarify ambiguity 
in the literature. In particular, this study investigates attrition, as measured by leaving teaching and moving 
schools, in charter and public schools. It finds that different specifications of the model and different samples 
of teachers contribute to the ambiguity in the literature.  Household characteristics enter into the teacher 
mobility decision, though these are often overlooked in the literature.   
     In the fully specified model for all teachers, charter status does not affect teacher mobility.  Among 
new teachers, charter teachers are more likely to leave teaching versus to stay in teaching compared to 
traditional public school teachers.  The odds increase by a factor of 2.13 for all new teachers and by a factor 
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of 3.04 for new teachers who voluntarily leave.   A potential limitation to this analysis is that it treats all 
charter schools the same, although they do vary quite significantly, even from charter to charter within states.   
     The marginal effect analysis indicates that among all new teachers, the average marginal effect of 
teaching at a charter school increases the probability of leaving teaching by 11.9 percentage points.  
Meanwhile, among new teachers who voluntarily left, the average marginal effect of teaching at a charter 
increases the probability of leaving teaching by 9.6 percentage points.  The difference in the two rates may 
reflect charter schools exercising their freedom to let go of teachers that are not a good fit for their schools.   
     The marginal effect analysis also indicates that graduating from a Most Competitive college does not 
increase the probability of leaving teaching but it does reduce the probability of moving schools.  College 
competitiveness does not affect mobility decisions of new teachers.   
     In sum, charter status appears to affect the mobility decisions of new teachers, while college 
competitiveness affects decisions of more tenured teachers.  The multinomial logit results suggest that 
household characteristics do enter into teachers' mobility decisions, even though these characteristics are 
often ignored in the literature.  Furthermore, teachers who have the greatest opportunity costs of teaching are 
more likely to leave than those with lower opportunity costs.  These include high school teachers, teachers 
with graduate degrees, and teachers with greater responsibilities outside of the classroom (e.g., more children 
under the age of five).  Ambiguities in the literature are due to different model specifications and different 
teacher populations, including newer and older teachers as well as voluntary and involuntary leavers. 
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